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Women and knowledge: A study of eight doctoral students in the school of education, University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Wallace, Priscilla Provost, Ed.D.

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U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

WOMEN AND KNOWLEDGE: A STUDY OF EIGHT DOCTORAL STUDENTS IN THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO

by

Priscilla Wallace

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Approved by

H. Svi Shapiro
Dissertation Advisor

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Dissertation Advisor H. Svi Shapiro

Committee Members David C Purpel

Lois Mensart

Kathleen Casey

Patricia Sparkes

Sept 6, 1990
Date of Acceptance by Committee

Sept 6 1990
Date of Final Examination

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This paper concerns the relationships between women and knowledge. Beginning with traditional and contemporary definitions of knowledge and the socially constructed place along the margins of culture that women have assumed over time, it confronts the present day issues women encounter as they enter the public, professional realm of knowledge as graduate students and one day college professors. This analysis includes the nature of the academy as a bastion of male privilege and women's personal redefinitions of themselves as participants in academe. In the course of eight interviews with doctoral candidates, notions of what women know, what "women's knowledge" might to for the world, and what women seek in schooling as an alternative pedagogy emerge. The dissertation concludes with a schematic description of a new, amended curriculum.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Long before this paper was begun, I was seeking a way to make sense of the world that would satisfy my unnamed but painfully felt questions, doubts,and perceptions of injustice. Today, I have an understanding of those things, a template to place over the world that I was given through doctoral study at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro's School of Education, in the area of Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies. This template sets well with me but, beyond that, it is a flexible, organic lens that promises to change with time and experience; it promises to change as I do. At least today I have a starting point. It has been a gift of inestimable value, one that did not just fall into my lap, but was brought forth largely through the tireless and creative efforts of one man, my chairman, mentor and friend, Dr. Svi Shapiro. He did for me what we, in curriculum theory, contend that education at its best is supposed to do: he enabled me to formulate and tell my story through an understanding of a much broader context, the world-at-large. Lest I miss the forest for the trees, I begin with thanking him ("thanking" is such a puny word) for all that follows: my initial awareness, the focus of this dissertation, his faithful midwifing the thing into its final form, and the joy of his friendship. My only regret is that our meaty conversations were always cut too short to my liking; if there is a heaven, I shall one day find you Svi, prop myself against a tree, and have that part of eternity I need for hearing you in full. Meanwhile, I will never forget.

Without the enthusiastic participation of the women who consented to these interviews, this paper could not have been written. I thank them wholeheartedly but anonymously, as agreed.

Without the constructive advice of my committee, I would never have known how to ground and organize their narratives, and I am grateful to them for that direction, and to Dr. Kathleen Casey for so much more.

My Santa Fe friends sent me east with an order not to return until I "got smart"; so while I am not planning a trip home in the near future, I must thank them now, especially Sue Horning, in writing.

My comrades-in-arms here in Greensboro propped me up during the thick of the ordeal with their sympathies, much advice, cheap movies, and gallons of coffee, and I owe them a perfunctory knowledge of my computer if not my sanity. Jean Luce, you made it an adventure through knowing you.

Paychecks from Advantage Travel paid my rent during the last three years and even bought some of the groceries. I am indebted to the wonderful women who founded and manage this agency, not only for their interest in hiring graduate students, but also for their providing me with a warm, welcome place to be everyday.

Without Greensboro's Friends of Bill, I could not and would not be sober today, and so I offer my deepest gratitude to them, and to Dora P., for her sponsorship and special brand of experience, strength, hope, and love. It has formed a bond that time and distance cannot dissolve.

Lastly, I have finally come to know the fullest meaning of "home." For all that it is supposed to be, all that was made possible, and all that it promises in the future, I credit my Significant Other; only the two of us can appreciate what was accomplished, what is in progress, and what it has cost her. May she never regret her efforts, and be rewarded a hundredfold.

Melissa, this one's for you.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Retrospective

For the purpose of locating the writer of this dissertation for its reader, a few coordinates need be plotted: at this writing I am 48 years old; Caucasian, middle class, and female. My parents are dead, my children grown and gone, and I attend the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, unconnected to family. My roots are the Great American Southwest, and I spend my time here as an appreciative but homesick guest.

Responding to my own request for an intellectual autobiography, it is difficult to know where to begin and how to separate "intellectual" from social, emotional, moral, or spiritual. I wonder: when and where did I learn what; what and how was it synthesized; what small gleanings became crystallized as my truth? I know that my approach to learning and to life has been askew from the beginning: I was the apple of my father's eye and he was my best friend, my intellectual companion during those earliest years, a scholarly, radical man with a Harvard education, who lost his sanity by the time I was seven and, with it, all future contact with me. But by then any inclination I might have developed to accept social norms and conform to them had been aborted. He questioned everything he beheld in the world. My childhood energies were directed toward endless analyses of The Way Things Were, their inherent conflicts and contradictions. He established a tradition of critical, reflective thought from those conversations we shared so long ago that has continued with me to the present day.

I went to the movie and saw a wonderful, sad story about Uncle Remus. Afterward, there was a "newsreel." It gave me a stomach ache. It was about the refugees: thousands of them snaking through Europe, ragged old people bent over from bundles on their backs, women in head scarves and shapeless coats, skinny children with staring eyes, inching silently in a procession towards nowhere. I needed to pack up my doll house and crayons.

"What are you doing?" my mother is asking me.

"I'm sending my Christmas things to the refugees," I tell her.

"But I thought you loved your doll house and art supplies," she says, dismayed and hurt that I would give them away.

"I do. But in Sunday School we learned that Jesus said we must take all we have. . .the things we love the most. . .and give it to the poor. The refugee children don't have doll houses and colors. But you have to help me: I don't know how to address the box!"

To further distance me from the possibility of a cultural fit was the influence of my mother. She was a free-thinking, divorced school teacher whose one consuming love was music, one great regret that she had not pursued a life as a concert violinist. Yet, she managed to find her footing between the public demands of society and the private longings of her heart far better than I ever did or likely ever will. I never learned her secret, though I asked many times; she never understood the question. She said she tried not to think about things too much: she was not an intellectual but an artist.

She raised me in a small, Texas Bible Belt community during the '40s and '50s whose religion and social structure kept me a disgruntled observer at the margins of acceptance. Those years were a heyday for ladylike respectability, and the limits of gender assignments were severe. While other girls were going to Wednesday night

Prayer Meeting, learning to cook and to sew, and practicing the arts of deportment and appearance (which included shopping, dressing, and sitting properly), I was reading books, wading barelegged in a stream, writing short stories, nursing a sketchbook, playing sandlot softball with the boys, or sitting at the dinner table listening to our friends: artists and psychics and other social renegades who discussed reincarnation, homophobia, the War, grand opera, the plight of women, Mozart, the Kinsey Report, and the dangers of materialism. I learned early on the meaning of a double life.

During the day I was thrust into the evangelical training camp of the public schools, where I suffered the socio-religious machinations of the cultural caste system; in the evenings I returned to a nest of resistance. Within the schoolhouse itself I felt a rift between the ideas I encountered in history books and the occasional academic offerings of the teachers, and the social constraints that were perpetuated by class and gender rehearsal. It was a combination of the history and literature I received from schooling, the discussion at home of ideas relating to them, the expectations of my mother that I achieve at school, and my success with being a student that kept me interested and attending. Taken for granted at home as a fixture, and regarded at school as one of the "smart" ones, I was able to find a life in academia apart from the school's function as a social matrix for the others. Scholarship gave me an identity.

Loving the debate of ideas was (and frequently is) a double-edged sword. While it opened new worlds for me, it set me apart from my peers: other young girls who sat by me in classes and never knew their presence might connect them to thoughts beyond their cheerleading schedules or Elvis Presley. Our experience in school was completely different. I learned to keep my questions and musings to myself: if there were an intersection of time and space; if it were more important to do rather than to be; if women and men were "equal"; if war was moral; or why we went to church and felt that

it was better to give than to receive but tolerated slums in the east side of town. There was nothing about me that could compensate for this condition of serious moral and intellectual alienation: physically, I was a social disaster, plain, thin, bespectacled, and flat-chested; consequently, the prospect of attending the local high school held terrors for me and I enrolled in a Catholic High School instead (everyone knew that Catholic schools are geared to learning, and besides, Catholics were misfits in Baptist Gulch, too). There I fell in love with a sister (not to worry, I was assured; it's just a crush, just a phase, perfectly normal) whose treasured friendship is today intact, and became acquainted with the thinking of Thomas Aquinas and the formal structure of philosophized theology. This was school knowledge at its best. Definitions fit the world into little boxes. All that existed had been named. The task of the student was to become knowledgeable about the contents of the boxes, and he would know all the Truth of the universe and the solution to every dilemma. I had a way with this stuff. I emerged convinced that Great Men had answered every question that could ever be; that if I put my trust in them, tried hard to learn, and assimilated their thoughts, I would know the True Meaning of Life.

Prioritizing school knowledge over what I half perceived as my own experiential knowledge played a central part in my confusion about myself, learning and living. (I cannot help but look back at the tragicomic figure I must have been, a pimply teenage outcast in blue jeans, sitting crosslegged in bed munching an apple, glasses sliding down her nose, combing through books to find the significance of human experience rather than her own, and the formulas for moral courage and virtue.) But like the women I know in the 1950s and tried to emulate, I could not put the real struggles of my life in a sociological context of Justice.

Sister called me out of biology and talked to me in the hall about my essay and I was thrilled with a dream come true (I hated biology and loved Sister). She said, "You've written the best essay and I want you to rewrite it for competition. If you stay after school one day this week, I can help you with it."

I swooned. I would stay after.

"If we go to competition, you'll deliver the essay from memory, and that means learning it, rehearsing it, and polishing. . . ." Her voice drifted. "Of course, no girl has ever won it, even when the essay was superior. The Jesuits always groom some square-jawed, crew-cut boy with a bass voice and a command of their style, who takes first place every time on delivery alone. Still, I keep trying. . . . Let's just see how far we can go!"

In the end it was a senior girl of a poor family whom Sister took to competition and, as I recall, was awarded runner-up. (One of the brightest and most promising scholars I have ever known, she wound up The Other Woman in a love triangle with a married man, became pregnant and had an illegal abortion, was damned by the Church and robbed of aspirations of a college scholarship that would lead to middle class respectability.) The winner of the contest was some square-jawed, crew-cut boy with a bass voice and a command of the Jesuit style of public declamation.

After a year with the nuns, I obtained a scholarship to a girls' boarding school and was exposed to small classes, relatively sophisticated reading, rigorous assignments, and the blessed company of girls in sailor middies who were, for once, not in competition for the attentions of boys. (As an alumnus I have received recent notice that my boarding school will become coeducational as soon as the athletic and science facilities can be upgraded and expanded to accommodate male students. While the irony of that is not lost

on me, it is a greater sorrow that the safe haven I enjoyed from the storms of teenage society will no longer be available as a source of nurturance and liberation for girls who need an identity as well as an education. Consequently, I do not lend financial support to the new institution.)

Since we lived on the money my mother earned as a schoolteacher, my choices among colleges were limited. I began as a freshman in a state university, simultaneously working 3 campus jobs to pay off the notes my mother made at the beginning of each semester. After entering a convent in search of God and leaving it after a year in a cloud of confusion, I graduated from college with a baccalaureate degree in elementary education and certification in special education for the mentally retarded. From this course of study I had sought (and failed to find) the origins of human learning. My grades were mediocre but my mother was happy: she had guided me through an "education" that would give me "something to fall back on," in the event that anything might happen to the earning capability of a future husband. According to her plan, it was time for me to teach school, get married, and have children, (and in that order) to "pay back to society what I had taken out," meaning the experiences of taking flesh and participating in family. As so commonly happens, a male appeared at this juncture of my life plan and we were married long enough to produce one son and adopt another. In five years, I was divorced, working, raising children, and inching toward a masters degree that would enhance my paycheck. My mother had established more of a precedent than she realized.

My masters program was taken on in the spirit of a financial necessity. I had chosen to study the "emotionally disturbed," a popular euphemism given to the "mentally ill," "behavior disordered," or otherwise deviant children found in the school population. I learned how we categorize and medicate them. In the milieu of graduate school, I saved

my own sanity by taking classes that were "fun": Old Testament history, painting and drawing, creative writing, and art history. I wrote papers about psychic phenomena and prophecy, about the paintings of Friedrich and Turner, about the building program of the Emperor Constantine, while in my other lives I was attending faculty meetings, learning behavior modification systems, seeing that my whites were whiter than white, and selling snow cones at little league baseball games. Gnawing at my unconscious and my conscious mind was the immutable truth that, as always, I was "different" from other women in my turmoil: I was not "fulfilled," though I loved my children fiercely and worried a good deal about the long shadow of the future that fell over them. I was prey to several nebulous conflicts. Mothers who gathered around the swimming pool chatted companionably about their husbands and kitchens, while I felt that the less attention paid to mine, the better. No one was interested in my "fun" courses, my questions of life as I knew it, or how I regarded my lack of fulfillment. Something was wrong with me, and my aim was to keep this as deeply hidden as I could.

I found a solace from the tensions of loneliness and fear, the binding magic of alcoholic drinking. I ventured into a Dark Night of the Soul that only addicts know and wandered in its mist for several eternal years. As the expressed need for drunk mothers and schoolteachers had sunk to an all-time low, I became closetted with alcohol, quite as lost to myself as I was to my world. I suffered acutely and did not know why.

> Nothing I thought I knew makes sense, nothing works, all the answers are wrong. I don't know how to live in the world and suspect that I probably shouldn't. I am defective because the All-Powerful Cosmic Jester has made me a cripple to flop around for His amusement. All the Other is real and I am the unreal. The children need a mother I can't be and a life I can't give them. I can't understand and I can't try, anymore.

Shortly after finding sobriety, I came to terms with my sexuality (I have observed since, that the 30s are self-revelatory years for women: the children are on their feet, college loans are paid, marriage honeymoons are over, we become acclimatized to the very real conditions of our lives, and we pause to reflect upon who we are, if in part, and the direction we would go). That, too, was deviant by social norms, and provided yet another set of hurdles to meet. While undertaking those, I carried the secrets that I was and ever would be a recovering alcoholic, that I renewed my strength from the intimate company of women, and that teaching school was desultory, draining, and futile by nature. At 45, with the challenges of my 30s behind me (if not "solved"), I dropped out of the workforce to seek a Ph.D. at the University of New Mexico, this time in Gifted Education, with the hope that I might finally grasp an understanding of the mind and how it came to think. If I could know that, perhaps teaching children would have meaning and the maze of my own intellectualizing could be mapped.

The program at UNM was disturbing in its preoccupation with the nuts and bolts of graduate study and the business of education, but I hoped I would adjust to it in time as my apprenticeship progressed. It consisted of pleasing the graduate faculty and producing statistical research, involving a good deal of humble toadying and the intricate manipulations of numbers. Being restless and unencumbered by family or obligations, I discovered the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and transferred here. Six weeks after my arrival at this place my mother suffered a ruptured aneurysm in the brain, lapsed into a four-month coma, and died.

> When the blood blister burst in her head, the neurosurgeon said that she had to be delivered into his hands for a necessary surgery to "correct" the damage. The procedure would clamp off the clotted blister so that perhaps she could live out her remaining years normally. If she were not delivered into his hands, she

would live normally for no longer than a year and would surely die from a second rupture. This surgery was extremely successful, he assured me, with a mortality factor of only 5%.

By the time I arrived at the hospital, the initial effects of the trauma had subsided and my mother was conversant. I entered the ICU at 12:40, noon, and the surgery was scheduled for 1:00. My brother stood between me and my mother's bed for those 20 minutes and physically prevented me from talking to her, from asking if she wanted the operation, or from saying good-bye. They wheeled her away and the surgeon "prepped" us while the technicians "prepped" her, which amounted to medical gobbledygook passing between the two males while I asked feeble questions from the edge in shocked horror.

Four hours later I saw what had been my mother: the swollen, blotched, spasmodic caricature of a woman who was pronounced a surgical "success" by the physician (who was paid generously for his handiwork), a gasping hull that would lie insensate for four interminable months and never regain consciousness before her death. I returned to school and my brother, luxuriating in the glory of testicular authority, took everything from her house, sold her possessions, and disposed of her ashes secretly.

This we call "taking charge," "the miracle of modern medicine," "economy of time and motion," a son (not mentioned as the child who abused her all of his sodden life) exercising his rights of progenitor. Sometimes at night I dream of my mother in ICU. We've found a stolen moment together alone and she's lucid and I lean toward her and say, "Mommy, they're going to take away your brain. You've got to wake up, now, and tell them you want to go home!" And she holds my hand and smiles at me the smile I wanted all my life and nods with understanding,

and suddenly I'm screaming in a vacuum and there's no sound and the grisly chain of events that lead to her annihilation begins to take form like gathering storm clouds and I wake up and it's over, again, and too late.

The men chose (neither she nor I was allowed to discuss, decide) and went with the statistical odds and acted within the surgeon's "time frame." And so, like all the true Sons of Patriarchy who fear and detest the feisty old women who bore them, they snuffed her out and threw her to the winds; and, in doing so, efficiently dispelled any lingering notions I entertained about the existence of a God who gives a shit for what happens to us, the silenced. There was no Universal Goodness, there was no abiding companionship; there was only my boy standing there with me. He knew. He knows. He remembers.

By one of those strokes of good fortune that cannot be explained, I fell into the area of critical theory in the School of Education. It was a marriage made in heaven, at least from my point of view: for the first time in my life, my inclinations toward critical analyses of school and society were encouraged. I stumbled across feminism, which I had dismissed in the '70s as an angry protest that would only serve to render me more obnoxious. My general dissatisfaction with schooling and the world had been carefully examined by critical theorists and eloquently explained by fundamental, substantial reasons. I came to learn that my personal challenges and the anquish they produced echoed the sufferings of women, and politically powerless others, over the last 5,000 years that we know of; and that they could be understood through a thoughtful feminist critique of a patriarchal, liberalist, capitalist culture. I learned the importance of understanding my addiction and sexuality within a social context; that my lifelong recovery from alcoholism must include rational processes as well as faith. Given a poetic language and permission from my department, I have learned to speak of

myself as an artistic effort rather than a psychological or medical problem for science to solve.

> In my middle years with sobriety, when the honeymoon is over and we've become used to each other, she has become a metaphor for Life, for Destiny, for the Spirit, for Membership in Humanity. She is a living, breathing entity who whispers in my ear over the roar of battle: "I am always with you. Nothing you can say or do may change that, my love is so possessive. Rattle the bars of your cage, if it makes you happy; flirt all you wish with my old rivals; be unfaithful; but you will have me ever lurking at the edges of consciousness to claim you in the end, your first and great lover who will never let you go." I am resigned; I cannot break faith.

Having abandoned the God of my school days, I have developed an intimation, a suspicion of a Something that moves about me as a faceless, genderless current, catching me up unawares in its motion from time to time. If I turn to find it, like peripheral vision, it disappears. I am closest to it in the company of others who would also seek, who would greet my questions with a warm recognition. I am certain only that there is Something afoot; I know I would like to know more and am content that I might never.

I learned that Thomas Aquinas was an obese glutton who gave offense to would-be friends as a dinner guest by consuming great volumes of their food. I learned that Objective Truth is the product of one human mind building on the product of another human mind, and that the thought cannot be separated from the thinker. This being the case, my being and my knowledge count for something, regardless of their value to the world's Truth; further, I can understand some if its significance through my own experience, I can enjoy other parts of it as having no practical consequence at all, and I

can offer occasional personal insights about this Truth to others for their possible liberation, based on my confrontation with the world.

I am a feminist, though my experience is not that of Dorothy Dinnerstein, Madeline Grummet, Gloria Steinem, or Betty Freidan. It feels much the same to be looking out at life behind these eyes at 48 as it did at two. I gather the years to me and find that the one constant is and has been my consciousness through it all; so I question developmentalism. Must we, do we, can we become anything beyond the miracle we are at our birth? I wonder if the human race is a seamless tapestry of unique threads, some strong and vibrant, others thin and subtle, beautiful in their diversity and in their random placement in a pattern too close for us to see.

So I talk about these things to my friends with great tolerance: I am back to ideas, and these ideas are the dangerous sort that incite rebellion against the conditions of one's life. They are essentially unwelcome. As one has spent years coming to accept her role and what passed as "choices," many women indicate that it is best to let sleeping dogs lie. I wonder what I have done to myself by liberating and validating my mind, but it is a far happier concern than it once was because I am beginning to interpret with understanding and forgiveness. Today that interpretation seeks language, and with it will come peace.

The confusion that came about from mothering children returns in mothering adults. The nightmare they gave me of their adolescence is over; all grown up and respectable, now, they go off with other women to share their love and gentle humor. The boys are planning marriages and, six weeks before I plan to graduate, my grandchild will make her appearance in the world. I have shifted from daughter to grandmother in three short years and have not yet found an existential foothold in that space. But when did I ever?

In the evenings we walk the dogs, my landlady and I. It seems to be shaping them up. My charge stops to sniff every fireplug and I wait for her to identify her landmarks, taking the opportunity to glance at a rising moon and the glow of twilight over lawns and gardens. Enveloped in a reverie of my past, I think of this autobiography and want to discard it because it is likely tiresome, or trite. My advisor says, No, the dissertation is about you; it is you that must be written. I argue with him in my mind as Katy chases a cricket: I'm interested in interviewing women to develop my thesis, but what does MY life add to it? My advisor smiles. I remember his words.

"Easy to apply feminist principles to others. . . .Why can't you apply them to yourself?"

Why? Well, I just never thought of it. I never took it as worth the attention, as important, as relevant. And I think of my favorite snippet of the Scripture written by the evangelist Luke, in reference to the Mother of Jesus: "And Mary kept all these things and pondered them in her heart." Sweet Mary, who never raised hell, never spoke out, who suffered in silence, whose patriarchal description and place in religious mythology has offered a model of order-taking submission for all women to follow for 2,000 years, and I see I am her daughter at that. I would rather be Magdelene's, though, if I could choose. So I will try, not to "find voice," but to use the one that will do us all most good.

Response and Inquiry

My story presents, among other things, two primary metaphors that can be interpreted to illustrate the devaluation and ultimate destruction of women's knowledge and of women: my mother's brain surgery, which was performed upon her as an external assault by individual males acting within a popular social conscience; and my

alcoholism, which was self-induced and freely taken on (if in the initial stages) as my response in a dialogue with patriarchal culture. In the first instance, the fact that my mother's mind and its contents, her wisdom and knowledge, were so insignificant that they could be placed at risk by "those who knew," that her physical brain and her very person could be taken over the management by males deriving their authority from "science" and "birthright," that her remains could be thrown to the winds as a mere handful of dust, offer a personal illustration of the long, political history of women. When she was destroyed, all her knowledge disappeared, except what she left with me, the female child who grew up at her elbow and learned from her who I was, what it meant to be a woman, and what the world was all about. Her private dilemmas, her spirituality, her decisions, and her creativity were so inconsequential that the world took no notice of them and would have awarded no importance to them if it had. She was, in its eyes, another "nobody," whose inglorious role in life centered upon "fifth world activity" (Boulding, 1988): that is, sustaining and acculturating children, bolstering a few friends, running a household, lending time and energy to community projects, and supporting the economy. Dale Spender writes eloquently of the historical fate of women's public ideas under patriarchy (Spender, 1983), and the private story of my mother's contribution to the world and her destiny is but one among many: the personal is political. The fact that my wishes regarding her surgery were unwelcome and unheard adds an unsurprising dimension to the scenario: If one women's existence is so trivial as to be the stakes in a game of medical roulette, why would another woman's feelings about that be valued? My role, as well as the roles of other women involved (my aunt, who admonished me: "You must not cause a problem at the hospital, fighting with your brother," the ICU nurses, my mother's visiting friends) was to acquiesce, to further the process, to enable the surgeon and his minions to perform his services as he had decided

what they would be. The women did not decide: we put our energies to making the men's knowledge real. My need was to speak from my experience and intuition about my mother's life, her needs, and my knowledge of them, but I could not do so in the face of scientific theory and be heard. For one thing, I myself did not respect my knowledge sufficiently to voice it; it was given over to the superior forces of medicine and statistics. How can one's own knowledge and scientific theory be brought together for the best outcomes in human learning and practical situations?

Within our society, the most devastating effects of patriarchy appear most evident as its values team with other hierarchical systems, such as capitalism, sexism, liberalism, and education. Health service in this country embodies the worst of all worlds, wielding an authority over patients' lives that renders them powerless: hierarchy legitimates "power-over" (Ruether, 1975) as a paradigm; patriarchy supports the notion of a few men at the top; capitalism finds and pursues monetary profit in all our dealings with each other (Karl Marx said that the one thing capitalism had shown him was that there is nothing about the human being that could not be bought and sold); liberalism teaches alienation among persons and erodes community, so that one's motives and actions need serve only oneself; and education confers upon the decision-makers that right of office by virtue of endured rote schooling (degrees, certificates, diplomas) in the scientific tradition. Nowhere is there to be found an "ethic of care" (Gilligan, 1982), a view of the patient as intelligent determiner of her own well-being, or an assumption of community in life-and-death decisions occurring there. Addressing the multi-layered society we have created (the varieties of oppressed classes of people that result from the collusion of oppressive systems), and the remarkable resilience of a hegemonic patriarchy that is ever seeking new systems and forms through which to manifest itself (Eisenstein, 1984), contemporary feminism solidifies an antithetical

response to patriarchy, as the "intersection of gender, race, and class" (Weller, 1988). It must be so. Speculation on the possible fate of a sick old man serves to illustrate this intersection of power-oppression and feminism's focus upon it: because of the combined forces of capitalism, education, and patriarchal hierarchy, a weak male in my mother's position would fare little better than she; however, the lawyer who came to my brother's aid in procuring for him my mother's power of attorney would likely have hesitated before turning a father's life and goods over to a son. Patriarchy sometimes sanctions the control of weak men by stronger ones (Lerner, 1986), but it always ascribes the control of any woman by any man.

In the other instance, that of my alcoholism, I remain as baffled and curious about its causes as other recovering alcoholics and professionals working with the field of alcoholism. I am equally curious about the phenomenon of recovery itself. We observe that there are sociological, biological, familial, and personality factors accompanying the appearance of alcoholism in populations; we have no understanding of the active drunk's "hitting bottom" and being "restore(d). . .to sanity" (Alcoholics Anonymous, 1976); it appears that we understand destruction better than we understand construction. The statistics informing us that women are five times more likely to be addicted to chemicals than men (Daly, 1984), that cultures encouraging the ingestion of alcoholic beverages in large quantities (such as the Irish and Italians) and among the very young, and that economically depressed peoples in all societies (the Soviet working class, Hispanics, Native Americans, and the American poor), reflect some sociological influence upon the potential addict. Eisenbaum and Orbach (1983) report that women, given their identity by men, sense being trapped; that our anxiety is manifested in certain phobias (such as claustrophobia and agoraphobia) that become metaphors for the lager, more nebulous one; that we often seek to escape through the magic door of alcohol

and other drugs. This was part of my alcoholic psychology and it is through a feminist critique of gendering and the torturous dialogue between women and culture that I understand it, if partially, today.

At this juncture I must toy with a conflict that appears for me between critical social theory and my "recovery" program: like the child who grows up to criticize and accuse her mother, I took the gifts of nurturance and support from my program, gradually gained balance, and am now strong enough and clear-headed enough to find fault with it at fundamental levels. The basis of my antagonism is this: my program teaches that one's addiction springs from unknown causes, causes necessarily left unexamined. It conceptualizes alcoholism as a terminal illness that cannot be cured, but rather managed; recovery, as a life-long process that results in a continual "getting better." It sees the addict as a sick person whose defense against drunkeness is the development of personal strengths and the intervention of a "Higher Power." One's "slip" into alcoholic drinking is seen as the result of one's own choice, one's own fault, for which one bears total responsibility. Against this eventuality, one is advised to attend meetings of other alcoholics, to practice its principles in all one's affairs, and to pray to one's "Higher Power" for increased, continued protection.

Critical theory, on the other hand, views addiction as but one dysfunction created by a society that engenders alienation, despair, and suicidal behavior among its members. It observes that we have fashioned a world that many people do not want to, or cannot, live in, as its demands are oppressive and often impossible, incompatible as they are with the human spirit. Addiction is therefore socially constructed, as a by-product of our socially constructed world, and we will continue to see individual dysfunction as a microcosmic reflection of larger social dysfunction until the world is a freer, more nurturant place. For today, an alcoholic response to culture can be viewed as inevitable.

For now, the presence of chemical dependence in our society clearly indicates that something about our system is not working, and that something is of global proportions.

Radical feminists working in theology take issue with a "Higher" Power (Ruether, 1983; Soelle, 1974,; Starhawk, 1988; Wakeman, 1984) that Alcoholics Anonymous recommends to its members as a spiritual resource. These feminists describe power as arising from people in community as they come together to share their experience by speaking from the heart. It is a power-among, or a power with, rather than a power-over. Feminists are quite adamant in their contentions that the difference in this language is important, because it is from such language that our concepts of power and how it can be used emerge.

Where does this alternative view place prayer, meditation, and worship? Is there a "God" existing independently of Self to be sought and known? Is this God some power we discover together, or is it one we create together? To the addict directed to meditate privately and pray for protection and care, these questions assume a vital importance. I have no answers to them, and they will not go away. I attend my recovery meetings, caught in the crossfire between Postmodern interpretation that calls to me intellectually and recovery dogma which reminds me that it was the program that got me sober (though no one claims to know how) when all the intellectualizing and philosophizing and criticizing could not. I did plenty of that drunk; I am intensely interested that this not happen again.

It is the old experience-theory split nagging at me one more time, taking a new twist. Looking at my past for direction for my future, I know that plucking a theory from someone else's experiential knowledge to live by is dangerous to me, even to the ends of destruction and death. But both schoolhouse learning, recovery program dogma, and feminism fall into the theory category, and the obvious question becomes, Whose

knowledge is it that I would buy this time? What is mine, if fruitful living must be based on and powered by my own? And, lastly, where did I get it? My story is one in which the theme of betrayal recurs, betrayal of my experience by scholars' theory. It describes an endless effort to be at home in the world through certainty (scholarship) on the one hand, and connectedness (relationship) on the other, leading to wastelands of doubt and alienation. How may the experience-theory split be viewed and then bridged?

Acknowledging that many men have their own difficulties conforming to the character of patriarchal stereotypes (and one wonders why great numbers of them have not named their oppression and risen up in rebellion against it), all women face an alienation from the world of ideas simply because they were born female. Our choices seem to be to spend a lifetime "proving" that we can get into the men's game and play it just as well; to read the system and perform a feminine role that will bring us security in some measure of goods and prestige; or to vacillate between both positions without a language to understand our difficulties or chart our course. Without this langugae women are only vaguely aware that somehow we are at odds with the world's logic and that the fault undoubtedly lies with us.

My perception that we separate ourselves from what the world calls knowledge is most visible to me when I talk to my non-academic friends (read: minimally education and poorly paid) at home about my doctoral studies. They follow my progress with suspicion. One says, "I want to ask you what you're doing, but I probably can't understand it." Another says, "I never went on with a masters degree because I can't deal with theory." And another sympathizes, "I hope you don't get so caught up in ideas that you can't enjoy life anymore." One of the most intelligent and insightful women I have ever had the pleasure of knowing said to me, "Feminism? That's not for me! It's too angry!" She recently married a rich man and will not correspond with me anymore. The

choice to go back to school has cost me their companionship, the support that got me this far, and I feel that loss keenly. Why has that choice come down to the university, a matrix of ideas, and the world, where "real" things happen?

It is my observation, having talked with women over my lifetime, that we are generally more grounded (confined) in our daily experience than are men, and that we are resistant to the introduction of academic theory into conversation when we become aware of it. I wonder if this is the result of the public (professional) lives of women demanding performance rather than thought (nursing, teaching, factory work, secretarial jobs, child care, domestic work), coupled with the "fifth world activities" of our private (personal) lives; if so, a patriarchal, political dimension appears as an influential factor: keeping women in active, order-taking roles frees up the men to give the orders. On the other hand, there are women I have encountered who prefer to think about theory than the mundane chores of their lives. They constantly relate their immediate concerns to larger issues, described by other women as "out of touch" with the real world, living in an "ivory tower," or as a masculine in their interests and presentations. They "think like a man." If this observation is correct, they why? Do women fear that their hidden appetite for "intellectual" challenges will make them aggressive, knowledgeable, and masculine? Is it that the sorts of lives we live, by the politics of gendering, demand attention to mundane tasks and leave little opportunity for the exploration of ideas? Perhaps we are simply uncertain as to what "theory" is, put off by its scientific sound, actually engaging in it everyday. This being the case, the liberal notion of sameness, or equality, of the sexes emerges: it now becomes a matter of what is processed rather than how women do or do not think, who devised the theory, and how accurately it reflects lived experience.

Everyone's life makes some set of ideas (theory) interesting through relevance: it depends on what theory surrounding what issues and for what person. The ideas I have derived from my experiences teaching school or keeping house appeal to a limited audience; theories I have come to know and love regarding accommodation and resistance appeal to even fewer. But my experiences with alcohol always elicit as much discussion as I am willing to give them. What accounts for the difference? "Relevance" appears to be only a patial explanation (only a small percentage of the population has personal experience with alcoholism), as does "remoteness." Some ideas about ideas (remotely relevant) hold fascination for us and others about common daily experience (closely relevant) do not. There are no formulas governing interest, but only generalizations. The rule of thumb seems to be that ideas come from our dealings with the worlds we live in, and that we are more likely to find interest in ideas from others who live in those similar to ours, understanding that rules of thumb are not absolutes.

If women characteristically pull away from theory and theoretical interpretation, it could be our acquiescence to a long tradition that teaches both men and women that we are not capable of participating in it: that theorists are very smart men whose lives and thoughts are different from ours. We do not know what theory is and do not see ourselves as theory-makers. We see theory as something "up" there, having little or no connection to what we do in the world. What is the answer, then, that would liberate the minds of our women and enrich the world with the contributions they would make?

First, we can rethink the meaning of theory itself, coming to understand that it is empty without praxis. We can redefine knowledge, recognizing that it comes from experience, that it is as varied as those who produce it, that it is valid in the context of the knower, and that it can all lead to global study of problems and solutions. We can

revalue our notions of public and private arrangements so that they are integrated and intertwined to yield theory with experiential roots. In short, we can seek a healing of the mind-body split from both sides of the equation.

Dissertation

This dissertation seeks to examine the rift between experience and theory as it occurs in the lives of women. What difference does it make in the view(s) we have of ourselves and the plans we make for our future(s) as we approach scholarship? How can we educate women, and men, so that individual lives are enriched by choice and global problems are managed by a respect for human be-ing? I want to know what we learn, how we learn it, and how we regard our own knowledge, pursuing these questions in conversations with women who, like myself, have chosen to live in the public world of ideas. I want to know if my history as a thinker and its affect upon me as a woman constitute an isolated experience, or if others have encountered similar struggles by placing themselves in the academy, which I see as a bastion of patriarchal values, definitions, and processes.

The dissertation consists of five chapters, an appendix, and an afterword. Chapter One contains the previous autobiographical narrative that recounts something of my background, aspects of my nature and upbringing most relevant to this research, and reflections upon it. Emerging from the narrative are questions about the female experience, in and out of school, that I bring to feminist theory and feminist pedagogy.

Chapter Two traces traditional concepts of knowledge and some ways in which those concepts have been maintained over time. It introduces newer paradigms of learning, including recently presented dichotomies of male and female modes of thought, and ask these questions of feminist theory:

1. What are traditional concepts of knowledge, and where did they come from?
2. What is it about these concepts that has set knowledge part from women?
3. How have dichotomies of male and female ways of being and knowing come about, and how might they be viewed and implemented in education to benefit women and the planet?
4. How does schooling support gender differences for hegemonic power arrangements?

To answer these questions, traditional philosophers, learning theorists, social scientists, and feminist scholars writing within those disciplines are consulted. The politics of present day schooling are discussed and conclusions are drawn.

Chapter Three presents critical and feminist pedagogies. The nature of each is described through their respective philosophical underpinnings, concepts, responsibilities to culture, methodologies, curricula, outlooks, and goals. Following that, similarities and differences between the two are suggested form a feminist point of view.

Chapter Four outlines the research project undertaken to answer my initial questions. My suspicions are:

1. that women do regard scholarship as male in character, and that we have consistently separated our life-knowledge (experience) from school-knowledge (theory);
2. that women regard our experiential knowledge as not very important against historically revered "great" ideas, even though we find it more meaningful;

3. that pursuing advanced degrees in the academy causes conflict in women surrounding our self-descriptions, social and intimate relationships, and professional aspirations that must be dealt with somehow;
4. that aspiring to a public profession (college teaching) that handles knowledge as stock-in-trade requires women to redefine knowledge, theory, and scholarship as well as ourselves;
5. that choosing a life in academia presents barriers between us and the university, between us and others, both men and other women.

As procedure I will interview a small group (eight female graduate students studying in the area of "Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies"), generally described in this chapter, from the School of Education at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Included is a full statement of the purpose and content of this specialization as is published in the Proposal of April, 1988. It is made clear that our area demands programs of study for women during which we are forced to deal with ideas, with ourselves, and with our lives as thinkers. The women in our program as doctoral students are currently in the throes of this struggle. I seek information from interviewing them that supports or refutes my suspicions. The questions asked of these women are included in Chapter Four, an analysis of the impact of their individual characteristics ("variables") upon their political views, and a discussion of the themes that emerge from their narratives collectively.

Chapter Five provides a summary of the historical exclusion of women from what passes for knowledge, and a discussion of the theory vs. experience conflict. It will continue with a brief description of critical and feminist pedagogies as instruments of empowerment. Articulating the most important common themes emerging from women's narratives, it will conclude with implications for the future in terms of curriculum.

The Appendix begins with some objections to positivist research and the alternative put forth by feminists and other dissenters. It goes on to describe the research methodology that is used in this project, the phenomenological, interpretive method that feminists value and recommend, contending that information received in this manner could not be elicited through traditional, positivist means. The process itself serves as a praxis for both interviewed and interviewer, validating the experience of subjects and calling for a hermeneutic reflection that results in a changed or clarified perception on part of both. The Appendix follows with a brief discussion of Postmodern interpretation: what it seeks to do and why it is useful to us today. Next appears an argument for the legitimacy of oral history as a research paradigm, advocated by those scholars who use it (Casey, Lather, and Oakley), including something of the debate that ensues between traditional and phenomenological researchers. The Appendix makes it clear that I see my task as making sense of the sense others make of their experiences, which I understand to be the core of interpretive theory.

Throughout my life there as been a dual discourse running through my brain. I have assumed, falsely or otherwise, that everyone entertained such a dialogue by which she tried to make sense of things, usually involving what was taught as "truth" and what one experienced as true in her life. Unfortunately, this dissertation does not elucidate that possibility to the extent that I would like; all I can gather at the present time is that some people do this and others do not do it so much. Some of us took "objective truth" to heart and others were able to leave it at the schoolhouse door everyday, along with stacks of forgotten books, abandoning it as unworthy of much more attention than it had already been given. Nevertheless, I was one of those who took schooling very seriously, the knowledge of historic thinkers ringing in my ears as clearly as the commentary I made upon my own circumstances. Sometimes, when that voice speaks through this

dissertation, I have inset its words in blocks. It indicates a stepping back, or stepping inward, where some perspective on my juggling of competing knowledges may be achieved. But at all times, throughout the dissertation, the inner dialogue can be heard as I speak what I know and again what the world knows. I hope that this duality is made clear and that both voices may be accepted and understood by the reader.

As the underlying motive for writing this dissertation is the answering of my personal questions, it would be a partial effort if I did not reflect on it in some way. What has been clarified for me as a result of this project? Have my own questions been answered, and to what ends? In a short final note, I will describe my place in its completion, referring back to my place in the beginning. Hopefully, there will be a difference.

CHAPTER TWO

PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the meaning of knowledge from a feminist perspective. It begins with the origins of knowledge as a definable commodity, its place in present day ideology, its gendered characterization through ways of coming to know; it continues with its hegemonic, political valuation; it concludes with the "Canon Debate" that is presently raging within the discourse of academe, the demand by college professors for a definition of what counts for knowledge and therefore should be included in curricula as part of "Higher Education." This chapter describes the way people learn as put forth by John Dewey, and the romantic dichotomies of male and female modes of thought, as they are conceptualized by feminist theorists. It attempts to show that women have been and frequently still are set apart from some kinds of knowledge in Western culture.

Traditional Concepts of Knowledge

Knowledge is generated by the mind: "All knowledge is humanly constructed" (Mengert, class notes, Fall, 1987). In other words, knowledge is that which the mind produces rather than that which the mind aborbs; consequently, it seems to be more useful to us, and more interesting to me, to pursue the question of how knowledge accrues rather than the relative "truth" of one knowledge over another. Knowledge is the product of men's and women's thinking about things, whether individually, dialectically, or in relationship: it does not float in the atmosphere apart from human authorship or emerge from divine origins. How we've have come to regard knowledge itself is a history

of knowledge about knowledge, a definition that has changed from one age to another, dependent upon a society's political arrangements: its government, economics, social strata, distributions of power, and its needs. In short, a culture's interest in perpetuating itself legitimates those systems of thought (as well as religion, morality, aesthetics, human behavior, and any other field of human activity found within the culture) that support the social status quo. In retrospect, dramatic shifts among concepts of knowledge reflect redefined needs of a given society and indicate the directions in which that society would evolve.

From my perspective, then, knowledge in and of itself does not exist: it is always attached to something else, as "knowledge-about-X"; a theoretical circumstance or condition relative to some aspect(s) of the milieu of information available to and perceived by the human mind. At any given time, what is considered to be valid knowledge about anything is that which has been socially agreed upon as Truth. Those individuals who are in possession of this Truth are regarded as knowledgeable elite by their culture(s), and it stands to reason that such keepers of Truth serve the interests of themselves and the society that supports their position by defining knowledge as specialized and available to only a few. The continued operation of the national nuclear physics laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, serves as a case in point: having contributed to the war effort in the 1940s by developing the atomic bomb, the laboratory might well have closed in 1945 when World War II was over; however, Edward Teller, one of the principal physicists of the erstwhile Manhattan Project, appeared before the Congress of the United States and lobbied for the continuation of nuclear research at Los Alamos, now for "peaceful" uses. His request was granted and funded, and not in vain: Los Alamos produced the Strategic Defense Initiative, and Teller is known as the Father of Star Wars. Today the laboratory employs around 2,000

scientists and auxilary staff, as our country continues to support the need for war technology. Since we are convinced that warfare makes a likely appearance on our national agenda, and that winning wars involves a highly specialized knowledge to which only a few people have access, Teller dignifies both military strength and the role of science, dumping one in the lap of the other, by sharing his knowledge. This paradigm gains depth when the economy benefits from the production of war machinery, military and science personnel benefit by the validation of billions of dollars infused into their programs, the average citizen benefits from a tenuous sense of personal safety, protected by nuclear weaponry, politicians benefit by access to a public rhetoric proclaiming America's strong image before other nations, and Teller appears as a famous, brilliant man. This mutually advantageous arrangement is dependent upon the tacit understandings found in our "dominant ideology" that war is inevitable (if not necessary), that emerging victorious from wars results from updated scientific technology, and that scientific technology is so complex and difficult to understand that it is beyond the ken of the ordinary mind. Hence, knowledge about science become critically important, as do the few who have it.

(Where, if anywhere, do women and children appear in the Los Alamos story? Peggy Pond Church, local Santa Fe writer, recalls being a teenager when her hometown of Los Alamos was seized by the government (Church, 1959). The only facility there was a boys' school where her father, Ashley Pond, was headmaster. When the community became a laboratory for the Manhattan Project, the school was dismantled, the students shipped home, the teachers dismissed, and an enclosure was built around this remote village to insure maximum security. Ms. Church's book recounts the presence of a women, Edith Warner, who lived at the foot of the mountain, a penniless, Eastern refugee from the chaos of Philadelphia, who gave spiritual comfort to the beleaguered, bitter

citizens of Los Alamos and the Pueblo Indians nearby. She provided a haven for the scientists -- all men -- who found a way to her meager table for an ease of the pressures of their stressful work. As always, women stand at the edge of culture, creating from raw nature the materials it needs for its operations.[1] Her contribution to human beings who sacrificed their homes and their life work to the war effort is rarely acknowledge by chroniclers of the Los Alamos saga. Her contribution is not regarded as "knowledge" against the genius of creating a bomb.)

This specialization of knowledge, making it accessible to only a few, introduces the political nature of possession and injects political advantage into its definition: knowledge is a theoretical construct about X that benefits Y at the cost of Z. In the example cited above, the entire global community pays for our definition (and valuation) of knowledge about science, both now and in the future. Aside from the original, unhappily dispossessed residents of Los Alamos, whose town was literally purchased and appropriated by the United States government, and the American taxpayers, who are burdened by providing the lab with an operating budget and payroll, foreign populations will ostensibly suffer the effects of our war technology, present thinking about conflict resolution though violence is reinforced, and hegemonic notions of international power through externally-imposed might are further established for the tacit understanding of future generations in their dealings with each other. At this cost, knowledge (validation is assumed; non-knowledge is all that which is not validated) benefits the knower, some portion of society, and the cultural status quo, at the expense of those who do not know, another (and often much larger) portion of society, and the processes of social change in the future. Obviously, what has been considered to be the nature of knowledge is an integral part of particular cultures and their historical, inherited values -- an articulation of the meaning of specific cultural experience.

The specialized, political nature of knowledge as we have come to regard it excludes masses of people, notably all children. In our culture, children cannot know, unless we count those prodigious few among them who are able to accurately parrot information already established by adults, or mimic artistic forms. Schools become training grounds for acculturating the young into what we have determined as True, their insights and interpretations seen as primitive or incomplete. As we know them, schools exist to empower certain students to make a contribution to the status quo. Only since the Middle Ages has it been thought that a human being (man) was partially developed without a formal education; that his natural state was insufficient without schooling. Since we believe that today, children necessarily become the least powerful among us and the least important, comparable in status to the elderly and infirm. They are physically weak and control no wealth of their own, consumers in a capitalist society that values production. We reflect our impatience with them as a necessary evil, or another burden placed upon us by the poor, by our refusal to provide adequate day care for working mothers, by our penurious funding of aid to children in any form, by our scandalous physical abuse of them in record numbers, and by our withholding quality education to all through competition. Since women have been the caretakers and nurturers of the young since the Neanderthal caves, it seems possible that, through forced association, the value of women and women's knowledge becomes insignificant, relegated to the same shallow pool as that of children.

Philosophers and Philosophies

In Western civilization, the first analyses of knowledge emerged in the fourth century BCE, with the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle. They established the foundations for the two major strains of philosophic thought that would dominate the following 2,500

years: Idealism (Plato) and Empiricism (Aristotle). Their legacies to us include the ways in which we regard knowledge and the knower.

To suggest that the few thinkers listed below are responsible for today's world, or that they fashioned ideas with the malicious purpose of oppressing women and the ethnically different, would be inaccurate through profound oversimplification. In the first place, these men were academics, and the degree of impact of the academy upon dominant ideology is a complex issue, relative to specific societies, one that changes over time. Secondly, these thinkers offered their thoughts within contexts of larger philosophical systems against a backdrop of their own social milieus, an understanding of which has often not survived. Thirdly, societies that perpetuate themselves through hegemonic power arrangements will incoporate any idea, event, or condition to future strengthen internal structures through whatever preferred interpretation, apart from the intent of its author (that is to say, ideas can be and are co-opted to support any cause, even opposing sides of the same issue). Knowing that any single idea may be usurped by any ideology for its own maintenance, regardless of the original conditions that spawned it, feminists contend that patriarchal states have always brought available information to the service of their support. As Eisenstein (1981, p. 221) says, "The state, at present, is looking for new forms of patriarchal control." The appropriate description of the infusion of philosophy into dominant ideology might best be expressed as dialectical: the machinations of culture come to bear upon ideas; ideas come to bear upon culture.

Identifying the dominant class that profits from ideas forms the basis of prevailing ideology. Such identification explains why certain ideas are lasting and others never enjoy even preliminary circulation; why, from a milieu of ideas, only a few are selected and immortalized; why one thinker is credited with genius and others

are forgotten as mediocre. If thinkers are designated as such by their contemporary societies, and their ideas represent the views of different groups, we can say that ideologies compete, or conflict. We all adopt the ideas that most nearly agree with our own: the dominant classes will adopt ideologies that support their positions and these ideologies will become dominant as well. Sometimes we feel the tuggings of ideologies that compete within us for our loyalties, none ever really overcoming another, none dying for lack of nourishment. For example, I am an American who loves her country like a mother loves her child, decrying the evils of capitalism and saving money for a compact disk player. To make things worse, I secretly believe that I "deserve" a compact disk player more than anyone else I know. In addition, I am an ardent feminist, intensely concerned with the happiness of my sons. But America is not feminist by any count, and egalitarian politics do not take into account the apportionment of material goods on the basis of self-determined merit. I am, at once, Catholic and anti-Catholic, both loving and hating the institutional container of Catholicism. I believe passionately in developing the creative nature of all human beings for a better world, but what looks to me like "bad" art makes me slightly nauseated, and I try to keep it out of my home. At different times and all at once I choose to stroke these competing values, depending on what will serve my desire in specific situations. Ideologically I am in turmoil, and so it appears to be with cultures.

Feminism serves me (my needs for survival, productivity, and identity) better than any other philosophy or political agenda I have read. It gives me power. It describes who I am better than any other voice I might join; hence, I support its aims, selecting out certain ideas and events that describe it, choosing it as a lens through which to view the past, the present, and the conditions of my life. It pleases me that there are others with similar needs with whom I may stand as I do so. As a woman who would see

her credibility (power) enhanced, I adopt its ideology, along with competing others, as valid. It furthers my aims.

It is not surprising, then, that dominant classes strive to maintain themselves by supporting ideologies that support them; nor is it surprising that within any culture there is found much conflict of interest. What does appear regrettable to me is that the context in which powerful ideas occur is frequently forgotten, that the rich complexity of thought is impoverished through oversimplification, and that the intention of the thinker is perverted by a conscription of his or her words into the service of a cruel opposition. Some of the most elegant, if not kindest, scholars have fallen as such prey to history.

Idealism. My reading of Plato yields that some of his contributions to patriarchal notions of knowledge and knower were subtle, being outgrowths of more obvious ones. (An example of this is the assumption that knowledge is fixed because "reality" is fixed in ideal "forms.") Nevertheless, it is my interpretation that all Platonic conceptions were political in their subsequent usages, and were pervasive enough to remain with us today. Among his significant concepts that continue to influence our academic and political ideology are: the primacy and authority of reason over feeling and intuition, the hierarchical rank-ordering of different kinds of knowledge and knowers, the separation of thought and action, and the valuation of public over private activity. For Plato, the soul was divided into three levels (Warmington and Rouse, 1956, p. 241). The bottom layer consisted of the body and all impulses, appetites, and instincts that gave pleasure to it, such as the desire for delicious food, an attractive appearance, and gratifying sexual experiences. These pursuits were largely undertaken privately and in connection with women, within a woman's domain. Plato regarded these concerns to be

the lowest, or least respectable, of man's nature and needs. Everything relative to the physical body was devalued.

The middle layer can best be described in current terms as agency, the energy and impulse to act. It included both the spirit and courage that precipitated action as well as action itself. Courageous action, especially battlefield heroics inspired by a love of the State, was undertaken publicly for public benefit.

The top layer of Plato's soul was comprised of man's thinking mind, the dwelling place of reason, the seeker of virtue, beauty, and truth. Not only was its purpose to determine the real world, but also to govern and control the two lower conditions of the soul. By the operations of this soul-layer, man's "highest" destiny might be realized: he could know what was true and do what was right. These levels functioned separately from one another, tacitly defining knowledge as unconnected to any other experience of self. Ideas existed as true or false in themselves, separate from human authorship.

Societies have extracted from Plato what serves their interests. Just this content of Plato's theories has characterized our ideological assumptions about knowledge, discounting the wisdom of all social classes but the ruling elite. Furthermore, it has legitimated the position of subordinate classes in Western civilization by defining a spiritual hierarchy. As Ruether (1975) says, "Where spiritual hierarchies exist, social hierarchies follow." It has separated the use of the brain from the use of the hand in paid labor, glorifying the thinker at the expense of the craftsman, and excluded the wisdom of women's experience, creating a closed system that perpetuates itself. Only philosopher-kings speak truth, women are not philosopher-kings because they are busy tending the boy, therefore they are incapable of public performance, therefore the men who are the philosopher-kings continue to speak truth, and we have this on the authority of the philosopher-kings. If we hold to politics that

grant authority only to an elite group (aristocratic males, for example) who then define knowledge as that which comes for itself and knowers as its members, it seems safe to say that the elite ruling group will maintain self-defined characteristics for a long time to come.

Another Idealist, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), underscored his dualistic view of the human being (Churchland, 1988, p. 8) by asserting that only through the mind and its activity (as opposed to the body and its activity) could one be certain of one's existence. Furthermore, he contended that "it is only through the exploration of metaphysics that the basis of human knowledge [could] be discerned" (Scruton, 1984, p. 31). Only thought produced certainty: for him "true knowledge came from thought rather than from experience. This means that knowledge worthy of respect would come from the minds of those who, like Plato's philosopher-kings, busied themselves with thinking rather than those who performed "mundane" tasks. The doing of mundane tasks could not produce significant knowledge. Regarding the methodology of coming-to-know, the political dimension implied in Descartes' idea is obvious enough in that only some people may aspire to be the thinkers of great thought, and only some enjoy the authority to legitimate it as such. The element of authority is unavoidable: that authority was held by ruling-class males. The knowledge that came from them had an authoritative character in its effort to articulate certainty, reflecting the inherent sameness of methodology and product. Shotter and Logan (1988, p. 75) speak to this issue of acquiring a positive knowledge of the world through thought as yet another tool of patriarchy: "This knowledge is expressed in a hierarchically arranged, closed system of binary oppositions; it is concerned with achieving a unity of vision and thought, with everything in its proper place and all conflict eradicated, once and for all." Thought Descartes was himself plagued by the tension between knowing and the object known (he

eventually conceived the "tree trunk=science, roots=philosophy" analogy to describe a unity), what survives for the modern student is the Cartesian mind-body split, or Cartesian dualism, which stamps the imprimatur of importance upon the mind and its processes. Reality was known by thinking. What made a man real was the existence of his thought. "Patriarchy leads to a general, decontexted kind of theoretical knowledge that can be possessed by individuals of their external world" (Shotter & Logan, 1988, p. 76).

Empiricism. Aristotle is credited as the first Empiricist as he based knowledge of Truth upon the observation of natural phenomena. Truth existed externally, apart from the self, perceived by him as sets of hierarchical dualisms:

> . . . .that is, polar opposites within which one side rules over the other. . . .Soul rules over body, Reason over emotion, Male over female, and so on. For him, Pure Mind . . .is connected with "divine" Soul, which is supreme of all earthly things. The male Mind is therefore higher and holier than all matter, even higher than the beloved Apollonian (ideal, male) body; certainly the male Mind and Reason rule over and are "more divine" than the female body because she (being ruled by emotions and body functions) is not as capable of Mind or Reason, and so on. (Wilshire, 1989, p. 93)

Aristotle not only saw knowledge of Plato's permanent forms, absolute and unchanging, as emerging from the study of natural science, he also verified his social philosophy on the basis of what he observed to be "natural." Apart from his contribution to scientific methodology, his legitimation of social hierarchies through biological determinism created the lens through which we regard one another today. Politically, it maintains the privileges of the already advantaged at the expense of women, ethnically different, and the poor. Farrington (1944) says:

> This early exposition of the biological determinist argument, citing immutable, inherited differences in the soul as the natural basis for the dualist categories underlying existing racial and sexual relationships, is presented as "obvious" and beyond doubt by Aristotle. His identification of the leisured male master with the rational, the mind, and the nonproductive (science for science's sake) and women

> and slaves with the irrational and the useful were patently self-serving. The world of the leisured few and the exploited many was good to him; he could see no need for technical advances or increased productivity. . . .

Berman (1989, p. 234) remarks:

> The dualist rationalism of Aristotle and Plato is an extraordinary illustration of how the self-interest of a society's rulers and their desire to maintain the status quo, limit and distort the understanding of even their most profound thinkers. The invocation of a hierarchy of human worth, presumed "natural," to justify widely disparate economic and social conditions, is still the prevailing practice today.

The reverence, the awe, in which Aristotle has been held throughout history can hardly be paralleled by that accorded to any other thinker; by anyone's reckoning he was a genius whose thought stands as a cornerstone of Western civilization. Today, students of philosophy, theology, biology, history, and education read Aristotle as a primary source as well as coming to him through myriad commentators and interpreters from past and present. He wrote extensively, yet his excoriating treatment of women and his substantiation of an oppressive social model that appear in several of his works are rarely attended or used to discredit him.[2] Though we can acknowledge that his ideas reflected the dominant ideology of his day (it was no accident that he was the boyhood tutor of a warrior-conqueror), we do not deal with Aristotle's stratified politics as narrow and dated. In the face of newer, enlightened philosophies that dignify the nature and knowing of all human beings, we continue to regard Aristotle as ingeniously "truthful" and "right." How can this be? One part of the answer might be that we, as a patriarchy, still find him useful in affirming those power arrangements we make within our relationships both collectively, as nations and groups, and individually, as private persons. Hierarchies aid in defining ourselves in terms of other people when we profit by comparison. Perhaps by neglecting to examine and publicize the more spurious of Aristotle's essays, we are able to maintain attitudes of natural superiority without the

necessity of grounding them in the quicksand of historical bigotry. By keeping his reputation above reproach, we tacitly accept a sweeping array of assumptions unsupported by moral standards and given validity by his name.

Plato and Aristotle, giants that they are, were not the only Greek thinkers to have shaped thought, nor are contemporary historians the only ones to have discovered women among them. A remarkable and little-known bit of research into rare manuscripts by Gilles Menage (1613-1692) yields scholarly information about 71 women philosophers from the Platonists to the Pythagoreans (Zedler, 1984). Modern feminist researchers come forth with a surprising list of ancient Greek women philosophers, dating from 600 BCE (Waithe, 1987). Apparently, these women were respected in their day as thinkers and public persons. One must ask: What was their contribution to thought, and why do we not credit them with that contribution? Their forgotten presence informs us of at least two phenomena: one, that women have actively participated in whatever public world exists at the time as we have been allowed to do so; and, two, that patriarchy will ultimately have its way by omitting us from the annals of history, erasing all trace of our names and our creative work.

With notions of the importance of rationality established by Plato, the dualism that would be articulated by Descartes, and Aristotle's empiricism and hierarchies rooted in dominant ideologies of Western though (what constitutes knowledge, where it comes from, and who produces it), societies of feudal Europe moved into new economic patterns of power and dependence. New philosophies accompanied these changes and reacted to them: liberalism, democracy, capitalism, and communism. But patriarchy remained, only to change form, carrying hegemonic assumptions into a world now fragmented by the phenomenon of private ownership.

Economic Materialism. As a philosophy, materialism is related to (a form of) empiricism as it derives its theories from the physical world outside the self, directly observable by the senses rather than from "spiritual," intuitive, or intellectual concerns. It describes human nature in terms of material conditions and speaks of social change as materially caused. As a doctrine it arose with the economic restructuring of Europe that radically changed the ways people lived, how they came to regard one another, and where they found their power.

The Crusades introduced exotic consumer goods into burgeoning European markets, and the spirit of consumerism reached such levels as to create a middle class of merchants and to define human worth by what people owned in goods, land, and finally labor. By the seventeenth century in Britain, laws and customs that protected the "rights of common" of the poor to live on attractive pasture land were manipulated by large wool producers for the private construction of sheep enclosures. The poor were chased off the land so that the once-poor became poor and homeless. Their respected shamans and rabble-rousers were witches, women who spoke out against the injustices against them and thus kept in foment an underlying threat to the landed gentry. In an effort to keep the disfranchised politically unfocused and disorganized, these soothsayer-healers (witches) were executed in numbers ranging from 100,000 to 9,000,000 (Starhawk, 1988, Appendix A). As women's knowledge was formerly disregarded and ignored, now it was viewed as dangerous to the ruling class.

The basis of overriding authority was economic: capitalism was born. Democracies emerged to insure the franchise of all landowning citizens, without the prerequisite of aristocratic lineage; and liberalism informed us further that success of failure in accumulating wealth depended upon the disposition of the individual who achieved it. Marxism appeared as Capitalism's voice of conscience, decrying its immoral

cost of the masses of working poor. Nations rose to importance and fell into obscurity within the paradigm of monetary profit and loss, buttressed by their concurrent philosophies and religions, involving the ownership of a few and the exploitations of many. While ownership of land rested in private hands, its existence was rooted in the pan-cultural acceptance of it as a valid source of control, an unwritten contract between the haves and the have-nots that possessions meant privilege. Private ownership was and is a profoundly public matter, arising from public convention and bearing political consequences.

With privilege and power still a social function, valued knowledge consisted of ideas that justified its base. Valued knowers, then, were those who produced such ideas. Owners were generally Christian males, though individual women sometimes held property through family connections and Jewish bankers (unfettered by the Christian onus against "usury") built fortunes, both as fringe minorities. Le Doeuff (1987, chap. 9) traces the historical presence of women in philosophy from Diogenese Laertius' Hipparchia through Rousseau's Julie, and points out that, "although they lived in very different times, these women had one thing in common: they all experienced great passions, and their relationship with philosophy existed only through their love for a man, a particular philosopher" (pp. 184-185). Although feminist historians are able to unearth the names of some women who engaged publicly in philosophical discourse and scholarship, it bears mentioning that they participated in men's knowledge already established. They succeeded only in proving their worth as students. None of them is credited with publishing under her own name, or birthing new systems of thought.

Interestingly, though few people became wealthy and powerful in societies, either men or women, the experience of those men who did serve to reinforce hegemonic patterns of male authority; the experience as those women and minorities, and the

respect they commanded as individuals, did not likewise transfer across the board to their gender and ethnic groups, giving them more credence and respect. Patriarchal models of knowledge and knowers persisted.

Phenomenology. In the early twentieth century a German professor, Edmund Husserl, constructed a philosophy that "aimed to produce a complete metaphysical vision from reflection on the peculiarities of consciousness" (Scruton, 1984, chap. 18); a philosophy that established the subjectivity of the knower as creator of his or her reality. Unlike his predecessors, Husserl saw the meaning of perceived objects and events existing in their interpretations in the mind of the knower rather than existing within the objects or events perceived. Like Descartes, he wanted to separate what was perceived from the mental state of the knower, seeking "a method whereby to isolate the pure deliverances of consciousness from the encumbrances which impede our understanding of them" (Scruton, 1984, chap. 18). He arrived at the notion of "bracketing." Simply described, bracketing refers to becoming conscious of a thing. Beginning with the stream of consciousness moving through one's mind, one brackets a moment in that consciousness, bringing an experience to attention. Then one compares this bracketed experience with a previous one held in memory, paring off nonessentials of both to get to the essence shared by each. Extending beyond one's individual concept to communicating with others, one then compares this concept with that of someone else, then with other people, and thus determines basic concepts common to society (Kneller, 1984, pp. 28-19). As the thought begins as a product of the mind, so it is part of the knower, and is subjective in nature. In an effort to gain knowledge of an independent world, the knower has succeeded in describing his or herself. Phenomenology posits that this is all one may ever do in the struggle to know, and that one's knowledge is always unique to his or her individual interpretation.

Heidegger, Husserl's student, widens Husserl's focus on contents of the mind to include all of human existence. He contends that, from a state of anxiety by which the individual becomes aware of his or her solitary, finite nature, one arrives at three human traits: that one is free and can act from will, that one is "thrown" into the world, and that one is unique as a result of one's choices. He conceives of "authenticity" as the most developed human state. As the individual overcomes the anxiety wrought by fear and conformity, he or she becomes authentic and responsible.

Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) offers another dimension to consciousness. He says that consciousness is achieved and maintained through body experiences of the learner: that the body is one's entrance into the world. Through its senses and its interactions with Other, the body enables concept formation. He thinks that there is a pre-constructed, "pre-reflective" condition to perception that has been created for the learner by sensory activity that precedes thought. He finds little of human behavior bracketed deliberately for analysis and understanding, even by the person acting; that most of it is rather automatic, based on the pre-reflective experience of one's early years. Merleau-Ponty sees the body as both Subject and Object at the same time (further contesting Husserl, that one could never be both): one (Subject) thinks; one sees oneself (Object) as thinking. Existentialism continues with this theme.

At least two strikes are made against traditional assumptions about the "objective" world, knowing the world to be what it "is," and the knower. One is that there is no objective world to be known, because as soon as a concept about the world is formed in the mind of the knower, it becomes part of the knower and is therefore subjective in nature; hence, no one's knowledge has more authority than that of anyone else. It follows, then, that no one knower has more authority in knowing than anyone else. Phenomenology raises new questions to science and politics aimed at their

fundamental legitimacy: what is to be "known," what is "knowledge," or "Truth," about the physical world around us, How can it be known, Who can know it, What is "authority," Who has the "right" of authority, and Who may govern?

Speaking of scientific "truth," Kuhn (1971) writes of the difficulties of science in naming and describing the world, asserting that one of them lies in the pursuit of knowledge through the exercise of methodology that is not designed to question the methdology itself. He says that truth always lies just beyond the paradigm (which itself is unquestioned, only hoped to be further clarified and expanded), and indicates that science occupies a tenuous position in the world because of it. The existence of warring theories and theorists within the same scientific disciplines bears witness to the notion that "truth" is a matter of point-of-view, or interpretation.

Bernstein (1976, Part IV), the social theorist, expresses the necessity of understanding social theory as connected to and supported by philosophical thought. He describes our current interest in theory and praxis as incompatible with the traditional conviction that the salvation of humankind lies in truth offered by thought alone; that social praxis was inconsequential and did not feed into the validity of theory. He sees a "phenomenological alternative" to ideological, naturalistic interpretations of social and political theory (Part III, pp. 117-169). On the threshold of this decade, when the peoples of Latin America, eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa are demanding answers to who should govern and by what authority, we see the philosophical assumptions of hierarchy confronted by the knowledges and authorities of common people, arising from their experience in the world. They would legitimate their knowledge by their own experience, their own dealings with life, out of which would develop their own theories for living together, rather than accept the classical

definitions and arrangements of a remote few whose economic interests are supported by historical claims.

Significantly, the phenomenological alternative to idealism and empiricism appears to be essentially individualistic and apolitical, which probably accounts for its marginal acceptance and popularity within the political bureaucracies of universities and governments. Phenomenology validates the wisdom of all knowers, regardless of their position on the hierarchical social ladder, their income bracket, or the nature of their work. It supports no traditional concepts of knowledge and authority and challenges those that have dominated Western civilization over the centuries. Through the phenomenological alternative, marginal populations (women, people of color, the poor) are heard and their knowledges are validated, not in spite of their experience or by how strongly their experience supports traditional, ideological concepts, but because of and through their dealings with the world, whatever they may be. Within the phenomenological context, the connection between knowledge and experience is implicit. How one produces the other can be illustrated by Dewey's paradigm of the way individuals learn.

How People Learn: John Dewey

John Dewey (1859-1952), American philosopher, educator, and writer, was an empiricist and a pragmatist by persuasion but whose model of learning was cognitive. He appeared at a time when scientific invention was transforming America from a rural nation to an urban one, and his observations of the power of science and technology led him to believe in the scientific approach to all problem-solving. He saw life to be problematic, and that one's life story would be the recant of a series of problems one had met and overcome. He was committed to the scientific method of positivist research as

the best system for resolving life's dilemmas. Therefore, it is interesting that his learning model rested so squarely on one's interpretation of personal experience.

Dewey described knowledge (Dewey, 1933) as the result or an encounter of one's experience (and one's expectations) with a given dictum or standard, recently presented or in memory, analyzed reflectively by the knower through his (sic) language. What is gleaned through this process, the interpretation of "new" experience, is one's knowledge, or truth. This, now, becomes the new standard, or expectation, with which one encounters new experience, and the process begins again, constantly in motion, ever folding in fresh experience with previous interpretations to form an amended knowledge. For Dewey, it was during times (if only moments) of reflection upon experience confronting one's prior knowledge when learning occurs: learning is cognitive, private, and intensely personal. As his model involves the necessary features of both experience and reflection, it becomes dialectical. Experience grows out of, and feeds into, reflection; reflection grows out of, and feeds into, experience. In other words, one without the other does not produce knowledge, is not complete; one's truth emerges from an interaction of the two. The link between them is the inner language used by the learner to interpret and describe (and thereby give meaning to) his or her experience.

Dewey's pragmatism ("We learn by doing") is much more visible in classrooms today than is his learning theory. If learning is reflective, individual, and private, it remains beyond the control (though certainly not beyond the influence) of teachers and of the society that would reproduce itself in the young. If we accepted it in such a determining way that our classrooms were structured for the purpose of producing diverse thought among our students, hegemonic values would be undermined dangerously. Those on the margins of social acceptance would be dignified with the respect afforded all

others, their voices would be heard, and society would likely change at its foundations as the result of essential changes in our dominant ideology.

Knowledge and Dominant Ideologies

As has been stated earlier, valued knowledge emerges from the values of groups of people. Groups differ and subgroups within them differ. Consequently, values held at the same time within groups, subgroups, and individuals are seen to compete. While several competing ideologies govern the lives of all of us, a few generally revered assumptions of the dominant mode permeate weaker systems, even when we are unaware. This happens most commonly through our use of language. As an ideological lens, feminism decries the patriarchal practice of elevating a few persons to places of importance (hierarchy) while the National Women's Studies Association awards grants and scholarships to "most deserving" students. I see some glaring evils of capitalism, but I want to be paid every dime I can get from the University that pays me to talk about them. None of our affiliated groups is free of the influence of dominant ideology, as none of us as individuals stands outside the created reality of her own life. Perhaps the best we can do is wrestle with its conflicts, never forgetting that ideologies, some chosen and some thrust upon us, create our realities, the meaning of our lives.

Definition and discussion of ideology. How societies develop attitudes and come to know what is "real" to them is a multi-faceted phenomenon, the structures and agencies of which change over time, depending on what is available to a culture at any given period in history. What results is a generally held "common sense" view of the world by its members: ". . .the lived consciousness of the actual political/social events that are taking place (or are being aimed for). . . .perception of the world. . . from a particular standpoint, which is influenced by a multifarious collection of factors" (Harris, 1979, p. 63). Harris notes that ideology is, by definition, necessarily misleading and

misrepresentative, as its purpose is to underpin and protect the status quo that benefits some classes of people. The task of ideology is to maintain certain assumptions throughout all social classes that benefit the ruling class either exclusively or (as is most often the case) more than they benefit the others. The development and stabilization of ideology should not be oversimplified to be understood as a handful of men in a back room making policy that will make a few rich people richer and masses of poor people poorer, though oftentimes that is the economic result of ideological values. It is a highly complex network of processes involving the collusion of all people within a society.

There are many ideologies that operate within a large, diverse population at one time, some written and some unwritten, often found in the philosophies of our governments, political parties, religions, schools, economies and industries, and social clubs; contained within upper, middle, and lower economic classes of people; defining identities of ethnic groups and gendering males into men and females into women, and distributing privilege and power accordingly.

An example of ideology at work may be seen in the American maxim that "Competition benefits everyone." This is borne out by high school students injecting anabolic steroids in an effort to make the Olympic track team, midwestern housewives vying for the Best Cook award at county fairs, Little League ball players striving to win a place in the national playoffs, rose growers exhibiting the yield from their gardens in the hope of receiving a Best of Show ribbon, graduate students eyeing one another furtively in the hope of being the one selected for a grant or scholarship of some kind, as well as corporate presidents like Roger Smith of General Motors closing the plant in Flint, Michigan, on the heels of posting an annual 9-million-dollar profit, because his operation could be moved to Japan at an even lager profit (in 1990, the Japanese will

work for 70 cents an hour). Competition is seen to bring out "the best" in producers of ideas, goods, and performance; its cost to competitors (alienation, idolatry, damaged self-esteem, fear, and the denial of privilege to the bulk of them) is assumed to be an inevitable part of participating in life. The ideological acceptance of competition is thought to be "the American way," and is supported cross-culturally.

What passes for knowledge is controlled by ideology as well. In a capitalist, patriarchical society, respected knowledge, or Truth, is that which maintains the legality of a few profitting from the labor of many, and the supremacy of (white) stronger males over weaker males and females. Our notions of knowledge still break down by two major divisions: "common sense" and "school learning," or, practical knowledge vs. theory, and greater respect is accorded one over the other, depending on the social group in which either or both are found. This division is related to the mind-body split of antique philosophies, though those perceiving knowledge in this way are by and large unaware of Cartesian Dualism, let alone Platonic Rationalism. Phenomenologists would have the division dissolved so that ideology would embrace theory as emerging out of experience so that the knowledge of one individual or one social class with a different experience would have the same respect as that of the already-powerful. The midwife that can produce theory out of experience would be education.

In order for ideology to continue to serve special interests, it must be kept viable and passed along to each successive generation. There are forces that accomplish this, sometimes working in concert and during other times at variance with one another. Many of them are difficult to identify; we, as citizens who support the status quo by our everyday lives, are not trained to identify them, for obvious reasons.

Hegemonic transmission of the dominant ideology. Harris (1979) makes it clear that it is impossible to lie outside the context of an ideology; that it is of more valid

concern to determine which ideology we would choose. The public and private forces that support ideology are sometimes neutral in their moral character, tools that can be used for good or ill; sometimes effecting both good and evil ends; and sometimes simply destructive from the outset. They all further the reproduction of society, as we know it, by instilling necessary values in our children and controlling resistance.

Public agencies of transmission include: the church, its teaching and rituals; the law and its interpretation; massive industries and corporations that control such basic needs as procuring food; schools and their curricula and methodologies; authority by bureaucracy; medical science, its view of the body and its delivery of health care; the military-industrial complex; institutions of "higher learning," their promulgated philosophy, and their empirical methods of research; our government, committed to the support of profit through private enterprise; the police and the authority they wield as the result of a tacit contract with the public that we "must" obey them; the media and its use in the hands of power; publishing houses that print only certain books and articles; and consumer advertising that inundates the public with archetypical images of men and women encountering life situations and making decisions (generally about buying one product over another). As mentioned earlier, these influences change to delete some and include more, depending on what is available to a culture at any given time (for example, prior to 1950, television advertising was not a factor in perpetuation ideology as it did not exist; on the other hand, the fine arts, particularly painting, have been a greater influence in the past than they are today). Children grow up quite aware of the parameters of their freedoms, both from watching their parents navigate through a maze of social demands and restrictions, and from being taught overtly what they can and cannot do.

Private agencies of transmissions include: the family, with its hierarchies of authority and dynamic interactions; peer groups and their informal, but persuasive codes; one's socioeconomic class that distributes among its members in nebulous but very real ways the "correct" attitudes, behaviors, material possessions, and aspirations one may and must have in order to survive within that class, and those that one must not have. These agencies impinge upon each other and interact with public agencies to shape us, if not create us, to be the people we are and the reality we will know. What it means to be man or woman, of color or white, rich or poor, is determined by the ideologies we live with and pass along to our children. The knowledges identified within these social categories are widely variant and disparately valued, likewise passed along for better or for worse. Recently a number of theorists have argued that the ways in which individuals and groups come-to-know differ as radically as the knowledges that are produced. Some of these differences are seen as polarizing around male and female paradigms of thought.

Romantic Dichotomies of Male and Female Modes of Thought

The term "romantic" refers to one of several broad groupings of feminist theory organized by Alison Jaggar (Jaggar, 1988) to help clarify feminism as a political philosophy, its foundations and its agenda. She credits Ehrenreich and English with first calling "sexual romanticism" that trend in the women's movement that "asserted the uniqueness of women, the mystical experience of motherhood and women's special purity" (Jaggar, p. 5), appearing in the United States in the early part of the 20th century. As a philosophical position it reflects biological determinism and, though it is less popular among feminists today than it once was, some radicals still base their theories on the inherent differences between male and female (Gray, 1981; Griffin, 1978; Grumet, 1988; Starhawk, 1988; Washbourne, 1977). The most visible legacy

of Romanticism today is reflected in dichotomies of orientation: male values vs. female values, male behavior vs. female behavior; giving rise to questions of when and where these dichotomies become evident, and to what do we attribute the phenomenon? It is the old nature-nurture split in another form. Do these differences come from physical predisposition or politicization?

Some theorists (Al-Hibri, 1981; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1983; Farrell, 1974; Gilligan, 1982; Schaef, 1981; Wilshire, 1989) are content to say that men and women see things differently, whether the result of body experiences, early psychodynamic interactions with parents, role rehearsal, or lifelong socialization by culture; that experiences generally known to women produce a feminine perspective, and that those known to men produce a masculine perspective. On the basis of this difference, lists of traits appear that are commonly associated with male and female approaches and responses to life. The origins of these dichotomies, whether biological or experiential, become less important than the fact that they are "seen" by society as "natural" and played out in daily life by men and women. The young are therefore gendered into these patterns.

Farrell (1974, p. 56) lists masculine traits that form basic assumptions of male superiority, with corresponding feminine traits (see Table 1).

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Insert Table 1 about here

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If Farrell's perceived differences seem generally applicable and one relates them to male and female experience, it follows that within the life experience of each there are roles to play and challenges to meet that create different sensitivities, ways of looking at the world, modes of behavior, and hierarchies of values.

Kohlberg and Gilligan

Plato held justice to be the highest moral virtue in man, and public service to be the highest of man's calling, as he could then dispense justice to others. Considering Plato's experience and that of the men he knew, perhaps this was an important and accurate disclosure about men. It was echoed in 1950 ACE by Lawrence Kohlberg's research (Kohlberg, 1981) of the moral development of the young as they mature, setting the value of justice as the final (and most sophisticated) driving motive behind the search for solutions to moral dilemmas. In Kohlberg's hierarchy of moral stages, only the most mature individuals were capable of making decisions on the basis of what was fair. Carol Gilligan, responding to Kohlberg's research which had been conducted with young males, perceived that his results might not yield the same results if conducted with females. Pursuing this idea, she researched women and found that, in fact, the guiding force behind women's mature moral decisions was indeed not justice; upon hearing the stories of her subjects and exploring the motives that underlay their moral behavior, she found that they were more typically guided by an ethic of love, or care. Other differences followed (see Table 2), such as women's striving for connection in relationship and men's striving for separateness, women's subjectivity and men's objectivity.

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Insert Table 2 about here

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(Today, though still holding to the justice-care themes found in the moral positioning of individuals, Gilligan sees them as existing in both men and women and not necessarily as oppositional. She is quite adamant that her conceptual themes, though gender-associated,

not be assigned exclusively to either sex. Likewise, she is concerned that her notion of moral development is not segmented and prioritized to form yet another hierarchy.)

Significantly, Gilligan's research indicated that the male view of what constituted morality was not the universal view; that future research, if it is to have universal application, must be gender-balanced to include female subjects; and it gave rise to another area of investigation: "women's ways of knowing" (Belenky, et al., 1986).

Belenky, et al.

Emerging from an abortion study at Harvard University with Carol Gilligan, Mary Belenky (Belenky, et al., 1986) became interested in the ways women come to their knowledge. She found "five different perspectives from which women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority" (p. 3). Like Gilligan, Belenky's model is developmental and roughly parallels identity development in the individual woman; and, like Gilligan, she uses "voice" as a metaphor for the actualized self. The stronger and more certain the voice, the stronger and more certain one's identity and knowledge are to the knower herself. Though Belenky regrets that her "five different perspectives" have become another hierarchy in skill complexity, she presents them in sequential order and gives each stage of development a name (see Table 3): it becomes difficult to see them as a group without seeing rank-ordered levels.

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Insert Table 3 about here

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Wilshire

Donna Wilshire (1989, pp. 95-96) reports the core dualisms in our social values (see Table 4) that come to bear directly on "value judgments that have

unnecessarily brought about human alienation from self, other, and planet and that have disastrously limited what we think is desirable and worth knowing."

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Insert Table 4 about here

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This dichotomy supports Farrell's short list and relates to Belenky's description of the struggle women must make to "claim the power of their own minds"; the barriers that ideology places before us in that struggle. She is interested in redeeming the right-column words themselves, reclaiming all "female-associated things that were anciently, unfairly relegated to lowly status. . .the value in things perceived as unmanly and therefore unworthy for three millennia. . .[to] enhance and enrich the search for truth and knowledge" (p. 96).

Summary: Knowledge and Women

The feminist effort to identify, describe, and dignify women's knowledge did not occur in a vacuum. Several stepping stones appeared over the last hundred years to lead to it: ; philosophy's shift from attention to "man" in and of himself to "man" in context with others (economic materialism and its critics), as well as its development of phenomenology ("reality" is what one perceives to be "real"); Dewey's contention that knowledge results from reflection on experience; and Gilligan's insightful idea that women value differently than do men. Concurrently, temperament theory growing out of the work of Carl Jung has described a variety of "learning styles" found within any group of individuals (Golay, 1982), the inference being that they should be accepted and accommodated by all who would teach. Sociology as a science has evolved to give language to dominant ideology and meaning to politics, elucidating the human instruments by which "common sense" is produced and reproduced in cultures over time, and demanding

a closer look at the impact of acculturation upon what has been traditionally defined as "human nature." When the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War protests of the '60s and '70s drew the thoughts and energies of masses of women, from all stations of life, toward the rights of the oppressed in the face of authority and power, the Women's Movement we know today was born. It turned that demand for dignity and justice toward its own. Philosophically and politically, the climate had been created for a new consciousness and the (as yet) infinite stream of questions that would come from it, among them, What is women's knowledge, and Where does it fit in the scheme of things?

The difficulties in exploring these questions are many: for one thing, generalities are hard to make, and the best ones are never universally applicable. If it is said that women are more likely to make moral decisions out of a concern for human beings rather than by a standard of justice, the question of the caring man and the just woman arises. Another difficulty lies in the need to theorize about the origins of gender differences: a need that seems to reintensify every time another dichotomy appears; and yet, how may we come to understand women as women without comparing them to men, or what has been thought to be "mankind"? Is the propensity for dualism so much a part of us that we cannot think about and understand one thing without creating its "opposite" with which to compare it? If we continue to reinforce the notion that we are "different" from men in fundamental, unalterable ways, do we not inevitably continue to reinforce the hegemonic paradigm that difference means domination, and that this state of affairs is as "natural" as it is lamentable? Perhaps the recognition and description of those "differences" becomes crucial in the languages used to lay them out, replacing the language of patriarchy; that the dichotomies themselves are most helpful in the reconstruction of thought when they reflect gendering and experience.

The Politics of Schooling

All education is political from its philosophy through its methodology. Harris (1979) says:

> When we look at specific areas of knowledge, and their propagation through education, we find the same thing that Marx identifies happening. A ruling class determine what subjects shall be taught. . . .Children do not simply learn maths, English, history and so on; they learn what certain ruling interests take as maths, English and history; and they accept as correct and worth knowing what those same interests count as correct and worth knowing. (pp. 73, 74)

One small example of this may be gleaned from the February, 1990 statement offered by the Bush administration that outlines, for the first time in the history of the United States, a national agenda for American schools (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1990, February 26). Number One on the President's list of objectives is "that American school children rank first in the world in math and science." Considering that "political," here, refers to the relationship of persons in which one has the advantage over the other, we may draw the following inferences: first, that Americans count value by competing with others and besting them; second, that competition within school classrooms is a proper and fitting tool of "education," classmate pitted against classmate; third, that math and science knowledges are the most important highly prized of all the knowledges a student might generate (as opposed to, say, emotional, intuitive, or body knowledge); fourth, that a nation proficient in science and technology is more worthwhile than one characterized by compassion, cooperation, humor, or artistic sensibility; and fifth, that the purpose of the school is to make America the "strongest" nation in the world, maintaining an advantage over all other nations. Within Bush's first objective can be seen philosophy (the purpose of education is to maintain the State), methodology (the scientific method and competition produce "objective" truth and the "best" learners), content (math and science are more valuable

than any other disciplines), and evaluation (competitive examinations will determine what a student knows and how important he or she may be to this society). There is nothing apolitical in this, and these name only a few inferences to be drawn. Others relate to gender, race, and class.

Gendered Education

It has been demonstrated that females, racial minorities, and the economically disadvantaged [American Association of University Women (AAUW), 1988, June] score lower than white males on both the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and the American College Assessment Test (ACT). One reason for girls' scoring lower is that the tests themselves are biased in their constructions ("an analysis of 24 passages from the SAT's reading comprehension sections contained 34 references to famous men, but only one reference to a famous women -- Margaret Mead -- and that was in a passage criticizing her work"). The AAUW goes on to say, "If the SAT were an accurate predictor of students' freshman grades, girls would score 20 points higher than boys, not 57 points lower." The tests seem not to have much bearing on college performance beyond naming who gets to perform. Our educative system is self-perpetuating: as the male preoccupation with objectified, assessable knowledge is pursued and tested by competition, scholarships are awarded to high scorers (other white males), young men graduate to places in business and industry where they rise to power and maintain the traditional notions of "excellence" that put them there.

If high school graduating seniors are expected to know (and have mastered) certain subjects tested by the SAT and ACT, and white males demonstrate a greater knowledge of them than other students, what is it that females, ethnic minorities, and the poor might know and contribute to academia? Can the knowledges that come from their experience enrich the academic community? Are they important enough to society-at-

large to merit attention by "Higher Education"? How much attention might they appropriately be given? These questions have incited the "Canon Debate," a discourse regarding curriculum reform in American colleges and universities, a discourse that finds voice across all disciplines.

The Canon Debate

Taken all together, articles published in 1988 and 1989 by The Chronicle of Higher Education reveal that heat and fervor generated by proponents and opponents of curriculum reform. As usual, there are two major divisions of thought, one being conservative and the other liberal, by contemporary labels. Educators found at the extreme conservative end of the continuum "call for a movement to 'reclaim' [the] academy" (Mooney, C., 1988, November 23, p. 1), fearing that the rigor of intellectual pursuit and the respect that it commanded in the past have been lost to a preoccupation with popular culture. They see a worsening neglect of classic Western literature as a primary cause of this loss, and view the gap between university matriculation and true scholarship as widening as time goes by. Liberals at the other extreme end see the foundation of classic Western literature as insufficient (if necessary at all) for the development of educational graduates who must live and solve their problems in a pluralistic society. They see the university curriculum to be remiss in providing the literature students need for understanding their world, and that academe lags far behind students' experience in its limited focus and irrelevancy of required reading.

Currently, the Canon Debate deliberates over two questions: first, across all disciplines, what should college graduates have read, or become familiar with (such as artworks), that would be considered as Canons of a general education? And then, within each paticular discipline, what should be included to form a Canon of that area of study? For example, as a college graduate one might be expected to know that Plato is the Father

of Western Philosophy and to have read something from his Republic; as a college graduate from a teacher training program, one might be expected to be knowledgeable about the contributions of Jean Piaget, Maria Montessori, and B.F. Skinner, through their writings. Other questions regarding the connection of the larger and narrower realism emerge: Should some training programs not be included under the academic umbrella due to their seemingly non-academic nature; and, if they are, should they necessitate the same academic (theoretical) background as those more obviously dependent upon theory? For example, considering the concerns and duties of nursing, how important is it to nurses that they be well-versed in the philosophies of their pioneers? Should one's permission to care for the sick depend upon his or her familiarity with Plato? If not, should training for patient care even be included in university programs? (Questions of this nature will be addressed in Chapter Three.)

By tradition, universities and colleges take pride in the academic (theoretical) underpinnings of their programs, even when that knowledge in unconnected to what is visible as daily experience. But Bloom (1987) and Hirsch (1987) lament the reported, large numbers of high school graduates (and worse, college graduates) who have no grasp of basic information about our culture, such as America entering the Second World War in 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, or the names of major rivers flowing through North America. Hirsch promotes a cultural restoration "through a concept of literacy that focuses on the basic structures of language, and applies this version of cultural literacy to the broader consideration of the needs of the business community, as well as the maintenance of American institutions (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1988, May, p. 173). Bloom's critique of education is wider. He advocates a core curriculum based on the Great Books, convinced that a return to our "roots" would correct the spirt of anti-intellectualism found among students and its resultant

ignorance of American values (Bloom, 1987, p. 344). Bloom and Hirsch find an audience among those who have been aware of spasmodic, ineffectual efforts toward "curricular reform" in this century, and have been concerned about declining intellectual achievement of high school graduates, following the publication of A Nation at Risk [United States Department of Education (USDE), 1983]. Noting and decrying certain surprising inadequacies of students is not what identifies a conservative; limiting the Canon to include only the Great Books (presumably for the inculcation of Americanism and the maintenance of economic superiority, but resulting in the legitimation of an elite among the culturally superior) to correct those inadequacies does.

In 1988 a group of 300 members of the "National Association of Scholars" met in New York City to pool their complaints and solidify their ranks as conservatives. While no official agenda was formulated, their criticisms targeted a watered-down college curriculum, the hiring of substandard faculty in the interest of implementing affirmative action goals, feminist scholarship and Women's Studies programs, the demand of minority-group members, and the abandonment of rational thought and a search for truth (Mooney, 1988, November 23). While this group was vocal in its disapproval of perceived radicalism in the academy, members contend that the vast majority of college faculties silently (secretly) agree with them.

From the laundry list of conservatives' complaints, it takes little imagination to determine who their opponents would be. Two months prior to the conservatives' convention, 300 members of the academy's "cultural left" met in North Carolina, on the campuses of Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, to refute their critics' claims and share support with one another in the struggle for a more diverse curriculum. These liberal academics include feminists, ethnic minorities,

and others who would give greater importance to ethnic and women's studies, along with their emphases on gender, race, and class, and to the ideas of non-Western cultures, expanding the Canon to include the literature that develops them. Essentially, the members of the conference denied the notion of timeless truths that were revealed once and for all by legendary thinkers to be presented to each generation following as eternal wisdom. While they do not dismiss the Great Books as unimportant, they feel that other reading is as necessary for understanding the world in which we live; that the Great Books must be read and judged within the political context in which they were written. Liberals would take a more critical stance in regard to the American Dream, Hirsch's contention that indeed there are things every American should know, and that there is such a thing as a "Canon" of Higher Education in the first place (Greene, 1988, September 28).

How might the dilemma be resolved, as there appears to be one among educators? Obviously, special groups (elitists as well as feminists and ethnic minorities) find a place rather easily in the maelstrom; for others, perhaps certain questions could be directed toward the premises underlying the debate. As we plan curriculum for students, we could ask what sort of human being we would have as a graduate of our institution; what qualities and skills we would like him and her to have; what an education should be doing for that person. We could examine the roles that we play in our individual and communal lives and determine what literature would enhance those roles and relate them to the world at large, toward the ends of preserving our planet and saving our children. We could invoke the feminist principle of listening to all who would speak, even those with whom we disagree strongly, and dignify their voices with respect. Tillich (1957) describes a way for solving dilemmas: he advocates an initial coming to agreement on what issue is of "ultimate concern" for all participants from all interests

of disciplines (in this case, it could be the well-being of the individual in the world, for example, that would be placed in the center as the issue of ultimate concern). Then, the best and most effective ways and means of implementing that concern would follow. A heated dialogue over how to produce loving parents of our young, or how we might develop a consciousness of and responsibility for global poverty, would seem to be more meaningful and productive than deliberation over the importance of the Great Books in the college curriculum. It is not that we are arguing that is disturbing, but rather what we are and are not arguing about; that our discourse trivializes the critical issues by neglect, sidestepping them for peripheral distractions.

The late Dr. James MacDonald, onetime professor of education at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and revered curriculum theorist, left us the legacy of his conception of all curriculum. He said that it inevitably addresses and answers two questions: What does it mean to be human? and How should we live together? Critical theory takes up those questions seriously as it hears the Canon Debate and calls for a redefinition of knowledge and knowers. Further, it embraces two alternative pedagogies, one "critical," and the other, "feminist."

Conclusion

Traditional conceptions of knowledge were produced by early philosophers to support social hierarchies that included the philosophers themselves among the topmost levels. Such conceptions were self-serving, legitimating the men who voiced them as a ruling (knowing) elite. Knowledge about the world and about knowledge itself resulted from the daily experience of the elite who produced it, an experience of thinking, teaching, writing, and discoursing with fellow elitists. Other knowledge (theory) that arose from the daily experience of women and slaves, whose activities consisted of menial tasks or caring of the body, was so trivialized and denigrated as to be ignored or

relegated to the lowest levels of hierarchical valuation. There, it was categorically branded as inferior, or evil.

Women, as creators and bearers of inferior knowledge, have been judged by the world, and known to themselves, as inferior knowers. Only through the implicit political content of contemporary philosophies (Marxism, Existentialism, and Phenomenology) and modern learning theory (Dewey and Freire) have silenced, marginalized populations been dignified as knowers, their experience judged to be as valid as any other path to knowledge, and the meaning they derive from life respected as "true." Educational philosophies that address such learners produce "pedagogies of the oppressed," critical and feminist.

Today there is great interest in the differences among knowers as to what knowledges they may produce from the bases of sexual identity and gendering, the natures of those processes, and how they might be elicited by teachers. Within pedagogy this interest is quite new, appearing in its infancy. It merits the content of the next chapter.

Footnotes

[1]Feminists are confronted with a dilemma: Have we participated in culture or have we not? If so, how do we justify our complaints that, as Lerner says, "The world has been seen with just one eye"? Does our resentment gather around the neglect of patriarchy to acknowledge our contributions, or the exclusively masculine creation of a culture that is harsh and destructive? The first part of the question is a liberal complaint, the second part of concern of radicals. A synthesis would answer yes to both: by a failure of the public world to incorporate women's knowledge and nurturing in its machinations, we have created a culture that is threatening to the earth, its resources, and its people. For more, see Jaggar (1988), Lerner (1986), and Ortner (1974).

[2]Biological treatises: History of animals; On the generation of animals; On the soul. Politics.

CHAPTER THREE

CRITICAL AND FEMINIST PEDAGOGIES

Introduction

Critical pedagogies speak to change. They make their appearance in academe at a time when public education is controlled by an immense, multi-leveled bureaucracy whose authority terminates with the Supreme Court of the United States. Individual citizens with concerns about perceived inequities in local schools may or may not find redress in their local school boards, as power as been redistributed across state and federal offices. Federal involvement in (control over) education comes as a mixed blessing. How can the dissenting voice be heard? One vessel presenting a critique of American schooling is the academy which, if it chooses to do so, creates a Foundations of Curriculum area within its School of Education which demands a careful look at the American system of schooling: what it is about, the effect it has upon us, our children, and the world, and how it might be reconceptualized for more desirable results.

This chapter explores critical and feminist pedagogies as two alternatives to the pervasive, generically homogenized systems of schooling practiced across the United States as public education. In a sense, feminist pedagogy is one of the critical pedagogies in its outlook and processes (education that places blacks or Native Americans in the center of their own histories would be other), taking a critical stance toward the world and schooling and sharing some fundamental values. In another sense, feminist pedagogy grows out of critical pedagogy and expands some of its concepts. Following a discussion of both, connections between both pedagogies will be made. This chapter recommends the functions and concepts of critical and feminist pedagogies as the most effective, humane

agencies for the creation of a better world and better schooling, describes the program of "Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies" at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro as an example of critical pedagogy within the matrix of a state university, with some of the problems it encounters.

Critical Pedagogy

Critical pedagogy is an analysis of the processes and interrelatedness of 1) education, that includes the components of its philosophy and aims, teachers and students, curriculum and methodology, evaluation and research; 2) knowledge, as it is generated by the individual and groups; 3) the social matrix, that defines and determines the processes and their components; 4) criticism and analysis themselves; and the means by which the alternative visions of social culture may be conceived. Beyond the functions of producing criticism and developing theory, critical pedagogy demands activity in the world: a praxis based on and incorporating its concepts.

Characteristics

Critical pedagogy and its theoretical underpinnings are questioning and analytical in nature. They are also necessarily political: they address a society that is perceived to be "exploitative and oppressive" (Weiler, 1988, p. 5), which is the political description of power arrangements among groups. It is the "voice of conscience" to the specific dominant ideology of a society, whatever that might include, engaging in a discourse with it that may shift but remains directed toward an idea.

Ultimate purposes. The aim of critical pedagogy is the creation and continual re-creation of a society that is liberating for all its members, one in which the themes of domination-subordination do not appear. It seeks to do this through the revitalizing and democratizing of a public education that dignifies the learner and produces critical thinkers and compassionate human beings of students who are thus empowered to

"transform the world according to their own vision" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985, p. 157). It provides hope for the present and the future through a "language of possibility" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985, chap. 7). Though it could be theorized that the realization of an egalitarian society would render the premise and language of critical pedagogy obsolete, a more realistic understanding of the practice of theory indicates that any ideology, or forces at work within it, bears watching, critiquing, and shaping.

Theoretical sources. Weiler (1988, pp. 4-25) organizes critical theory around two paradigms: one contains traditional and critical divisions, the other contains production and reproduction divisions. The process of criticism itself is traditional, but as a method it is less critical and hopeful than what is considered to be critical theory today. By comparison, critical theory today is Marxist in flavor, having been deeply influenced by the Marxist concerns of the domination and subordination of social groups, and the concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971).

Reproduction theory describes the structures and forces influencing the individual, the school, and society that continually extend and perpetuate that society in the future. It contends that the society builds safeguards into its own machinery to see that its survival is assured; that one of these safeguarding structures is the school and its processes. By analysis, it assumes that an understanding of those forces could provide a basis for change.

Production theory describes the ways in which present day ideology is altered and reinterpreted so that a new one emerges from generation to generation. It focuses on counter-hegemonic activity through the resistance of groups within the society. It is within production theory that the language of possibility becomes most evident.

Concepts

Critical educational theory includes the study and application of three major concepts, all of which are socio-political in nature: hegemony, ideology, and resistance. This is not to say that the involvement of the individual is not important, or that the behavior of groups is not observed to be mirrored in the behavior of individuals. Critical educational theory locates the individual within the structures and interactions of his or her social matrix; it posits that any study of the individual without consideration of these structures and forces that come to bear upon him or her is incomplete.

Hegemony. Gramsci (1971) was the first theorist to develop the notion of hegemony that contributes so heavily to critical social and educational theory today. He was intrigued by the repetitious appearance of the domination-subordination paradigm in societies throughout history, raising several significant questions of interest to reproductionists: Why are some values perpetuated in society? What forces operate to perpetuate them? In what ways do people participate in their own oppression? Are human beings actors, or acted upon? Other questions fuel the productionists: Is it possible to intervene in the process of reproduction and deliberately change hegemonic assumptions and values? Has this ever occurred? How might this be done? What assumptions and values would have to be changed in order to change the way(s) in which people regard each other, the way(s) in which we live together, and the ultimate value of life?

The answers to these questions lie in the study of people's experience, in the careful analyses of specified truths and attitudes among them, present over time, and the forces and influences upon them that obliterated, modified, or reinforced them through historical periods. Obviously, there is no formula. For those interested in education and

educational theory, the implications are these: what we study affects how we think about things. How we think about things affects what we do about them. If social injustice can be attacked by scholarship and study, a new view of social arrangements may at least be added to the hegemonic milieu for an amended ideology.

Ideology. Ideology is the total collection of formal and informal knowledge (religious, political, social, and individual) that constitute a generally agreed-upon thought system for a specific culture at any given time. Ideology may include myth, "common sense," and laboratory research, as long as they are assumed to be true. The dominant ideology may or may not be accepted by every human being within the culture, but it is that which is responsible for official political decisions, the forms that social structures take within the society, and the moral interpretations that groups and individuals make that govern the lives of persons therein. Ideology accrues from the collective past experience of a people as it is reinterpreted in the present. Whether or not individuals accept or support certain features of the dominant ideology, all individuals participate in it (if unwittingly); all suffer and profit by it. For critical educational theory, the importance of ideology is this: there is a dialectic operating between education and accepted truth. One impacts upon the other. If ideas become freed and transmitted through schooling, the dominant ideology of a culture (ours) can be changed.

Resistance. Resistance is the visible behavior of individuals and groups in opposition to strictures imposed by the dominant ideology, and it is of special interest to productionists. Generally, resistance is seen most readily in subcultures and among the young in "pop culture." Boycotts, picket lines, marches, riots, sit-ins, demonstrations, and petitions; bizarre dress, music, and language; and the establishment of certain schools and political parties are some manifestations of resistance by groups to the

dominant ideology. Among individuals, resistance can be seen in alternative lifestyles and sexual mores, personal appearance, and codes of behavior that deviate from the accepted ideological norm. The numbers of people who participate in resistance, the degree to which it varies from the norm, and its duration over time determine the extent of the threat posed to dominant ideology. Understandably, resistance is punished by culture as an effort to preserve its authority and control. The experience of resistance is incorporated into cultural memory. If significant numbers of people participate in it over a long enough period of time, positive or negative connotations can overtake the issues resisted (on the other hand, they may not: another interesting problem for students of hegemony, which do and which not). Its implications for education are these: resistance is a socio-political activity that manifests itself in schools in a variety of divergent behaviors, often for the same reasons it becomes apparent in the larger society (such as the pain of individuals wrought by class restrictions). It can be monitored in the classroom by students themselves as they confront the dominant ideology of schooling, and in that social microcosm it can be dealt with safely, productively, and with understanding. Resistance can be generated by education and, in fact, perhaps should be. At the least, it can serve observers of society as an index of the restrictive nature of its ideology and the extent to which it is opposed.

Functions

Critical pedagogy analyzes and critiques society, education, and criticism itself. It offers new models for schooling (its processes, curriculum, the roles of teachers and students) and for education research. It provides hope for those who assume that our problems have grown so unmanageable as to be inevitable and beyond us.

Critique of society. According to Aronowitz and Giroux (1985, chap. 6), critical theory owes the foundation of its social analysis to Marxism. Karl Marx explained the

workings of society and its inherent political advantages in terms of the means, control, and profits of production; he described the results of these forces and the costs extracted by capitalism upon an increasingly industrialized society, upon its groups and its individuals. He correlated the acquisition of material wealth with an artificial acquisition of dignity, both of which were achieved by few at the expense of many. He viewed the nature of man (sic) as that which has been assigned him as role by the society he serves; his critique and philosophy were inexorably bound to the Industrial Revolution, based on economic and political arrangements. As Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) point out, Marxism, as a doctrine, is not equally applicable for all times and in all places. It contains its own limitations. Its primary benefit to us today lies in its description of school settings as representative of the stratified, larger society, plagued by artificial divisions of class, and of the struggles of students and teachers for power and domination within them. The task for critical theorists, in developing a language of possibility, seems to be that of moving beyond Marx without abandoning his point of view.

Critique of education. In its critique of educational theory and practice, critical theory owes more to Paulo Freire than to anyone else since John Dewey (Fritz Mengert, personal conversation, April, 1989). Freire was an adult educator in Brazil until the mid '60s, when he was imprisoned after the coup, committed to raising adult literacy in a largely illiterate country that was further handicapped by democratic inexperience. He combined an authentic and relevant teaching methodology with an optimistic philosophy of humankind and society (Freire, 1983). As Schilb (1985, p. 258) says, ". . .it connects true reciprocity in the educational process with a truly humanistic praxis in the larger world." While there is likely nothing new in Freire's model, it contrasts dramatically with traditional teaching forms. In his words, traditional

education is "massifying"; "propaganda"; and the "changing [of] one's knowledge for other knowledge" (Freire, 1983). The purpose of critical education, in his view, is:

> . . .to form critical attitudes. . .by predisposing men [sic] to perceive themselves in a dialectical relationship with their social reality. . .to assume an increasingly critical attitude toward the world and so to transform it. . . . Our new education would have to offer man [sic] the means to resist the 'uprooting' tendencies of our industrial civilization which accompany its capacity to improve living standards." (pp. 32-34)

His literacy curriculum resulted in a cultural literacy. The topics and vocabulary, generated by his students, were of life and death importance to them. For Freire, the classroom setting was simply a small gathering of individuals who discussed topics to which they could bring their experience and questions; each student shared his or her experience and learned from shared experiences of others. By this process, students not only gained knowledge and insight into the events that were shaping their lives, but also a new concept of themselves as thinkers who were capable of understanding and shaping those events. They gained a new self-respect and dignity; forming community by learning in community, they respected and dignified one another. Teachers made materials available, offered their single ideas to facilitate discussion, and placed themselves in the political debate, assuming a role of minimal leadership; but they were rather an integral part of the process than Givers of Truth. Freire's concept of education forged inexorable links between the individual and one's experience and learning, one's community, and the machinations of one's culture; hence, his concept is definitively sociological and political.

Critique of criticism. Greene (1971) describes two philosophies of criticism: the dominant mode coming from England and the United States is analytic. It contends that objects are understood in isolation. The subject to be studied is removed from its matrix and dismembered, each particle analyzed as thoroughly as possible by itself. The

dominant mode coming from France and Switzerland is existential, or phenomenological. The object to be studied is considered to be the effort of its creator to understand his or her own experience by having couched it in language. One's knowledge could be considered as such a creation; as such, it is the "curriculum" of one's life. Pre-structured, it functions as a map to follow in the strangeness of new situations and ideas. To be understood, it must be studied within the matrix of the learner-creator, his or her past experiences, and his or her interpretations of those experiences. Critical educational theory promotes this form of analysis as it is consistent with its notion of the connections between knower and knowledge.

Through the lens of the critical theorist, the acquisition of knowledge and schooling are separate issues. As has been described, knowledge is seen to be generated by the knower and is therefore part of him or her. Knowledge exists in the mind and cannot be analyzed or understood apart from the mind of the knower. As Dewey says, learning, or producing knowledge, occurs during one's reflection upon one's experience.

Schooling, on the other hand, is described by Greene (1971, pp. 482-483), at its best, to be the structured opportunity for that reflection: "Having engaged in a reflexive consideration of his new consciousness, he [sic, the student] can now shift his attention back to the life-world which [may have]. . .been rendered so unrecognizable. . . "Ideally, schooling provides the time and space in which the student may engage in a reflection of his or her experience as well as its praxis in a social laboratory.

Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) cite 3 major theoretical tasks that must be addressed in the reconstruction of a radical theory of schooling:

> First, it is necessary to articulate a new critical view which recognizes the political and strategic relevance of distinguishing between education and schooling. Secondly, it is imperative to develop a discourse and set of concepts around which this distinction becomes theoretically operational for developing more viable forms of political pedagogy. Thirdly, theoretical work that focuses on social and cultural reproduction has to be developed in conjunction with

> analyses of social and cultural production, particularly in relation to historical studies of oppositional public spheres and the emergence of critical social movements. (p. 131)

The learning-schooling comparison looks something like theory-experience. Cocks (1985, chap. 14) reminds us that "reflection [is] different from the experience reflected upon. . .it secures its status as the analysis, rather than the verbal copy, of the world." Learning is related to reflection, and schooling is related to experience.

Models of educational research constitute an important concern and contribution of critical theory. It does not discard the empirical model, nor does it abandon its role of interpreting empirical data. However, it supports the collection of "subjective" data by "subjective" researchers, contending that all collected data is subjective anyway. It advocates phenomenological research, which views one's life experiences as phenomena observed by the mind, and consists of in-depth analysis of a few individuals as opposed to shallow analysis of many. The researcher is expected to engage in the interview process, which becomes a praxis in itself. He or she listens to the subject in an effort to determine what tacit assumptions the subject holds about life, and how those assumptions were formulated in the subject's mind as constructed knowledge. This method is considered to be valid because it connects opinions and events with the person who experiences and interprets them. Again, knowledge and knower cannot be separated.

Outlook

If a function of critical pedagogy is to instigate a penetrating discourse over the truly significant issues in education and the larger world, another is to describe more just and humane models of existence. This description is what Aronowitz and Giroux (1981) mean by a "language of possibility." A diatribe of public education and the society it mirrors, analyzing their ills and failures, is neither possible nor constructive without companion visions to which they are compared. Descriptions of

"how it might be" provide reference points for theorists, teachers, and citizens who would effect and enjoy a better life.

Relevant education. Freire (1983, p. 96) says, ". . .true education incarnates the permanent search of people together with others for their becoming more fully human in the world in which they exists." It would be one ". . .which would lead men [sic] to take a new stance toward their problems -- that of intimacy with those problems, one oriented toward research instead of repeating irrelevant principles. An education of 'I wonder,' instead of merely, 'I do'" (Freire, 1983, p. 36). This education would draw the student into the process and environment of his or her own learning, developing an understanding of democracy through the experienced exercise of democracy. It would connect the daily, present struggles of students with those that exist in the larger society.

Radical curriculum. Greene (1971, p. 475) describes the learner "who is 'open to the world,' eager, indeed condemned to give meaning to it -- and, in the process of doing so, recreating or generating the materials of a curriculum in terms of his [sic] own consciousness." Freire (1983) develops such a curriculum in his cultural literacy program. Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) describe it as, "an historical expression of both past struggles over what constituted political and cultural authority, and the forms of ethical, intellectual, and moral regulation implied in specific forms of school authority" (p. 214). Curriculum is the stuff of students' lives, ever expanding with the interpretation of experience.

This leads directly to the Canon Debate. Subscribing to this concept of the connection between experience and theory, personal experience and knowledge, radical educators call for an expansion of the canon in Higher Education. Additionally, they know that there is no part of a student's experience, such as the manner of his or her means of

employment, that has no meaning and is not worthy of critical examination. In the example of nursing, not only the techniques of patient care should be taught to students, but also the moral and ethical dimensions of the ways in which patients are cared for, and to what ends, should be scrutinized continually. This is the business of education, if one understands its purpose as developing in the student the habits of understanding of, responsibility for, and commitment to what he or she does in life; in fact, the most persuasive argument for the inclusion of "non-academic" programs within the academy is enabling students to make connections between the ordinary, daily realities of their lives and their larger, moral and political dimensions.

Critical activity. Critical pedagogy is committed to holding a mirror before the face of dominant social and educational ideology on a continuous basis. If criticism were accepted in its most constructive function, it would aid the power system in examining itself in terms of its cost to humanity, to the American people and to the individual student. It would demand an analysis of what we are teaching, how we are teaching it, and to what end. It could and would reform education here and have some impact on the world at large through the dialectical relationship between education and culture. Theorists recognize that this influence of formal education has limits (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985, p. 131), but as long as education remains as we know it to be, we will never witness its potential and power.

Feminist Pedagogy

The purpose of this section is to examine and describe the amorphous nature of feminist pedagogy as it appears in its infancy, its philosophy and concepts, focus, methodology, and curriculum, to determine the way(s) in which the feminist extension of critical theory and practice might further the feminization of schooling as well as the realization of broader feminist aims. Commonalities with critical pedagogy are noted

with an explanation of why feminist pedagogy claims a necessary identity apart from it; that is, why a feminist pedagogy is important in itself when critical pedagogy is available. This chapter is completed by a summary and observations.

Feminist pedagogy includes two related formats: one is the feminized classroom serving students from pre-school ages through Higher Education, and the other is the Women's Studies Program found as part of curricula in colleges and universities. The feminized classroom is one in which the voices of all students are heard and dignified, ideological assumptions are tested by democratic principles and new values emerge (such as competition giving way to co-operation), conflicts and problems in the classroom are analyzed through an analysis of the larger society, activities are non-gendered, authority is shared, and curricula reporting the world through the eyes of women and minorities are developed. Essentially, critical thinking is elicited from all students, male and female, and theory is made from experience.

Women's Studies Programs in the academy usually consist of a committee-chosen collection of courses taught across disciplines that place women, people of color, and the poor in the center of the scholarly investigation of that discipline. (In some places, Departments of Women's Studies exist; this is not typical.) Women's Studies defines itself as an intersection of gender, race, and class, endeavoring to teach students something about these silenced populations as they relate to particular disciplines (history, science, and so forth), employing feminist methodologies and a radically revised curriculum. Critics of feminism, many of whom adhere to classical definitions of scholarship as professors in the academy, question the need for Women's Studies courses, referring to them as "watered down"; they maintain that all worthwhile knowledge has already been written and preserved in the traditional curriculum or will be carried forth by the directions such curricula have been moving since Plato. In fact,

the University has provided a much needed place where women from all disciplines can come together with new research and alternative interpretations of the old to create new knowledge for everyone. Further, taken as part of a total academic program, such courses give women and minorities an understanding of themselves as historical subjects and objects and their roles in their disciplines. The feminized classroom and Women's Studies Programs are differentiated in the Curriculum section of this chapter, where their differences are most obvious.

Feminist pedagogy emerges from "radical" feminism in its response to patriarchy and its concern with the roots of gendering and sexism. As has been stated, radical feminism includes the study of patriarchy, ecofeminism, romantic feminism, goddess worship, the Gaia principle in nature, feminist theology, feminist liberation theology, lesbian separatism, and alternative visions of non-sexist social arrangements. Though this paper is written from a radical perspective, it regards seriously the political concerns of socialist feminism (namely, power imbalances within and between the sexes and the nature of revolutions), as well as the liberalist agenda for what they contribute.

Philosophy and Concepts

As has been stated, a single theory that distinguishes sexual identity from gendering is not complete; that is, a debate continues among radical feminists over what it means to be uniquely female. What is biologically predetermined, what is "known" from body experiences, and what has been socially constructed and taught are not yet clearly determined. What we do know is that: culture is primarily a masculine enterprise (Ortner, 1974); women are, and historically have been, universally devalued (Ortner, 1974, p. 71); the patriarchally constructed world has been interpreted and reported by a masculine perspective ["the world has been seen with one

eye," (Lerner, 1986)]; the male experience in the world has been accepted as the universal and only experience; that schooling and all it involves is based on masculist paradigms; that women have contributed to the building of culture and, in this way, have participated in their own domination.

The currently emerging theory of feminist pedagogy draws from these observations by radical feminists rather than from a definitive theory of woman's nature as differing from man's. The major concepts contained within feminist pedagogy are: 1) hegemonic ideology of society, of the school, of males and females; the dialectical tradition of gender in women as actors vs. acted upon; making the personal political; and eliminating the barrier between public and private spheres of activity; 2) hierarchy, the meaning of marginalization, and the conflict between middle-class and working-class subjectivities; and 3) empowerment, through studies of the dialectics of authority and resistance, and the dialectics of structural forces and agency vs. individual consciousness. Friedman (1985) puts it this way:

> We need a theory that first recognizes the androcentric denial of all authority to women and, second, points out a way for us to speak with an authentic voice not based on tyranny. . .to develop a classroom based on the 'authority' radical feminism has granted to women in the process of subverting and transforming patriarchal culture. (p. 207)

Focus

Considering the concepts central to feminist pedagogy and the direction it would take, its lens is primarily political, though the experience of woman-as-knower is critically important. Feminist pedagogy examines the dynamics of cultures and gender roles historically, and in present day society, their homes and schools, as hierarchically constructed arenas of struggle for identity and power. It connects the lived experience of the individual student with those historical and present day struggles of marginal

populations in the world-at-large. The classroom becomes a microcosm of that world, and a laboratory in which its dynamics may be experienced and its conflicts understood. Additionally, feminist pedagogy focuses on research. It encourages a model of subjective, interpretative inquiry into the lives of individual women to find their reality and the sense they make of it (see Appendix).

Friedman (1985, p. 204) lists the elements of a feminist pedagogy that would clarify its focus:

1. a non-hierarchical classroom;
2. validation and integration of "the personal";
3. commitment to changing students' attitudes toward women, most particularly women's images of themselves and their potential;
4. recognition that no education is value-free and that our field operates out of a feminist paradigm (as opposed to the patriarchal paradigm of most classrooms).

Methodology

Feminist methodology is rooted in the commitment of educators to the feminist principles that voices of the silenced must be heard; that power arises from within groups, increasing as it is shared; and that authority is awarded through respect. The teacher creates an atmosphere of trust in the classroom by encouraging contributions from all students and sharing with them as much of the decision making, such as planning course requirements and grading student performance (Brown, 1988, June) as the institutional school will allow. As feminist pedagogy promotes the finding and use of voice, it assumes that problems can be elucidated, understood, and solved by talking about them; hence, discussion undertaken by all class members is both process and product. There is nothing new about the notion that group participation and interaction

precipitate learning: Glasser (1969, chap. 10) describes a procedure for encouraging "Classroom Meetings," Stanford (1977) organizes various strategies for developing trust among group members, and Freire (1983, Part II) outlines his success with adult literacy programs in Brazil, all by group processes as method.

Schniedewind (1987, Fall/Winter) says:

> Feminist teachers, sometimes borrowing from other sources, have developed specific classroom processes that embody feminist principles as teaching tools. These feminist processes include skills for: 1) communicating, 2) developing a democratic group process, 3) cooperating, 4) integrating theory and practice, and 5) creating change. An important component of feminist pedagogy can be the teaching of these specific processes to students.

There is no one definitive feminist method of teaching, perhaps for several reasons: first, feminist pedagogy is too new and in experimental stages of its development (Spakes, personal conversation, 1989, September); secondly, good teaching is an artistic phenomenon that is not entirely controlled by formula; thirdly, learning is a process that occurs during the learner's reflection. Formalized, lock-step stages of learning that result from cookbook teaching methodologies are incompatible with feminist notions of knowledge and have a dehumanizing effect upon knower when practiced. It is likely (and hoped) that feminist methodology will never produce them.

Inevitably, feminist methodology involves tapping the latent despair of students, bringing their despair to their consciousness, enabling them to see how resolving it depends on knowing how their own freedom is limited, enabling them to see how the whole world functions, enabling them to see how others feel agony in specific, tangible forms, and showing them how global social change is possible and needed (Shilb, 1985, p. 259). Russell (1985, pp. 156-168) adivses feminist teachers to:

1. Take one subject at a time.
2. Encourage storytelling.

3. Give political value to daily life.
4. Be able to speak in tongues.
5. Use everything.
6. Be concrete.
7. Have a dream.

The classroom should be a collection of friends who value and respect one another, a community of individuals who come to realize that their learning depends upon their shared experiences. The individual student should come to understand that his or her perceptions and experiences are important as he or she is validated; and that they resonate with those of unnamed legions worldwide, and throughout time.

Curriculum

The feminized classroom. In the public schools, "curriculum" refers to those subjects selected to be taught and the books used to teach them (critical theorists know that everything school-related encountered by the student comprises his or her curriculum, hidden as well as overt. However, this section limits the concept to those subjects required and materials made available in the typical classroom). Until textbooks are rewritten as to tell the stories of women and minorities relative to subjects studied, it remains with the classroom teacher to use them as points of departure, creating a curriculum of students' lives and needs as he or she designs lessons. Ideally, teachers as "transformative intellectuals" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985) have the expertise to plan academic curriculum for children and could do so but for the "deskilling" strictures emanating from political-educational bureaucracies. Currently, feminist teachers must take the required curriculum and present it in a feminist context, and toward feminist goals (the redemption of the planet and its people). This results in an inexorable intertwining of curriculum and methodology.

An analysis of this task has been undertaken. Peggy McIntosh (1985), at Wellesley College, coins the phrase "transformation of the curriculum" to describe the process of re-visioning. She sees curriculum transformation of any discipline occurring in five phases. First, the discipline appears as "womanless," what we generally see today in traditional curriculum. This is a recounting of the accomplishments of "great men," the "Winners" of their day, brought to our attention and admiration. Second, the curriculum sticks a few contributing women in, "women in the discipline," usually at the end of a chapter of the text, or at the end of the book, who are frequently ignored. Third (and this is the entry level for critical theory), the curriculum includes "women as problematic," or, the problems and barriers women faced in approaching that discipline, with an analysis of why those barriers existed. Fourth, the curriculum discusses "women as" the discipline, recounting the ways that women, in their private and public spheres, contributed to the praxis of theory. Fifth, we see the discipline "redefined," in which the curriculum is rewritten to include us all. This last phase requires a new interpretation of all previous phases, culminating in total transformation. McIntosh says (p. 17):

> The study of women, like women themselves, can help to supply the vision, the information, and the courage needed for this task, and can thus increase our chances of global and personal survival.

Women's Studies Programs. Curricula for Women's Studies Programs is recommended by Women's Studies Committees in the academy and sanctioned by university administrations. Individual courses, as well as the Women's Studies Program overall, are responsible for raising students' consciousness of gender, race, and class through readings appropriate to subject areas. As professors must select those readings, feminists are drawn directly into the Canon Debate within Higher Education. Obviously, we join with liberals, radicals, and others in critical pedagogies by calling for an

expansion of the list of sources available to students that enable them to understand and give meaning to their lives.

Generally speaking, according to Rich (1979, pp. 237-245), a feminist curriculum would give women a knowledge of their own history and biology; the creative work of women in the past; the skills, crafts, techniques, and power exercised by women in different times and cultures; and knowledge of women's rebellions and organized movements against our oppression, and how they have been routed and diminished. In sum, both feminist methodology and curriculum are counter-hegemonic, consciousness-raising, and personal: the communication of "living feminist values in a socio-political context" (Raymond, 1985, p. 54).

Schmitz (1985) refers to the inclusion of Women's Studies programs in Higher Education as the "Integrated Curriculum," describing how change is initiated without conveying the ultimate goal, "which remains the transformation of structures of knowledge and of educational institutions" (p. 8). She recounts the two central aims of Women's Studies programs as these: "to develop a body of knowledge and a new curriculum that focus on women and gender; and to use this knowledge to transform the male-centered curriculum of educational institutions" (p. 1). Her use of the term "transform" is not accidental: she sees McIntosh's "transformation of curriculum" as the ultimate goal of the "integrated curriculum." Her book lays out the process of integrating Women's Studies courses as a manual for those pioneers in the academy who likely need step-by-step guidance in this effort.

This conception of a Women's Studies curriculum is sharply contrasted with the generally-found tokenism of "compensory education," in which textbooks are "revised" to include an occasional mention of some woman, now and again, in a boxed-off portion of a page, or a section about women at the end of the semester's course of study (which

frequently is not covered, by the constraints of time). Feminists who seek a transformation of the academy call for an overhaul of the entire presentation from a radically different point of view and the telling of its story. In the sciences that make use of statistical data regarding human beings, feminists contend that only "gender balanced" research (that is, studies including equal numbers of male and female subjects) be reported as valid. Furthermore, the methods of conducting research, or what academia acknowledges as research, should be expanded to include "interpretive inquiry" or "oral history" as well as traditional, statistical analyses (see Appendix).

Connections with Critical Pedagogy

Similarities. The similarities between critical and feminist pedagogies gather around their commonly shared values and their vision of the way we might live together: both take a critical posture toward dominant ideologies of hierarchy and endeavor to name and analyze their structures and agencies. Both contend that we can understand the world-at-large through the experience of our own lives: that knowledge is constructed through our individual interpretations of personal experience, and that schooling can make that connection. Both see individual empowerment as emerging from community, and that schools can teach community as a goal through democratic, community experience. Most importantly, both see that a just and joyous existence is not only possible within the human condition but, in fact, depends upon the critical understanding and personal effort of everyone: that egalitarianism is attainable, and that the world can be transformed.

There exists a strong similarity between critical and feminist pedagogies in methodology as well as purpose and vision: the importance of dialectical instruction. In its simplest form, this amounts to teaching and learning through a process of talking and listening, providing that the paticipants construct, through their discourse, a body of

thought or new understanding. Dialectical instruction comes from the dialectics of philosophy. Harris (1979, p. 123) describes it as:

> . . .simply part of a conception of reality as process or development, wherein everything, without exception, undergoes internal change. The world is thus seen to be dynamic. . .and the world is seen to be constantly in a state of change as a result of our investigations into and interactions with it. We interact with the world on the basis of our knowledge of it, but this interpretation also changes the world for us, and leaves us having to know again.

Dialectics involves the interactions between oppositions and contradictory situations and, by so doing, works against ideology, which seeks to obscure or camouflage conflicts at basic levels of human inquiry. It theorizes interior change of both oppositional positions by virtue of their struggle with each other. Even in the co-optation of a weaker force by a stronger one, the stronger will be changed in that process, in the engagement of the struggle. Dialectical instruction places the teacher, the student, and the material under consideration, in an interactive paradigm for power: Whose knowledge will triumph over the other? Dialectics assert that all knowledges will change the knowers, and that all knowledges will therefore change. Critical and feminist pedagogies rely on the concept of dialectics and the dialectical method as a primary mode of instruction.

Differences. Feminists agree that their cause cannot be left to universal goals of justice because inevitably it will be co-opted. (Universals are seen not to work: "All men are created equal"; or, "Everyone has equal opportunity under the law," among them). Further, real situations and personal responsibility for them have a way of getting lost in abstractions. (For instance, to call patriarchy "a language" may be true enough, but it is other things as well. People stand behind that language and produce it by attitude, with an eye on political advantage. While a reference to patriarchy as "a language" indicates its pervasiveness, it also tends to dismiss it in a way that obscures a

personal responsibility of patriarchal men for the oppression of women in very real, specific situations.) To place the goals of feminist pedagogy in the hands of critical pedagogy would not necessarily effect their coming to be, any more than the cause of feminism was furthered by Marxism.

Further, differences between critical and feminist pedagogies relate to emphases. One is the phenomenon of "male aggression": a feminist critique of human history demands an examination of dominance at its roots, including psychosexual, anthropological, and political possibilities. Historically, how has this paradigm made its way into human interaction? Feminist pedagogy pursues a goal of finding alternative ways for all people of varying "strengths" and "weaknesses" to get along with each other without some assuming a political advantage.

Another difference in emphasis is seen in the notion of male "agency" (Bakan, 1966), closely related to aggression. The assumption that intervening in a situation to manipulate its outcome is generally preferable to letting it work itself out appears to feminists as yet another version of bringing the universe under one's control, and by the speediest methods. Feminist historians note that the current history curriculum is a recounting of "great men and great events"; ever present is a notion of the heroic, which makes the story "worth" telling. This theme is evident even in Liberation Theology, which promotes a God who empowers His friends with the strength sufficient to overcome crushing odds. Women have no such epic literature, but feminists feel that we have a story to tell, nonetheless. It includes little of besting an opponent through contest or rushing into conflict with a sweeping solution. Education, growth, and a lasting change of attitude generally result from sustained effort over long periods of time, something women understand well; further, while intervention may often be the best human response, equally as often the wisest and most appropriate response may be to

leave things alone for whatever time they need to come to a natural conclusion. (Of course, it might be a matter of degree. The argument can be made that women are agentic, too, but in the home, where less dramatic events are likely to occur. However, there does seem to me to be a difference between assigning household chores to children, on the one hand, and cementing the banks of the Mississippi Delta so that the state of Louisiana loses 600 square acres of itself per year, on the other.)

Another difference lies in the articulation of "what is personal is political." Though this idea may be inferred from Freire's pedagogical methods and the principle of critical theorists that the larger world may be understood through one's personal life, it is hammered out quite clearly and incessantly by feminists. The need for women to see that the divisions between private and public spheres is paramount in the campaign against patriarchy; that they are arbitrary, false, self-serving to men and destructive to women as long as the private sphere is held in low esteem. In our culture we recognize drug and alcohol addiction as a major problem today. We remove active addicts from public office when their abuse of chemicals comes to light, knowing that it is impossible to be "privately" addicted and "publicly" coherent. Feminists call for a view of behavior that transcends these political divisions with the same logic, destroying the "double standard," liberating women from the confines of private space, and rewarding virtue wherever it is found. A woman oppressed in her own single life mirrors the oppression of women in societies around the world and throughout history: as it is wrong in the global sense, it is just as wrong in the personal sense.

The value to education of the personal and its manifestation in relationship is another emphasis that separates critical and feminist pedagogies. Ellsworth (1989, August) reports a critical teaching experience that was not particularly successful and sifts through the possible causes for its failure to empower. She surmises that

empowerment, occurring as a result of honest disclosure of class members and teacher, depends upon community. Community embodies a trust and vulnerability that grow out of relationships of mutual caring, not a forum of rational discourse. In fact, she adds a necessary ingredient to the amorphous mixture of successful teaching by underscoring the need for friendship among those who would be empowered, and by questioning the need for rationality. As rationality is sought and revered, the irrational is sought and decried, and this throws "women's ways of knowing" into disrepute yet again. By Ellsworth's experience, human beings do not develop passionate empathies through logical, rational means, or the traditional masculist mode of learning. Learning is not exclusively logical. Feminist pedagogy can bring to critical study an awareness of the importance of the nurturance of individuals within groups along with the understanding that we can never fully know one another or experience one another's struggles; that our narratives are only "partial," as we tell them individually and as we put them together as a group. Like mothers who have traditionally accepted and nurtured the children they do not fully "understand," so we must develop in our classrooms the climate of a safe place through genuine friendship, where our disclosures are met with concern but our concealments are met with respect. Rationality, in the eyes of feminists, has limited value, and will retain its primacy as long as men set the standards for critical pedagogy.

Another difference between feminist and critical theories lies in the value of a Marxist critique. While critical theory owes its foundations to a Marxist critique of capitalism, feminists are not agreed that it fully explains sexual oppression. For one thing, the domination of women predates capitalism. Notions of hierarchy may well have set the stage for it. As Barrett (1985, p. 68) observes the composition of the labor force, "The belief that a (white) man has a 'right' to work over and above any rights of married women or immigrants has had significant effects in the organization of the

labour force." Finally then, gendering, as an emphasis, must be specifically addressed and relentlessly pursued by scholarly feminist inquiry toward the eventual destruction of patriarchal control. Gendering, as a concern of feminists, is of greater significance than its obvious social injustices to women. According to Jones (1985, p. 94):

> What we need to do is to move outside that male-centered, binary logic altogether. We need to ask not how Woman is different from Man (though the question of how women differ from what men think they are is important). We need to know how women have come to be who they are through history, which is the history of their oppression by men and male-designed institutions. Only through an analysis of the power relations between men and women, and practices based on that analysis, will we put an end to our oppression -- and only then will we discover what women are or can be.

She says that gendering is so much a part of us that it has invaded our subconscious and is expressed in dreams and autoerotic images. It is a staggering realization that woman-known-to-herself cannot occur within patriarchal systems of thought, behavior, and language. What she is and how she is always relates to the male, whom she calls "the eternal referent."

Another difference between feminist and critical pedagogies centers around a feminist vision of knowledge that involves the body. This vision is presently nebulous and difficult to describe, but theorists work to clarify it: they (Jones, 1985; Wilshire, 1989) perceive that the differences in the sexes can be reduced to genitals and libidos. Their rationale reads that as men bring everything under domination of the penis, women's erogenous zones are more subtle and diffuse; hence our libido is cosmic and our unconscious worldwide. They observe that women's bodies are made to bring about life and pleasure rather than to accumulate and dominate. They suggest that the world and our rightful activity in it can and should be known through the body; that, as men's bodies tell us about strength and mastery, women's bodies tell us about nurturance and interconnectedness; that our traditional dismissal of women's bodies as seductive, dirty,

or evil has denied the world a redemptive message of care to balance the masculist effort to control. While this edges toward biologic determinism, there is something in it worthy of consideration. If education ever comprehends and incorporates the notion of learning the world and human experience through the body, with all its attendant emotion, intuition, and sensuality, it would likely take a form unrecognizable by anything we know as pedagogy today.

Summary and Conclusions

Critical and feminist pedagogies are political in nature and purport to be so. They believe that learners can come to the world with understanding through the experiences of their own lives, and that effective education is that which enables them to do so. They both subscribe to a "pedagogy of the oppressed," creating curriculum from life, theory from experience. They are related by many common values, such as the dignity deserved by all students; similar goals, such as the realization of an egalitarian society; and a commitment to teaching democratic principles through a methodology of democracy. Critical pedagogy is the foundation upon which feminist pedagogy stands; yet feminist pedagogy as the "intersection of gender, race, and class" sees the need to extend the critique to pursue its own agenda: specifically, the liberation of women.

Considering that our society and our schools today are not feminized, females gendered into women struggle to gain understanding not only of the society that oppress us, but also of who we are and what we must do in order to "be ourselves." Patriarchal definitions of women, of knowledge, and of education demand a rigorous examination of self as woman and as knower. Where and how can this happen? Through a critical pedagogy such as appears in McIntosh's third phase of curriculum transformation, and the integration of Women's Studies programs in the academy, the plight of women (and other marginalized groups) can surface to women's and men's consciousness.

In an effort to establish a haven in which women and men may reflect upon themselves, the society we have re-created, and the society we would like to create, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro includes in its School of Education an area of specialization entitled, "Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies." The struggles of this tiny "department" within the matrix of the University are similar to those encountered by individuals in their lives and reflect the collective struggles of vast numbers of politically oppressed around the world. Sometimes its machinations seem liberating to students and faculty and sometimes they do not, just as feminist and critical pedagogies are seen, operating within the confines of patriarchal contexts, as effectual or ineffectual. But the dignity of struggle continues throughout. The area of foundations comprises yet another chapter in the never-ending saga of our attempts as visionaries to create the ideal situation in the real world; its problems address the question of putting things right.

Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies

Background

At the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the area of study in which students encounter critical theories of education is separate from the general teacher training track of pedagogical studies. Its purpose and character were seen as different from the purpose of the teacher training program (that is, meeting state guidelines and criteria in producing good classroom technicians). Ideally, education majors and professionals returning to school for additional coursework would be exposed to the offerings and challenges of critical pedagogy, approaching their students with an expanded consciousness of their activities and a critical understanding of what American schooling is about; certainly, critical theorists need the experience and tools of good instruction in their very real settings. Unfortunately, there exists something of a gulf

between "Foundations" majors and "Ped Studies" majors, in that opportunities for communication and community among us are difficult to arrange, if only by the constraints of time, tight scheduling, and competing activities.

Taken from a proposal approved by the University of North Carolina in April, 1988, this explanation describes the separate status of critical theory:

> During the times when Curriculum and Teaching was an area or a division, two broad approaches co-existed and co-operated, one general approach being (roughly) concerned with traditional professional areas (e.g., elementary education, math education, teacher training) with an emphasis on practice and application. The other general approach concerned itself more with broader theoretical and policy issues (e.g., moral dimensions of education; critical theory and curriculum; existential aspects of education). Obviously, the lines were often blurred but more often, the differences were quite clear. Indeed, the professional justification for splitting the group into two departments was to provide more opportunity for each orientation to develop more autonomously. We accepted a de facto specialization with its own character and uniqueness. The time has clearly come to formalize and further develop the program. This requires us to make our efforts better understood by more people; to be more energetic in our recruitment of students; and to actively solicit collegial support.

At this point in time, our area of specialization includes among its faculty a Marxist sociologist, an existentialist and Buberian scholar, a feminist, and a curriculum theorist. Their views and challenges to American systems of education and to professionals working within those contexts are fundamentally relevant. An active dialogue between Foundations and Pedagogical Studies would produce a rich, much-needed discourse within the academy that could extend into public school systems and the wider community.

Goals

Also taken from the April, 1988 proposal is this statement of the program's goals:

> We believe our proposed title Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies captures the essence of what our informal program has been. The concentration

would add particularly unique elements to the general Curriculum and Teaching Doctorate.

1. A concern for the disciplined study of the relationship between culture and education. Among these diciplines are philosophy, sociology, history, social psychology, cultural anthropology, and human development.
2. A concern for the disciplined study of the relationships among the arts, education, and culture.
3. A concern for providing broad philosophical, moral, and religious perspectives on educational policies and practices.
4. A concern for the rigorous study of the impact of current important intellectual movements in educational theory. Presently this involves focus on feminist and post-modernist thought.
5. A concern for providing a philosophical framework and foundation to current educational discourse.
6. A concern for the serious study of emerging forms of inquiry -- e.g., hermeneutical inquiry; ethnographic studies; phenomenological studies.
7. A concern for cross and interdisciplinary work requiring significant involvement of faculty across the School and University.
8. A concern for integrating personal and professional self; for providing synthesis, perspective, and direction.

We affirm the critical importance of professional training being grounded in liberal education. We are clearly concerned with the breadth and depth of what is fundamental to educational practice -- its ideology, philosophical assumptions, and its moral claims. We have a very strong commitment to the study of education and culture, and even more, a particular interest in the integration of the arts, cultural studies, social analysis, and moral inquiry.

We are willing to take intellectual risks, cross professional boundaries, experiment, and innovate, and we are eager to respond to students who are serious about rigorous study and also willing to take risks. Our program in education is committed to a liberal education emphasis rather than a professional education emphasis and is concerned fundamentally with philosophical, social, moral, economic, and religious analysis.

Program of Study

The usual length of time a graduate student spends working full-time towards a doctorate in Foundations is three years: two years of coursework and one year of dissertation. This varies among individuals, depending on the outside demands of our lives (families and jobs), as well as our financial capabilities. Though the program embodies a spirit of freedom and flexibility in accommodating student interests and

scheduling, there are requirements imposed upon it by the School of Education and the Graduate School that form the framework for the program of studies. The proposal goes on to say:

> The specialization in Cultural Studies operates within the guideline of the standards and requirements of the Doctoral Studies Program in Curriculum and Teaching (as revised in the statement of January 1, 1984). The purpose of this statement is to indicate more specifically how this specialization would respond to these general requirements, which are divided into five sections:
>
> 1. Educational Foundations: The general requirement is 9 semester hours but the Cultural Studies specialization will require the equivalent of a minimum of 18 hours. These courses would ordinarily include such courses as:
>
> History of Education
> Philosophies of Education
> Selected Critical Issues in Education
> Epistemology and Education
> Ethics and Education
> Human Development
> Social and Cultural Changes and Education
>
> 2. Curriculum and Teaching: The general requirement is for a minimum of 15 to 24 hours. Our students will, in meeting this requirement, ordinarily take such courses as:
>
> Curriculum Planning
> Implication of Learning and Development for Instruction
> Global Education in the Curriculum
> Teaching Models and the Analysis of Instruction
> Curriculum Theory
> Moral Dimensions of Educational Practice
> Supervision: Theory and Concepts
> Curriculum in Higher Education
> Models of Instruction in Adult and Higher Education
> Supervised Practicum in Curriculum and Teaching
>
> 3. Related Areas: Our students will very likely take such courses as those in the arts designed for the non-professional (e.g., Art: Laboratory Experiences in Art; Dance: The Creative Process); and/or courses in social analysis such as Sociology: Sociology of Education; Social Conflict; Changing Roles of Men and Women. Although there is no minimum requirement in the Curriculum and Teaching Doctorate, we will require a minimum of 9-12 hours in this area.
> 4. Field of Specialization: We will work within the guidelines of the general requirements and in reference to the specific needs and interests of individual students.
> 5. Research: The general requirement includes prior background in theory and practice in educational research design which we accept as minimal. Our specialization will require deep understanding of the concept of research and inquiry; knowledge and understanding of various research paradigms; criticisms of these paradigms; and the ability to conduct

significant scholarly research. Our students will very probably take such courses as:

Evaluation of Educational Programs
Epistemology and Education
Foundations of Interpretive Inquiry
Research in Curriculum and Educational Foundations
Historiography
Historical Research and Writing

The proposal describes the present collection of its dissertations-in-progress as "of high quality, often unconventional, sometimes at the very cutting edge of education research." Topics under consideration are: the deficiencies of developmental theory regarding the intuitive and spiritual sensitivities of young children; a critique of Freire from perspectives of Buberian thought and practices in special education; teachers committed to education as transformation; ideological nature of Jamaican education; feminist epistemology for curriculum theory; school resistance in rural high school students; and the metaphor of education as healing. The proposal goes on to say:

> Our Department has three [now four] faculty members and there are several members of the Pedagogical Studies and Supervision Department who can contribute to this concentration. In addition, we have already established strong ties with other faculty members within the School of Education and with Schools and Departments across the Campus who are willing to work with us in a program of Cultural Studies in Curriculum and Teaching. Outside the School of Education these include faculty from the Departments of Art, Biology, Religious Studies, Physical Education, Dance, Social Work, English, Sociology, and Psychology. The proposal summarizes its self-description in this way:
>
> We are proposing that our current doctoral offerings (as revised) be formally considered as a specialization in the doctoral program titled: Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies. With a separate title and set of goals, we believe we can attract students of high quality on a national level and engage in scholarly inquiry that will add to our understanding of education and contribute to a diversity of program offerings in the School of Education and the University. A special contribution of the concentration will be involvement of faculty members across the campus whose backgrounds and interest will bring an interdisciplinary emphasis to the study of education. We believe the concentration, if approved, can provide a unique experience for its students. We also believe it is clearly commensurate with the purpose of the School as revised in April, 1987 and the Mission and Goals of the University.

As has been noted, this proposal was accepted and presently stands as a clear and accurate picture of the Department. However, it encounters difficulties directly related to its character that become apparent within the operations of a patriarchal institution. It endeavors to provide a haven of critical thought and creative activity within a traditional University setting that is wedded to the values of voluminous positivist research, prestigious faculty, lock-step programs of advancement, federal grant funding, and all the attendant features of Big Business that characterize education today. The reality of maintaining the program and offering to graduate students free reign with their imaginations is similar to the revolutionary process of feminizing one classroom in a traditional school. A general description of some of the problems of the ideal encountering the real (theory "at odds" with experience) follows.

The Reality

Students in the Program. Students who seek a doctorate in Cultural Studies ("Foundations") generally struggle to pay in-state as well as out-of-state tuition fees at the University. Coming from professional positions, most of us must take part-time jobs that pay minimum wages in order to have the time to attend and prepare for classes. Most of us have families including spouse and children who necessarily take a secondary role in our lives during the most concentrated times of our programs. Students have no certainty that the conditions of our employment will improve the future, as we sacrifice today the benefits we were accruing in previous jobs. We take on the rigorous pursuit of this degree because the spirit of the Department spoke to deep, abiding questions that arose in our lives years ago, and demanded redress at long last. We find the strictures of the institutional University to be difficult in our efforts to understand the world and discover alternative values that would encourage happier, freer lives for all people.

Faculty. Our professors are suspended between the principles of emancipatory pedagogy and the habits of schooling that are rooted in their past experience as students and teachers. The effect is frequently uneven (for example, one is struck by the disparity between course content of interactive education taught by the lecture method; or, the role of teacher as just one of the participants heard from chairs that remain fixed in rows facing the front; or, the non-hierarchical nature of a classroom studied in one that has been pre-structured by assigned readings, required writing, and the rank-ordering of grades). Faculty choose which of the students will work with them as their assistants and who will be awarded plum opportunities to teach undergraduates, assignments that pay little but offer experience that future employers value. The faculty enjoy respect frequently bordering on awe, whether by achievement or ascription. What sets them apart from stereotypical professors is simply that they are aware of the inherent conflicts surrounding the issue of authority and struggle with them. The seek to change themselves and their methods as they advance the cause of global change and are open with students in discussing their personal difficulties with doing so.

The University's emphasis on publishing in professional journals, pressure on faculty to seek tenure, and increasing demands on their teaching loads further limit time and attention available to doctoral students. Sometimes submitted papers are not returned; at other times papers are returned but with minimal notations. The luxury of informal meetings with professors, during which students' ideas could be discussed, is becoming more rare. This is grievous for two reasons: first, because they, of all people, understand the nature of those concerns and could help us explore our thoughts; and second, because we miss the experience of deepening academic friendships, which lies at the heart of graduate study.

Programs of study. While the Department encourages students to explore and develop personal areas of interest, one's program is bounded by certain requirements. For example, if a student has not taken statistics in a masters program, he or she is required to do so now, even as our Department decries the notion of positivism and positivist research. Even for those students (such as I) who will never use statistics, who are morally opposed to the very premises upon which they are gathered, coursework in statistics is required. Additionally, the number of independent study courses a student may take for credit is limited: a student may not invest the major portion of his or her program into tutorials with individual professors. In our program, as in traditional programs, it is foolhardy and self-destructive for a student to appoint to his or her committee personalities that do not get along with each other; if there are resentments among members (perhaps unknown to the student, having been established long ago, before one's arrival), conflicts between them can hold the acceptance of a dissertation in suspension. Students in our Department must be as politically aware and sensitive as they must be in any other, if graduation is a goal.

Doctoral students from other states and foreign countries feel an estrangement, even an alienation, during graduate study. While local students return to families at the end of each day, out-of-state students do not; moreover, no formal organization exists within the Department to serve the social-emotional needs of students. Connections made with others occur through class attendance or not at all and, during the dissertation year, even that resource is not available. The academic demands made upon our time and energies partially obscure this need, but nothing short of a sense of belonging and community can truly meet it. In fact, as friendships are random, romance rarely blossoms; the more common occurrance is divorce, broken relationships, and sexual deprivation. Support from any group of fellow students is not forthcoming.

Curriculum. About 15 years ago the University became interested in claims by feminists that the curriculum and structure of the academy needed feminizing. A position was created for one woman and an assistant to coordinate and guide this process, a position that carried with it no real authority. There resulted great dissention across campus, with faculty members divided between poles of opinion. The feminist-advisor left the University and left in her wake lingering resentments among professors, both toward each other and toward the prospect of feminizing the University. This terrible price was paid for nothing: the academy had not been "transformed." At this point in time, renewed efforts on the part of recently hired faculty (naively thought by them to be novel and fresh) are met with soured disinterest, even by those who had previously supported feminization enthusiastically. It is today a sore subject.

There does exists a curriculum committee at the University whose function it is to oversee and examine the curriculum used in every course for its gender-balanced content; if gender balancing is not applicable, Departments are required to submit written justification for leaving it unrevised. The task of gender balancing curriculum is not easy: within every department of the University committees of adequate expertise must be formed to review textbooks in use and others offered as alternatives, and to choose those most appropriate for specific courses. University administration is loathe to give members reduced teaching schedules for this enterprise, as more instructors must be hired to meet enrollment needs. Spitzberg (1987, p. 304) describes how changes in university curriculum occur:

> Since substantive academic decisions are the heart of the university, much is at stake in these decisions: principle, status, resources. The very fact that so much is at stake and that the culture of the university prizes consultation make decisions about curriculum especially laborious and time consuming. . . .it is in the arena of curriculum that the faculty role is still primary and certainly meets the standard set by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in its Statement on University and College Government. This realty means that even considering incremental decisions about the nature of departmental curriculum

> takes a long time to talk through. When an institution reviews its whole educational program for assessment and possible reform, one measures the consultative process in years not months. This leads universities to be very conservative institutions.

Spitzberg traces curriculum change over an odyssey of four years, showing how an initial recommendation is discussed, written, rewritten, submitted for approval, rewritten again, resubmitted, sent to the university senate, to budget, to the president, and back to the senate with the recommendation that changes be implemented over a three-year period. True dedication must fuel the efforts of faculty to revise curriculum and, when there is dissention among them about the wisdom of revising it in the first place, the process will take even longer than Spitzberg's hypothetical four-plus years. Feminist revision and its dubious welcome fall into the unfortunate harangue generated by the Canon Debate.

Conclusions

Among the colliding interests of the University's commitments, Departmental philosophy, and individual challenges, women embark on doctoral study in Foundations unaware of the difficulties we will encounter in this voyage and the impact it will have upon us. Some of those difficulties follow these phenomena:

1. Our coursework will change our conceptions of the world and human purpose.
2. We will know financial and emotional hardship.
3. The support we find from the University and our Department will be limited and often inadequate.
4. Our academic goals will be tentative because our creativity has never been valued; our professional goals will be tentative because, as women, we have never been held in high esteem in the workplace.

5. We must learn to proceed on the shifting sands of expanded consciousness and redefinition of self, the academy, and culture; uncertainty will become a way of life.

From the milieu of our program, the stories of some women facing these difficulties are taken. While each is different, all contain recurrent themes relating to gender, race, and class. All describe the ongoing dialogue conducted with a world that is male-conceived, male-maintained, and male dominated.

CHAPTER FOUR

WOMEN IN ACADEME

Introduction

When my mother became ill and died, an unholy process that absorbed most of my first year in the doctoral program of this University, I found myself at a crossroads of self examination for my needs of immediate survival and future plans. It was similar to other junctures in my life, when such decisions were imminent and necessary, but it was different, too: What was it, in my head, that would sustain me (a critical issue for an addict)? Who was I, by my own analysis, without my mother's definition superimposed as a shadow? Her knowledge of me died during that long, bleak winter, and I felt keenly the exposure of a raw core to these questions. I wondered what of me had died with her, knowing that this was probably a mixed blessing. If I wanted to deal publicly with ideas, which is what college professors do, what ideas did I have? What knowledge did I think I understood well enough to share? And, more importantly, whatever led me to believe that I had the personal qualities of intelligence and intuition necessary for the task of entering the forbidding sanctum sanctorum of male scholarship known as Higher Education? As my conversations with other graduate students progressed, I began to hear those murmurings echoed by all the women in our program, in one context or another. Somehow each of us made the last decision of a series of decisions that put our names on a Departmental list as doctoral candidates, despite the external and the internal obstacles. I was fascinated to find out how we had come to it. Was it from a genius for abstract knowledge and learning? Was it from an abnormally well-formed faith in our abilities? Was it from a memory of our dazzling successes as

students? In short, who were we? What did we know? How did we value our knowledge? I tackled the inquiry of this dissertation as a personal quest. By its nature, it was a feminist concern and a concern of the academy, couched in a cultural ideology we struggle to see and understand.

Listening informally to others, I suspected that our challenges were more alike than unlike; that we shared the betrayal I had experienced by traditional knowledge in its failure to provide a map through life's dilemmas; that rigorous adherence to ascribed roles had not answered our deepest needs; that we were required by the pursuit of a doctorate in this discipline to reassess those needs by a renewed understanding of and faith in ourselves as individuals and as thinkers. This was my bias and the threshold upon which this study began.

I wondered about our differences. What observable characteristics of women interviewed come to bear upon our lives as we see them? Can certain responses be linked to personal attributes? In examining the individuals by conditions ("variables") established below, and by considering themes that emerged as clues to understanding their narratives, connections were sought to explain the type of feminism (liberal, socialist, or radical) each embraces and the purposes that drive our graduate studies. In other words, what influences shape our constructions? Can they be identified and correlated?

Construction of the Study

I chose eight women from our Department in all phases of their programs, including myself. It was a simple plan: I would ask a series of questions in a taped interview, have the tapes transcribed into paper copy, study their responses to my questions, reading for common themes and tacit assumptions, and interpret the data to either support, amend, or deny my suspicions. What resulted was a complex

interweaving of the subjective and objective, interviewer and subject, hoped for and heard. Those difficulties, foreshadowed by warnings from Oakley (1981), are apparent in this and the following chapter.

The Setting

I interviewed my subjects in my home or theirs, whichever was more convenient for them. I wanted the surroundings to be casual, informal, and familiar to them, as the nature of my questions was personal. I wanted the setting to add to an atmosphere of easy relaxation.

The Subjects

As has been stated, my subjects are women who have chosen a life in academia, currently pursuing a doctorate in the specialization of Curriculum and Teaching: Cultural Studies, within the School of Education at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. They find themselves in various stages of progress in their programs. As I met these women through classes we shared, they are personal friends of mine, some closer that others. Specific differences among them are organized around the following characteristics:

Age: 30s: 3
40s: 4
60s: 1

Ethnicity: Caucasian: 8

Home: South: 3
Midwest: 3
Southwest: 1
Foreign (England): 1

Childhood SES:	Lower middle class: 2	
	Middle middle class: 5	
	Upper middle class: 1	
Sexual Orientation:	Lesbian: 2	
	Bisexual: 2	
	Heterosexual: 4	
Marital Status:	Married: 3	
	Never marred: 2	
	Divorced: 3	
Motherhood:	Dependent children: 3	
	Grown children: 2	
	No children: 3	

The Process

I taped interviews that lasted approximately two hours per session, one session per subject. These sessions included the same questions for each subject, though not always in the same order. When several questions were answered in one response, I did not repeat the question if, by doing so, I imposed too much structure on what was a free-flowing narrative. We began with cups of coffee or hot tea with promises of refills but, as the narratives rolled on, the dregs in the bottoms of our cups grew cold and forgotten in the telling. Likewise, the tape recorder was forgotten, startling us when the end of a side clicked to a stop.

As these women spoke to me, I was caught up in a near-mystical experience. Their stories were astounding accounts of creativity and courage, and I felt that I was in the presence of something quite powerful: the trust that had invited me into the recesses of their hearts, and the nature of the secrets I found there. Sometimes their disclosures

were made with self-consciousness but sometimes they were recounted as a matter of course, the speaker unaware of the heroism (or pain) she revealed; it did not matter, I knew I was privileged to be listening, and recalled Buber's reference to that space between two people in relationship as "sacred." So that my subjects did not leave the sessions feeling raw from exposure, I wound the interviews down in conversations similar to those we had known together as students, commenting on their experiences and offering what of my own seemed a parallel. I found these sessions to be quite intense and emotionally draining.

When the taped interviews were collected, no follow-up inquires were made for verification. Each hypothesis of this study encompasses conflict; had I returned transcripts of the interviews to the subjects for later approval, surely these academic women would have become aware of the paradoxes in their answers and changed them to resemble well thought-out, consistent presentations. I felt that the only way to elicit those conflicts (what we tacitly know as opposed to what we have been lately schooled to know) was to ask similar questions in slightly different terminology and then analyze these "off the top of the head" responses for paradox. Subjects editing their responses would minimize those paradoxes.

The Questions

These were the questions I asked each woman at some point during the interview:

1. What does "theory" mean to you?
2. How would you define an "intellectual"?
3. Do you see yourself as an intellectual?
4. Give me the history of your life as a student.
5. What is the relationship between your schooling and your thoughts?

6. What has influenced you most as a thinker?
7. What would qualify a woman to be a scholar?
8. What personal qualities do you have that would make you a candidate for a doctorate?
9. How is the pursuit of this degree changing your life?
10. What price, in terms of relationship, are you paying for it?

Clues to Understanding

I listened (and later read) for answers to my initial question about women and knowledge by attending to certain features of the interviews and the subjects while speaking. These clues to understanding emerge as themes that became apparent when I reviewed all the narratives, something beyond what would have been established as variable conditions. They include:

1. References to relationships with families;
2. References to oppression: the impact of gender, race, and class influences during early years;
3. Emotional content of memories of early schooling;
4. Present day values and priorities: primary concerns, goals, plans for the future;
5. Metaphors used in describing lives and relationships;
7. Emergent issues, themes, and paradoxes from narratives;
8. Omissions.

Paradox

The inconsistencies of opinions held by one individual at any given time, on any given topic of consideration, are as wide and as varied as may be found within a body of cultural ideology. One sees, within the individual, a multitude of competing discourses,

each composed of the bits and pieces of her identity and her world, some of determined origins and others from sources unknown. Rather than one opinion or assumption invalidating its respondent in the discourse, each tends to support the other in such a way that both are maintained as a result. For example, an alcoholic in recovery frequently affirms, " I choose to live in sobriety"; and by doing so, he or she says at the same time, "I am addicted to a life-threatening drug that, in the past, has almost killed me." By the establishment of these seemingly "competing" truths, recovery becomes possible and occurs as process. In another instance one might say, "I do not believe that our elderly should be forced to lie in vegetative states before they die" and, "Better medical technology should have saved my mother's life," and still comprise two valid bits of one's overall outlook on current health care methodologies. If any one strand of the discourse were to banish the other, an incomplete and inadequate understanding of complex problems would result. Paradox, then, becomes an important aspect of one's knowing. It is only through the masculist paradigm of Dualist Rationality that we find paradox in ourselves disquieting to intolerable, as if the "integrated" (and only acceptable) personality were one that held a single opinion on every issue.

One response to the paradox issue lies in the distinction between universals and particulars. If, philosophically, we can accept that any truth is universal, it may be said that it need not be applied to absolutely every particular instance in order to retain its validity. Some philosophers believe that both seemingly oppositional truths may exist at one time. Examples of this proliferate in moral discourse; the two cited above are cases in point. In the first instance, the universal truth might be expressed as, "To live in sobriety is a good thing." The particular truth is that, at the same time, "I am irresistibly drawn to drunkenness." In the second instance, the universal truth is, "I am opposed to vegetative states for the elderly." The particular truth is, "I will turn my

mother over to the hands of doctors in the hope that they can prolong her life, even if that means she may lie in a vegetative state because of my decision." Both conditions were equally true at once, my commitments to universals and to particulars that conflicted with them; looking back on these situations I am no more resolved today about these dilemmas than I was at the times when they were current. Some forms of philosophies contend that the incompatibility of universals and particulars is a bogus issue, the obvious message being that we should forgive ourselves for the inability to forever be "consistent."

Paradox occupies a central place in Eastern philosophical thought and has been noted and dignified by Western scholars, particularly in recent years. Lee (1989, p. 6) says "Nietzsche was aware that any chosen 'truths' become stale and therefore powerless and that it is through our intuition that conceptual schemes are constantly modified, overthrown, and replaced." She cites the concern of Wilber (1983) that the "new paradigm" include paradox at its "heart," lest the intricacies of relationships be lost, ending her discussion with a comment by Carl Jung (1959):

> . . .sooner or later nuclear physics and the psychology of the unconscious will draw closer together as both of them, independently of one another and from opposite directions push forward into transcendental territory. . . .

However, paradoxical discourse must not be seen as a simple dialogue of two voices, but rather as strands of voices coming together as a polyphony of sound, strands in which single arguments achieve and then abandon prominence to others. The inner dialogue is in constant flux. As the women in this study speak, our several opinions on every topic indicate the ambiguities that we hold about ourselves and the worlds in which we live.

Language

Language has become the central concern of philosophy in the 20th century. As a result of the work of the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1957-1913), anthropologists, historians, philosophers, and others became aware of the social construction of reality by language and, finally, the dialectical relationship existing between the two. Its greatest impact upon scholarship occurs as it questions any certainty or the presence of any Universal Truth.

Much is made of language in our Department, and for several reasons: first, phenomenology is totally dependent upon language, asserting that phenomena are recognized by and stored in the mind by the words we use to describe them. Melville (1986, p. 82) says, ". . .a grasp of language [is] the terminus a quo for anything that would count as 'an experience of consciousness'. . . ." Further, it is relevant to curricular studies as it applies to culture and ideology: we are convinced that we come to make a reality of our world by what we call it. For graduate students in our Department, it defines academia by the terminology that it uses. This terminology not only defines what academia is about, but also what it is not about, establishing values for anything it names and describes. And academia includes us. Feminists take a critical view of language and its use, knowing that oppression is largely maintained by its language. Patriarchy may be described as a language in that it uses words and metaphors that describe (and then legitimate) power arrangements among persons on the basis of an assumed superiority of males over females. Such political arrangements are then socially perpetuated, in some measure, by the ways in which we talk about them.

Take, for example, the bit of New Mexico history that records the Spaniards' return to Santa Fe in 1610 for the purpose of retaking the city from the Pueblo Indians. It is known today as the "bloodless" conquest: no Spanish lives were lost. What is <u>not</u>

said is equally as significant: literally hundreds of these agrarian, peaceable Indians were sold into slavery, and the ones remaining were murdered if they would not adopt Spanish surnames and abandon their religion. Some escaped into Arizona and were given refuge by the Navajo, the influence of which may be seen in the Navajo weavings from that time. Those who stayed became "Martinez" or "Baca" (from "Vaca"), living in villages renamed to be "Santa Domingo," "Santa Clara," or the like. Pueblo churches are all Roman Catholic and Indian dances are performed to honor the saints. To celebrate the historical atrocity, Santa Feans gather at the Plaza every September to get drunk and remember the bloodless conquest, crediting the "miraculous" statue of the Virgin Mary that enjoys public veneration in the Cathedral as "La Conquistadora." Native Americans occupy the bottom rung of the social ladder in New Mexico, if indeed they make it that far, and the crushing of these people is seen as a heroic triumph that glorifies the Spanish in their finest hour.

But what if a Native American historian were telling this tale instead of the Hispanic newscaster I was horrified to hear? There would likely be a day of mourning rather than a celebration; a wreath placed on some Tomb of the Defeated Native; an analysis of this event as one in a series of events that results in the cultural despair pervading our Pueblos today; and a call for the reconstruction of Pueblo history, as much as can be done, by whatever tribal legends are available. To continue celebrating this conquest makes about as much sense as a continued celebration of the Holocaust by the Germans (of the 60 Pueblos existing in New Mexico at the time of Coronoda, only 19 remain today); yet we do this every year, keeping alive a social hierarchy that regularly reconquers and vilifies Native Americans in our narratives.

But what does language have to do with school curriculum, or the experience of women in the academy? For one thing, language describes what should be taught, what

subjects are important and which ones are not (we have "core" subjects, the "basics," and "electives"), giving value to certain bits of curriculum according to social usage; and language determines how teaching must be done and toward what end. We reference "important" information with the names of "important" scholars and omit the unimportant; we put the names of "top" students on the bulletin board and make no mention of the "low" achievers. In our effort to be Number One as a class, as a school, and as a nation, we perpetuate a social hierarchy in education that gives and withholds value to human beings.

As our culture is characterized by Big Business and industry, so education has come to be characterized by technological processes, scientific inquiry, and profit-and-loss evaluations. We speak of education in those terms and force students into this system without any apparent understanding that many of them (us) do not approach the world as businessmen, technologists, scientists, or accountants. In fact, for those of us who do not, such a world is remote and alien. We live in other worlds, worlds that consist of artworks, or human relationships, or ethical values, or religious pilgrimages.

Portrait 1 says:

> . . .I just remember, ever since I can remember, sitting out and thinking about these things. . . .looking at the clouds in the sky and having strange thoughts about where those clouds were and, you know, would I someday be in the sky, looking on the ocean along the coast and seeing the water going on forever. . . .and, I mean, it is really a strange sensation about infinity and something that never changes and wondering about what happens at death. . . .and, when I was real little, I asked my mother what will happen when we die. I mean, will we be like that water, the sky? I don't know why I was curious about stuff like that. I don't know. I don't remember one person in my life that was asking those questions. . . .I think, because of those questions, there was a discontent for me in school always. I really wanted someone to address those questions. . . .and it [school] has always fallen short of that.

Portrait 2 says:

> . . .Because for me, dance was everything. My "studying" had to do with dance, but I never considered it studying. My "education" had to do with learning dance,

and I'm one of those who would have been happy in a School of the Arts, because all I wanted to do was work hard and be a performer.

Portrait 3 says:

. . .As a kid, I was conforming to rules I didn't understand. . . .thought patterns that didn't make a lot of sense. . . .I didn't do much academically until I became interested in religious education. Then I fell into Jim MacDonald's class by accident, and felt I was coming home. All that I had been studying and wondering about was there: all the feelings about trying to understand schooling politically, the mystical dimensions of my life. . . .Every summer I returned to renew my spirit, like going to church. . . .the most fundamental question [has been] trying to know God, living some sort of life that has meaning which to me is spiritual. . .

Portrait 6 says:

In dance, I was performing and putting dances together right away and I loved it. It made intellectual stuff come alive. . . .made it real.

Portrait 7 says:

When I was young, I tried to take male philosophical wisdom and apply it to my pitiful life and it didn't fit. . . .I just couldn't "measure up" to ancient standards of virtue. . . .

Portrait 8 says:

I started dancing when I was in the sixth grade. It was the most exciting thing that ever happened to me. . . .using my body and using it with others. I believe I could have found direction through dancing, but it was viewed just as a pastime. . . .you know, something for fun. It wasn't something serious. When I graduated from high school, I had no idea what I wanted to do.

We are those deviants who learn little about situations from statistics, little about people from standardized tests, little about America from the Gross National Product. For us, then, present day schooling is a round hole in which we must force ourselves to fit as square pegs. The worst of it is this: we do not know that this is the problem. Language that would dignify us is not given to this difficulty. The education language of science and technology defines us as unscholarly.

Portrait 1 says:

. . . .when I think about kindergarten to my senior year, I think about those social kinds of learning. . . .Behind that was sort of what was being taught academically. That is not what I remember about learning; education. . . .I was sort of curious that all of this stuff that we were doing on the weekends and worrying about during the week was really not what life is all about. . . .Some people encouraged me, but most of the school experience I just don't think was addressing what I was curious about.

Portrait 3 says:

I made A's and kept quite. . . .I spent all my time being that, blending in, being terrified I'd be called on. I was considered to be "smart," but that's because I played the game well.

Portrait 5 says:

Later on I had trouble because the teachers thought I had no respect. In college I did what I had to do to get by. . . .I rebelled against some of the courses I had to take. . . .

Portrait 6 says:

I was in a very conservative school. . . .I was told my questions upset the rest of the students and that I should just keep my mouth shut.

Portrait 7 says:

I was alienated in school because I was fascinated with the theoretical, abstract material -- ideas, possibilities, reasons why -- and nobody else was like that. . . It was during my adolescence that I began to realize that I was at odds with factual learning and that some things didn't interest me at all. My mind just wouldn't deal with them. Like math or science. I figured, in my characteristic way, that something was wrong with me.

Portrait 8 says:

I was a third grader before I questioned school. Up to then, I was trying to figure out what it was all about, and learn how to control myself.

Not only did the curriculum in use burden us with an inappropriate education; it also branded us as the locus of the problem. Our deepest interests were not addressed by schooling; we could not speak what we know through its words, processes, and values.

We continue to think that there is something wrong with our intellect until we are informed otherwise, and it might be pointed out again that we are the very few among women who are well educated. In this delusion, we link arms with all females, those who come from poor families, or those who are ethnically different. It is no wonder that feminists and other curriculum theorists are vitally concerned with what we have come to call "curriculum language," and look for alternative languages that would recognize and authenticate us as individuals and put an end to patriarchal hierarchies currently maintained through public education.

Women in this study are sensitive to the issue of curriculum language. Portrait 1 says:

> [I want to] find a new language and be brave enough -- push myself -- to talk about issues beyond divisive kinds of thought. . . .I want to bring poetry back.

Portrait 3 says:

> I didn't know that my struggles were centered around masculine-feminine poles. Like with the dissertation: I'd start writing on the computer and I'd be in a masculine mode in language. In longhand, it comes out circular. Feminine, and illogical. I'd write by the hour and [my advisor] would reject it. Then, I'd go back and put it on disk, and it was accepted. This says something: my way of thinking is devalued because it's not logical. It doesn't come to conclusions and it just goes around in circles. The computer copy was linear and logical. Masculine. What I've learned to do is integrate the two. But it still isn't the unrestricted <u>me</u>.

Portrait 4 says:

> The feminist curriculum gives me a language, a context, and a method for doing dance. I've always wanted to present the subjective. Dance and philosophy cannot go together in the male curriculum, in the male world. . . .there, you find warfare between those two. With me, there is no separation.

Portrait 5 says that her problem with writing the dissertation is centered in the use of a "male dominated" language. Portrait 6 reports,

> My doctoral program is painful for me because I'm having to learn a different language from the one I know so well. . . .dance. It's difficult. It's made me more confident about expressing myself in their language. . . .I can't be at the University because I have so much anger against it. We don't use women's experiences as metaphors. . . .I feel that it's been very difficult; that I was a foreign animal here.

And Portrait 8 says:

> The University is masculine and I've been extremely angry, even about what I remember as a woman. I explain things differently. How do I connect that with theory? Well, I don't always explain things through theory. . . .Through my body in dance, I can retake control, be strong. . . .express myself without labels. I can feel things as a woman I couldn't be allowed to feel before.

It is important to note that we became aware of the importance of language at a conscious level in our doctoral programs, during which we were exposed to the work of curriculum critics. We understand that our experiences with schooling could have been different had curricular languages been available to us as young students. And now we demand changes in the language of academia, knowing that other alternatives exist and are recommended by others.

Use of Metaphor

Strictly speaking, a metaphor is the figure of speech that connects two ideas or concepts by some element common to both. As a vehicle of comparison, it is unique in that it makes use of the differences between two concepts as well as the similarities. It is subsumed under analogy which is subsumed under model; Belth (1977, chap. 4) distinguishes between them, but for the purposes of this analysis (exploring the ways women describe their experience), this distinction is mentioned only to acknowledge the importance currently placed on verbal references by philosophy and linguistics. Here, "metaphor" is used in its broadest sense.

All language, by its nature, is metaphorical on several counts. First of all, words cannot be experiences themselves but can refer to them, be like them. Further, we

describe for each other the union (the speaker's experience) by likening it to the known (the listener's experience) so that understanding occurs in that connection: one cannot fully enter into another's experience but can empathize to the extent that she has experienced something like it. Considering the metaphorical character of language, and the broadest application of metaphor itself, it becomes quite difficult to isolate and extract metaphors from a transcript or a text. As "metaphor" is used here, it is a category that encompasses some analogies and models as well. Its value to women's narratives lies in the kinds of references women use in their descriptions, showing how women view themselves, their activities, and the world.

In spite of the overarching difficulty in isolating metaphors, some arbitrary decisions were necessary in order to establish a field of inquiry. Some of those decisions were: "dead" metaphors (Belth, 197, p. 74), if there are such things, were excluded when they seemed not to reflect any personal interpretation of the speaker; they were included when they reflected strong personal feeling. (For example, Portrait Two refers to her undergraduate experience in a University system that was "cut and dried." This, to me, was not as significant as the description she makes of herself in elementary school as "a modest violet." I noted both, but found the second reference to yield more information about the speaker than the first.) Another decision had to do with similarities across narratives, even if the metaphors could be considered "dead." When the majority of women interviewed referred to something in similar but non-identical metaphors, I felt that they could be grouped together and treated as identical, as they revealed some generally held truth for them and perhaps for indeterminant numbers of others. (For example, in describing the academy as "an alien place," or one's experience there as that of a "foreign animal," women seemed to be to be saying the same thing, if in slightly different terms.) Lastly, I recognized a tendency among subjects to use

"Departmental language." Since we are immersed in concepts that are identified by one or two well-used words, it is expected that narratives would contain certain repetitions not found among other populations. I did find it significant when one individual used a specific metaphor excessively in her narrative and others used it once or twice, indicating a preoccupation of the speaker. (For example, all of us had something to say about "making connections," a concern so central to feminists in academia that I wondered if it had any value as a metaphor; but one Portrait uses the phrase nine times. I felt that its importance lay in the individual's focus on that particular issue on the feminist agenda, not that she was parroting jargon in the absence of something to say, but that the particular concept had great meaning to her at the time we spoke together.)

This discussion leads me back to the original question of what constitutes a metaphor in the first place. Such phrases as "looking for a solution," "searching for an answer," and "wrestling with ideas" are so commonly found in language that one is unaware that, by her use of them, she further commodifies and concretizes an intangible, abstract process, making knowledge a "thing." What are the ramifications of doing so? What does it hurt? Furthermore, if we use other words to describe mental processes, what words would those be? These questions contain a political dimension for feminists: if knowledge is a thing with boundaries, it can be assigned as the province of a chosen few and marketed for a profit. In a capitalist, pragmatic, materialistic society we are hard pressed to find other ways to talk about knowledge and thought: to us, "value" means "market value." The point is, the metaphors we use shape the way we know things to be, and reveal more about culture than is apparent at first blush. For this reason, I include commonly used metaphors, even the most banal, as they indicate how we view ourselves and our lives. It is worthy of note that the view we articulate is quite similar to the view held and expressed by society-at-large, we among the very few

women who have climbed to the top of the academic pinnacle and claim a different consciousness.

Among Individuals

Just as some individuals say many words to express a thought and some use fewer, individuals vary in their need for metaphor in speech. Within the length of an interview that was set by individuals themselves, between an hour and an hour and a half, numbers of tallied metaphors ranged from ten to 34. In fact, length of interview had nothing to do with this: the longest interview taped yielded the fewest recordable metaphors. It appears that some women (perhaps men, too) seem to speak metaphorically as a way of expressing themselves more routinely than others. While it would be interesting to know who uses metaphor more frequently and in what circumstances (men or women, public or private figures, younger or older, artists or academics), the central concern of this study is the kind of metaphor employed by women in academia: the issues they reference, the natures of their comparisons, and the general feeling of the speaker conveyed through illustration. (For example, if I refer to my years of child-raising as a "trap" or a "nest," it is noteworthy that I spoke of child-raising at all, if I brought it up unsolicited, and needed a metaphor of any kind to illustrate that experience; further, that both "trap" and "nest" are places, defined by conditions; and that the use of "trap" reveals probably painful memories for me, where the use of "nest" could reveal happy ones. In the true spirit of paradox, it would not be surprising if I used both metaphors, along with many others, in my reflections upon mothering.) Among the women interviewed, two major classifications of metaphors emerged: one is the Activity Metaphor and the other is the Metaphor of Place and Space.

Of the Group

Activity metaphors. Activity metaphors are employed by women when speaking about the public world, notably our experience in academia. These metaphors are characterized by strenuous physical effort, meaningless performance, and artificial social construction, foreign to our most comfortable ways of behaving. This is a general statement; Place and Space are also applied to the academy, but such references are less frequent and they are hostile in nature. Activity Metaphors are organized into the following groups:

1. Nine comparisons were made by four Portraits about early schooling, the University, and the public world, to "playing a game." The "game" was described as deadly serious, sometimes demeaning, but without intrinsic value. Recall Portrait 3 describing her early efforts in school as successful because she "played the game well." Portrait 5 says:

> There are games I must play with authority. . .to be a part of the fucked-up adult system [is to] play the games correctly. . . .I'm learning to play the political game [in this program] and that's a big part of it.

2. Related to this notion of game playing is the activity of "jumping through hoops," mentioned five times by two Portraits. They refer to the requirements placed upon us by the academy, seen as a demand to conformity in performance like that of circus dogs.

Portrait 4 says,

> . . . .a woman scholar must jump through proscribed hoops.

Portrait 5 expresses strong feelings:

> I can jump through those hoops. That's probably the biggest thing "I've learned in this program, to jump through those goddamned hoops!

This vigorous effort made by women in the academy is seen as "struggle." Six references made by four Portraits use that term. All Portraits refer to the process as a difficult business, from getting along with professors to writing the dissertation to getting a job in the academy to eventually publishing. Portrait 4 describes her familiarity with classic literature and thinkers as the gymnastic feat of "standing on the shoulders of others"; Portrait 3 speaks of the challenges as being torn between being true to her knowledge and "selling out" to patriarchy by "prostituting" herself. Portrait 6 describes that possibility as going into "a coma." Portrait 7 sees it as "measuring up."

All eight Portraits mention the need to exercise courage to survive in the academy and Portrait 5 mentions it twice. That survival is depicted as the same goal soldiers hold first and foremost in time of battle rather than that of wildlife foraging in the woods. It encompasses the maintenance of strong self-esteem, mentioned by five of the Portraits; tough thinking, mentioned by two; and agressive behavior, mentioned by two others. Portrait 3 asserts the need that we be "willing to make fools of ourselves" to establish our place in the academy and in the curriculum.

3. The act of thinking deeply and personally, resulting from the demands that the doctoral program makes upon one's own conceptualizing, bridges the gap between Activity and Place and Space. They reflect possible rigor, but not hostility. This sort of thought is seen as a "journey" by two Portraits, a "search" by one, "a coming away. . looking out a window" by one, and "being fed" by another. Three Portraits view the sharing of such thought as "coming together, " a function and potential force of the University. All portraits mention the process of "making connections" in academic careers between male scholarship and women's knowledge, illustrating both an activity and a concern on the feminist agenda.

4. The Place and Space metaphors used to describe University liken it to the unfamiliar, apart from our normal experience with life. Seven of eight Portraits view it as male in character in 22 references, by far the most numerous in tally, and all were unsolicited as such. Three Portraits made five references to the University as a "foreign" place, one regards herself as a "foreign animal" there, one spoke twice of it as an "unreal world," one as something she "didn't feel at home with," and one mentioned her experience with schooling overall as "alienated," where she felt as "outcast."

Place and space metaphors. Women in this study have a special regard for our own knowledge and our own thoughts, expressed in metaphors that describe a benign, private place or space. Whenever we refer to a natural compatibility with some concern or role, we seem to locate ourselves rather than describe an activity. Glancing at the Activity Metaphors, it appears to be the difference between doing and being: in the public world, we are doing; left in our private worlds, we are being.

Portrait 7 says,

> Thought became a private world for me, where I could crawl away and really be myself. . .wallow around with images and questions that seemed to be solely mine, all wrapped up in his [my father's] approval.

Portrait 1 says,

> I want to be alone a lot. . . .I'm searching for a place where people are dreaming.

Portrait 3 describes a "secret garden" of women's knowledge as opposed to the activity-based "working world":

> In a way, we've been fortunate to have been isolated in a secret garden. That's the way I see it. Most of my deepest self-knowledge has come from that isolation from the working world, when I was free to think my own thoughts when I looked out the window washing dishes. . .to nurture that feminine side of myself. Women in the working world might never find those secret spaces where they might engage in those thoughts without guilt. Work teaches us that it's a man's world. Sometimes we can find it in relationships. But without that secret place, women

> would have lost touch with themselves long ago. It's what's kept the feminine alive.

The most benign of the Place and Space metaphors refer to the home. Six references are made to being at home or coming home by four Portraits, and one describes the communal behavior of humankind as "coming to the table." The home is viewed as that private space to which we have, as women, all been assigned and for which we are all responsible as a place of nurturance, renewal, and freedom; the place where, traditionally, new life began, creativity found form, we could be ourselves, and consummated life came to an end. Waithe (1987, chap. 2), quoting the ancient philosophy of Aesara, Pythagorean and woman of Lucana, acknowledges the division of public and private in a way that births one from the other:

> Aesara's natural law theory appears to have feminist implications. If we assume, as did the Pythagoreans, that women bore the responsibility for creating harmony and justice in the home and that men had that responsibility in the city, then so-called "women's work" was the moral equivalent of "men's work." This is because justice in both areanas has the same natural foundation in the nature of the human soul. Just, harmonious cities require their component parts, households, also to be just and harmonious. Therefore, social justice depends on women raising just, harmonious individuals in those households. In the Pythagorean view, women are not peripheral to social justice, they make it possible. (p. 25)

It is hardly curious that women sense the importance of the home, though we may have lost the written wisdom of ancient Greece that defines it. We know that the serenity we experience and enjoy in the world is most likely to be that which we create at home; when we liken anything to "coming home," we have conferred upon it the ultimate in comfort, happiness, connectedness, and peace. It is the most powerful, poignant, and spiritual of all the metaphors commonly offered by the women in this study.

Perhaps some discussion of the "secret garden" metaphor is in order so that the notion of women's isolation in the private sphere not be over romanticized. This is one of the pitfalls confronting romantic feminists; that women's experience, being what is

has, yields invaluable information in situ, leading to the conclusion that such isolation is not such a bad thing and might well continue. A better analysis might be this: women have shown, throughout history, the ability to develop knowledge, whether that has occurred in isolation, at the margins of culture, or in the public domain. The most of it has occurred in isolation, as that has been our assigned place, and there are valuable gleanings from that experience, relevant to world survival. Today feminists are demanding that women move "from margin to center" (Hooks, 1984) with that knowledge, not only for our own sake, but for the well-being of humanity. We do not call for the disappearance of the private space, but rather that the walls isolating it (and us) be brought down.

The six references to this Place and Space describe the impact of probing, deeply meaningful thought prompted and developed during doctoral study. As Portrait 3 searches the academy for "a place for us," Portrait 7 says of her intellectual development over the last three years:

> I was unsettled until I came into this program, where it seemed that all my questions, the deep, ignored ones that had been rolling around in the pit of my stomach for a lifetime. . .were brought to the top. . .met with smiles of recognition. . .and dignified. For the first time in all my schooling, I felt that I had come home. These were my people, this was where I belonged.

Synthesis. By the use of metaphors, we present a lucid picture of ourselves and the constructions we make of our past and present circumstances. The following block describes that picture in one voice, acknowledging that no one Portrait contains everything included. This is a composite of all Portraits and our most frequently shared metaphors:

> I am a female doctoral student exploring curriculum theory in a state university, so I have been involved in schooling for much of my life. When I was a child, I became aware that schooling was something quite apart from what I knew to be

real life, and that my task was to accept the fact that I was required to attend everyday, all day, during my childhood and keep the teachers happy with me. I did that by conforming to meaningless rules and learning things that didn't have anything to do with the things that interested me the most. I learned how to play the game. I knew by third grade not to voice my questions; I kept my mouth shut and became invisible. Because I didn't make trouble and met their requirements, I was thought to be very smart. Eventually I came to regard school as mechanized and dull, a place where social pressures were more intense than academic curriculum. On the other hand, my own knowledge flourished and grew in some private part of me like a secret garden of thought.

What I know is different and has always been different from what they know. I've learned lately that all knowledge and theory emerges from someone's experience, and that mine is as valid as anyone's, but I'm still tentative about that, as if it sits in my brain and hasn't filtered down yet to a gut level. I have learned through critical theory and feminist critique that the academy is male and patriarchal in nature and that this accounts for my difficulties, both past and present. Unlike men pursuing doctorates, I have to struggle to keep my self-confidence adequate to surviving here, and I know that any future I envision in the academy will require a toughness in me that I must continue to develop and maintain.

My doctoral studies have impacted upon me radically. It has been a journey during which I have come to see the world and my place in it differently. When it brought me to a new consciousness, I felt that I had come home. My former relationships have suffered but I have made new ones, so I feel that its value to me has been worth its cost.

The most important thing I can say about the University is that it is male dominated in its personnel, processes, and values. I have learned to jump through hoops and play the patriarchal games thrust upon me, and this gives me confidence when I remind myself of that. I see the vast difference between what I know as real (the artistic, personal, and spiritual) and what the University knows as real (technological, scientific, and political) to be supported and created by language, which is a male convention. I have become bilingual: I speak my own language and have learned to speak theirs well enough to get by, because I've had no choice if I wanted to function in the public sphere, this foreign place. Men have the choice to become bilingual or not. I don't.

I am spiritual, honoring the need in humankind for nurturance, relationship, and earth-centered religion. I have dreams for every level of schooling so that women will be empowered to express how we come to perceive these things and how we come to value them. I want to implement curricula that will not only give us voice, but will give us the dignity of respect: I want a curriculum language in place that will enable us to be listened to, to be taken seriously, and to be included in education which is, after all, a human enterprise. I want the University to become humanized, so that it affirms us as creative human beings and women, abandoning its preoccupation with competition, profit and loss, and its deadly demands for conformity in thought and behavior.

I want the secret garden of women's knowledge to continue to grow, but I want to dismantle its barriers so that the fullness and variety of its beauty exists not just beyond men's vision or at the periphery of our own, but rather clearly in view of us all, as we go about cultivating and nurturing our own small allotments. It may be too late for us to enjoy the fruits of this harvest, but as

educators and mothers and grandmothers we have hope for our children and theirs.

Influences of Conditions

Age and Beauty

My youngest Portrait is interested in meditative spirituality, philosophy, and earth-women-centered religion. She is poetic by nature and markedly apolitical in the narrow sense of social activity, learning toward the romanticism of radical feminism. With an artistic personality, she approaches her doctorate as an academic rather than as a dancer. However, the Portrait who is closest to her in chronological age is far more actively socially, quite vocal about the oppression of the University, and is as political (liberal) as she is radical. She also approaches doctoral study as an academic but sees the world as a graphic artist. Neither of these women is married, neither supports young children. One feels that the University has been a haven for her, the other regards it as a Marine Corps boot camp. In contrast, my oldest Portrait is interested in dance education, coming to her program as a performer and dance teacher. She is financially secure by her husband's support and has raised her family, which offers her the freedom to pursue radical feminism if she chooses; but her personal sufferings under patriarchy, which she sees as quite painful, do not attach to deep radical underpinnings and her interests remain within the surface, liberal arena.

In appearance, one Portrait could be judged as especially beautiful by the world's standards and the other two (as well as the rest of the women interviewed) as "reasonably" attractive. Yet she is the radical feminist in this grouping, seeking a world characterized by poetic inquiry and goddess religion. Perhaps it could be said that her lack of interest in social-political issues results from the fact that her good looks have brought her special treatment under patriarchy; that she feels no anger toward a society

that has favored her. Yet the interview reveals that she felt "different" from her classmates and parents during her early years because she was intensely interested in spiritual matters; "neglected" by her schooling because these interests were not addressed; "alienated" from adolescent peers because she alone wanted some connection made between social activities and academics. She does not see her life as charmed, nor her place in it as privileged; she was as untended by an upper middle class environment as another might be in lower class circumstances.

The middle five Portraits, ranging in their 40's, include two dancers and three academics. Of this group, the two that are most politically focused (liberal) are the two dance performers; but both are committed to the expression of women's experience through dance. Neither claim to be spiritual but one discusses the need for Gaia to restore women to their proper place in society, and the other sees socialist feminism as the most appropriate vehicle for realizing her goals. The remaining three are academics, varied in their circumstances. Only one is married and supported by a husband but all three have a passionate entry into radical feminism in that they work for a reconstructed world.

Ethnicity

The women portrayed in these interviews are all white. There is only one reason for this unfortunate limitation. Since the purpose of the study is to plumb the attitudes of female graduate students currently involved in a doctoral program rather than to compare attitudes among ethnic groups, the graduate students on hand are the ones I sought. There are no black doctoral students in our program at this time; consequently, a comparative study could not be undertaken now in this Department. The inevitable question arises as to why black women are not appearing among the ranks of doctoral candidates in Foundations of Education in this mainstream, state supported, southern

University. Such a question may need to be explored. It is my conviction that a balanced study including both white and black women, if undertaken, would serve to strengthen this research of women's knowledge, and it is my great regret that we are ethnically so similar. Our black sisters are sorely missed and conspicuous by their absence, both in this study and in our Department.

Geographic Homes

Three doctoral students in our Department are from the south, three from the midwest, one from the southwest, and one from England. I cannot find that their responses group around regional differences, if those differences could be defined in the first place. Of the southern women, two are radical feminists and one is liberal; of the radicals, both are motivated by spiritual concerns, and the liberal, a native of this state, is strongly political. The most retiring of the Portraits in demeanor is from the midwest, but so is the most vigorous. The Portrait that strikes me as most scholarly is the one from England, but she has a masters degree in English philosophy and draws upon that background in her responses in addition to typical "British reserve," and the more precise and proficient use of language for which her culture is so well known. I find that the geographic origins of students have little (if anything) to do with the attitudes, courage, and aspirations reflected in their stories.

Childhood SES

The two extremes of childhood socioeconomic status represented in this group of eight women are one from an upper middle class family and another from a British working class home. Both are academics with an aesthetic approach; one is in her early 30's and the other is in her late 40's. The remaining six are from varying middle class environments in which it was expected that we would live by money earned, either from our labor or that of our husband's. None of us was raised on the bottom rung of the

economic ladder and none of us was independently wealthy. Our parents worked for our living, though the nature of that work differed from floor scrubbing to executive banking. The attributes of Portrait 4, who comes from the most meager surroundings, would likely make her concerns political; however, she is among the least politically oriented, interested in the connections that can be forged between the arts (particularly dance) and philosophy. The attributes of Portrait 1, who comes from "the upper crust," would likely make her a non-feminist, perhaps even committed to perpetuating patriarchal standards that benefit a few; yet, she is among the radicals who seek to refashion the world to be egalitarian, through meditation and poetry. All of us speak with vehemence about the economic difficulties of women in the workplace, as the University is the workplace in which we find ourselves; as we have come from homes that operated on the Work Ethic and are surviving in an unwelcoming economy by our own earning power, we are similarly alarmed by the strictures we encounter. Going to graduate school for a doctorate appears to be a middle class thing to do. Employment in the academy is employment, after all, accompanied with pay that sustains us in a capitalist society. The very poor rarely aspire to academia and the very rich rarely stoop to it. As the middle class bears the burden of morality, so it takes on the herculean task of developing knowledges that seem to ultimately support and benefit the ruling ideology and the upper classes who profit most from it. In the preliminary exercise of raising consciousness of women, feminist pedagogy must address liberal-socialist questions of who profits from education and how those rewards might be more equitably distributed.

Sexual Orientation

Of all the conditions coming to bear upon the outcomes of women's interpretations and their feminist interests, sexual orientation seems to rank among the least

influential. Unfortunately, it is still potentially professional suicide for a woman (or a man, for that matter) to profess any other than heterosexual orientation in the public sphere; for that reason, descriptions of these women that would identify individuals by "abnormal" sexuality are absent from this paper. Generally speaking, the matter is difficult to discuss because the categories are so elusive. Whether homosexuality is behavioral or intentional, whether it is erotic or emotional, whether it is caused by genetic or nongenetic factors, whether it is pursued by choice or by biology, or if it is a combination of all these things and others is subject to wide debate. Definitive lines are not drawn. For example, if a farmer sells his farm, moves into the city and begins work in the factory, is he still a farmer? If a woman turns away from another woman to marry and live with a man, bearing his children and presenting herself to society as a heterosexual, is she a lesbian? What if she never acknowledged or named her affection for her friend? What if she did? If a woman lived in a lesbian relationship and redefined herself as heterosexual, would she then be one? If a woman fears that homosexual activity is morally "wrong" and so has never indulged in it, but lives a single life strengthened by her female relationships, would we consider her to be a lesbian? And what part does age play in all this? Is it safe to assume that a 50-year-old woman is more certain of her sexuality than a 25-year-old? Would one look at the present social conditions of her life, or her history? How much weight would one place upon these factors when judging the sexual orientation of oneself or someone else?

Alcoholics Anonymous is famous for its position on making external judgments on internal conditions. It denies its members that privilege. One makes decisions about alcoholism in regard to oneself only. That is hard enough to do about addiction; perhaps it is harder still about sexuality because we are conditioned by gendering from the earliest days of our lives to "compulsory" heterosexuality. While anthropologists

regard this requirement to be a relatively recent phenomenon in human history, it is real enough today and has been borne by all women in this study. I did not ask them if they were heterosexual because I know, at least to the extent that they know. They are my colleagues and my friends. By personal knowledge of them and their conversations with me, I report two as bisexual, two as lesbian, and four as heterosexual. Not one woman is willing to say that she would be so under any and all conditions but rather is voicing a sense she has of herself at this time. Each considers her sexuality to be a particular response to culture, as a deep, psychological choice.

Of the bisexuals, one has been married and one has not; neither has children. One regrets this and one does not. Of the lesbians, both have been married and divorced and have children; one lives with a woman and one lives alone. Of the heterosexuals, all have been married: one has been married twice and is divorced with dependent children, one is happy in a first marriage with grown children, one is happy in a second marriage with children, and one is single without children.

Feminist orientations seem to have nothing to do with sexual orientations. Of the bisexuals, one is drawn to biologic determinism and the other to socialization; one is much more radical than the other. Of the lesbians, one is drawn to biologic determinism and the other to political gendering; both are radical, one much more political than her sister. Of the heterosexuals, three are political and one motivated by radical, spiritual concerns. It cannot be determined by listening to their interviews what the sexual orientation of these women might be, or if that in itself has created her feminist views. Only by asking them directly could we know; and then each would reflect on the ways in which she has been manipulated by society through her sexuality. Such responses would be as varied as there are individuals. I could find no correlations or emergent patterns.

Motherhood

Five of the eight Portraits have borne children and three have not. Of those five, three women live with them as dependents. Of the three who are childless, only one relates to her narrative any regret over not having been a mother. The oldest Portrait, one whose children are independent, is the most absorbed with children's lives; the youngest Portrait evidences no interest in having them at all.

Graduate study is but one of the compelling (and competing) projects in a woman's life and may be viewed from several positions. First, it reflects a direction toward specific public activity. (One completes a doctorate with particular types of jobs in minds.) Next, it stands to change the consciousness of the graduate student so that she comes to see her established relationships and roles in radically different ways. Finally, it demands a great deal of one's day to pursue, not only in class attendance, reading, writing, and talking with others, but in mental concentration. Considering the totality of a woman's necessary involvement in graduate study, the ongoing needs of family, and the fact that women -- "liberated" or not -- are responsible for children 24 hours a day while they are living at home, it is not surprising that most of the women in our program are in their 40s. At this time of our lives, children are less dependent if not living on their own. The two youngest Portraits, those who would most likely have young children, are childless.

Radicals cannot help but see the median age of female doctoral students and note that there is a conflict between mothering and studying. The obvious reason is socio-political: when there are young children underfoot, it is the mother charged with caring for them. Further, single mothers cannot afford the financial luxury of going to school; they take the highest paying jobs they can find and spend every dime they make supporting their children. But another interpretation might emerge, possibly

underlying the obvious, that reflects the old Caresian mind-body split: when a woman is fecund or fertile, she gives that time of her life to body concern (looking beautiful, seducing males, marrying, bearing children); when she approaches menopause and her "juices dry up," she gives herself to scholarship. It seems that the sensuality we ascribe to a young woman is incompatible with intellectuality; that women must make a choice between a student identity and a mother identity; and that, if she chooses both, enthusiastic cooperation from husband and children are essential. In the face of opposition from them or increased demands by family, such as unexpected illness, women will drop out of school either temporarily or permanently. A woman's academic life must be somehow "worked in" as convenient with family concerns; if she persists despite a conflict, she will feel enormous guilt for having "neglected" her children. In our society, men are not saddled with this choice. Their conflicts center around their jobs. Though the time they need for study is taken from their families as well, it is better understood and accepted by the world, certainly their wives, because everyone knows that he will advance to a better-paying position as the result of more education and can ultimately provide more for his family. His identity and worth as a man are defined by his ability to earn and provide. The only Portrait I interviewed who is divorced and raising young children alone is currently employed as a professor at the University and she is pursuing this degree for economic reasons as well as the requirements of her Department. I asked her if the presence of the children complicated her studies. She said that she did not think so, but that they had conflicted with her primary relationship to the extent that it had dissolved. The Portrait who is married and mothering dependent children credits the success of her program to her husband's encouragement; she claims to have been "lucky" to have his support in this venture.

When advised by her chair to move to Greensboro where she could "give her all" to graduate study, she declined:

> I though about it for three months and was impressed with all the broken marriages and relationships due to our transformation. Well, I didn't want another divorce, so I stayed where I was in [the town where I live]. I don't know how it would have been otherwise, but I think it's a real possibility my marriage would have collapsed had I left home.

We live different kinds of lives than men do because we are first the primary caretakers of our aging parents, husbands, and children. Next we are household managers. Then we are wage earners, then we are students. But there are just so many hours in the day, just so much fragmentation any one woman can endure, before something major must be sacrificed. The modern notion that women are liberated and may now "have it all" is a deception without a restructuring of social expectations and the requirements of shared responsibilities by men in this complicated milieu.

How does a woman's reproductive potential or her history of having raised children affect her offering to scholarship and her interests in the curriculum? Among the women I interviewed, there appears to be no difference in passion and attitude between those who had physically mothered and those who had not. The impulses to nurture the student, to feminize the academy, to humanize the public sphere, and to foster the arts through an aesthetic curriculum are expressed as strongly by childless women as they are by those who have given birth; the acknowledgement of patriarchal oppression in the University is voiced with equal vehemence; the tendency to radical feminism is just as pronounced. Whether the drive to nurture is biologically determined or has been thrust upon us through social gendering, it is apparent in all of us as part of our identity as women and the lens through which we see schooling and the world beyond.

Marital Status

Of these eight Portraits, three are married, two have never been married, and three are divorced. One of the divorced unmarrieds plans to marry when her program concludes. When the question was asked about the cost in relationship extracted by graduate study, all women reported some kind of loss: there has been one divorce in a heterosexual union and three splits among the lesbians and bisexuals. One of the heterosexuals has terminated her program because her husband became ill and needed her full-time attention. Like children in the home, husbands and lovers require that women remain emotionally available to them, which amounts to more than just getting the laundry and shopping done. The greatest threat to relationship seems to be the divided interests women experience between the worlds of their Significant Others and the worlds of academia. It is the changed consciousness of doctoral students that cannot bring the spouse or lover along that results in a spiritual rift between them. Portrait 8 says:

> I've lost a husband in the process of going to school. That came from the tension of this new consciousness of mine. I just couldn't make him have the same changes. I've had to lose my whole grounding but this new consciousness. . . letting go of everything but my search for meaning. I had to let everything else go.

Portrait 7 adds:

> Of course, being here has cost me a lot. Aside from the monetary crisis I've learned to live with, it's caused an irreparable rift in the relationship I had back home. There has been the physical distance and the psychic one. . . .I see education, society, religion, politics, relationship, and every other damned thing I ever thought about and found important in a different light that I did before I left. Overall, it's cost me who I was, but that might not have been a bad thing, even if it gets painfully stressful to think about sometimes. I got what I came here to get, and the cost it's extracting seems pretty total.

Compounding the problem is often physical distance. If a woman attends the University as an out-of-state student, there is only a slim chance that her established

relationship will endure the separation. Spiritual closeness appears to be heavily dependent upon physical closeness, and the task of keeping an absent partner abreast of one's thinking by long distance telephone calls and necessarily brief correspondence is next to impossible, especially when that partner never had her questions to answer from the outset.

Four of the Portraits report having found new relationships as a result of changed consciousness in doctoral study and feel that the loses they suffered have been repaid; two more report a choice to live alone after their splits (one of these is sorrowful and one is not), and two remain with their spouses (one of these is the woman who dropped out to care for her husband). Our double bind in graduate school is this: with the pressure of "measuring up" to academic requirements, we need comfort and support from home, both emotional and financial, more than we ever did before. Along with that increased need is the decreased time and energy we now have to invest in those sustaining relationships. Our major fields of interest are triangular: school, home, work. One woman told me:

> What we all need is a good wife. You know. Someone who doesn't work outside the home, someone who will put three meals on the table and keep clean clothes in the closet and run all the errands and do our typing. Someone who will wrap their arms around me at night and tell me everything's going to be all right. I did that when I was married. . . .that's what I need now.

Why do we put ourselves through this? There seem to be several answers. First, we know we must earn a living for ourselves and possibly our children. Next, we know the rigor of torn loyalties is temporary and we hope we can keep everything together while we endure. Underlying everything is a deep belief we have in ourselves and in our knowledge, that we have something to offer the academy and the young that follow; a commitment that our insights as women are necessary for the transformed

world we would know, a future promising peace to provide subtenance and fulfillment for its children.

Collective Themes

Radicals, Liberals and Socialists

Jaggar (1988) divides feminism into four political perspectives: liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist. While even she cautions against accepting these divisions as concrete, we keep referring to them because nothing better has come along to replace them. Here the Marxist and socialist categories have been included into one. According to Jaggar, a radical feminist is one who believes that patriarchy has promulgated a certain picture of social reality, "clearly colored by male values" (p. 250). Radical feminists call for different values that would change society at its roots. A liberal is one who believes in the rationality of humankind as a mental process of individuals rather than groups; that all persons have an equal measure of this ability. A liberal feminist seeks equality for women in the public sphere by a claim that women, as individual contenders to privilege, have the same right and ability to compete as men (p. 33). Socialist feminists are committed to a Marxist conception of human nature (as a dialectical relationship between biology, society, and environment), and seeks the reasons for women's subordination in human praxis, "in the way that people in each society organize to produce and distribute the basic necessities of life" (p. 134). A socialist is one who would accomplish egalitarianism through social revolution in the redistribution of wealth. These categories of feminism are useful in describing the focus of women's political perspectives; they describe very general agendas, however, and often appear in paradoxical combinations within given individuals. Hardly anyone can be characterized by any single point of view. For example, a radical feminist, who

wants to change the dominant ideology of her culture, may be considered a socialist if she believes that the best way to go about this is to participate in an overt revolution. More often we hear radicals voicing liberal concerns: in one breath a woman may exult because a female friend (or her son) has been employed or received a raise in pay; in the next breath she may go on to expound on the difficulties of women in a patriarchal society.

The women I interviewed are individual mixtures of these categories, though some seem to be more firmly entrenched in one camp than another. All are essentially radical. As students of critical theory, it would be unlikely that any of us could persevere to the dissertation stage of her program and be unaffected by the vision of social transformation that is held and proclaimed by our Department. Insights as to the need for social transformation are related to one's progress in the program: how long she has been wrestling with ideological problems, and how much thought she has given to making connections between them and the conditions of her own life.

We are radical because we would "change the world," an unpopular position to voice in a society that preaches "acceptance" and "coping mechanisms" through various mental health programs. Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) go so far as to claim that mission for teachers of the young; we have come to see that it is more aberrant to plod along accepting an unjust world than it is to work to change it. We begin with a vision and a faith in ourselves as effective agents of change, both the result of critical education we receive at the hands of our Department

As a consequence, there are no pure liberals among us; that is, women who have no fundamental quarrel with society, seeking only to make positions of power more accessible to women. We have a liberal sensitivity: we recount freely the

injustices we have suffered from political arrangements and we see how capitalism has been a source of liberation for us that was unavailable to American women in the past and economically depressed women in less affluent nations today. We acknowledge the personal investment we have in current political arrangements and see that it has benefitted us as well as oppressed us. While it is the position of this paper that the dominant classes benefit the most from Higher Education, in its pursuance of scientific research and concerns of Big Business, it is also true that critical theorists make a professional salary, albeit modest, at the hands of the University. Critical theorists profit also. But we feel a social responsibility for issues of race and class as well as of gender, and an obligation to act publicly in regard to those issues.

There are no pure socialists among us either. We have a socialist sensitivity, responding to the corruptions of capitalism. Aside from the fact that the marriage of feminism and Marxism has fallen on hard times (Sargent, 1981), we are uncertain that the roots of our difficulties are strictly economic, and that a massive overturning of the controls on production and a redistribution of material wealth would solve our problems once and for all. Our "socialist" leanings would tend to put us with the cultural-Marxists rather than the structural-Marxists, if we saw Marxism as a banner under which we would stand in the first place. We relish Marxist criticism as it seems to be the only vehicle through which a thoughtful criticism of American society may be made. Capitalism offers no position for criticism of itself.

As women who would seek the roots of patriarchy and destroy it, we are radical. As women who would take issue with hierarchy, hegemony, traditional religion, and the division between public and private spheres of morality, we are

radical. As ecofeminists drawing parallels between the destruction of the earth and the destruction of women, or religious pilgrims seeking the feminine face of God, we are radical. As teachers and mothers who would call the question of gendering in our homes and schools, institutions committed to our own care and management, we are radical. The point is that we would get to the roots of oppression and change the conscience and the consciousness of people everywhere so that the earth and her children might thrive in health and peace.

Relationships with Families

Martin Buber says that all we come to know of the world we learn through relationship. This is undisputed in child development, but he means that the principle may be extended to ongoing adult development as well. We learn about the world all our lives; further, for many of us, our world is comprised of the shifting network of relationships we maintain in varying degrees of intimacy with other people. We would not have a world without those we love. At this point in developing feminist theory, it is rather well accepted that women's lives are characterized by the importance we place upon others' presence: we feel a need to "connect" with Significant Others, we are sensitive to the effect we have upon them in social interactions, and we develop understanding through close proximity to persons and situations.

Fathers. One of the floating notions in feminist theory today is that politically active women emerge from poignant, vigorous relationships with their fathers, illustrating Buber's conviction. [Prominent British feminist and researcher, Ann Oakley, is a prime example of this. Her father was a well-known socialist activist, and she enjoyed an energetic love-hate relationship with him throughout their life together. See Oakley (1984).] This notion is based on the

assumption that one's father is the public person in the family. Through loving interactions and identification with him as a parent, she develops an affinity for his public concerns. As women become more numerous and visible in public, executive positions, it seems predictable that one day women will develop political connections through relationships with their mothers. (Psychologists in psychosexual dynamics will doubtless argue the comparative natures of such connections and relationships. Cultural Marxists would cite this hegemonic phenomenon as an example of social reproduction becoming social production, beneficial to some women and not so good for others.) What occurs in the absence of a father's influence on a daughter? If we develop political interests, how does this happen?

Some women interested in this study, women involved in public, politically constructed academia, came forward with references to their fathers and others did not. To me, the significance of this information lies in both fathers' absence or presence in our reconstructions, and in the fact that it was unsolicited. It is easier to explain why politically sensitive women would mention their fathers than why not, and one finds the omission particularly compelling.

Three narratives report the absence of fathers during early years. One, my British Portrait, says that her father was blown up in a troop train explosion by the Germans during World War II when she only months old. She was raised exclusively by her mother and aunt and admits to a bitterness about losing him that endures to the present day. As she puts it:

> There were no men in my life at all growing up. I have an uncle who is a Jesuit priest, but I didn't meet him until I was an adult. Since I went to girls' schools and was taught only by the bloody nuns, I know nothing about men.

Of all the women I interviewed, this one is (or was, prior to her exposure to feminist theory) the most "masculine" in her approach to scholarship. Whether this

is due to a personal need to succeed in the academy through excellence in competition with men on their terms, or whether it is the result of the masculine methods and structure of the British school of philosophy is uncertain. She has been the "public person" in her family in the absence of a father's protection and providence.) Another claims that her father left the family setting by divorce shortly after her earliest memories of him; however, it was in the relationship he had with her mother that her most enduring questions about life began. She says:

> Always, since I was "this big," watching my parents with each other, I had these questions about, What are we doing? Who are we to each other? And I often remember kind of talking to whatever my conception of God was, about those questions. I think that has been the primary intellectual force in me.

Like Portrait 4, she also reports an early schooling that was surrounded by females. Unlike Portrait 4, she speaks with no resentment:

> [After eighth grade] my mother decided it was important that I understand or at least be around the male species because I had no boys in the classrooms and really was pretty much illiterate as far as understanding anything about men. So I went to a co-ed Episcopal school from eighth grade to virtually my senior year.

The difference in attitudes about all-girls' schooling reflects the current conflict brewing over women's colleges across the nation. Portrait 4 regrets an all-female environment; Portrait 7 looks back at her all-girl high school years with gratitude. Knowing that the physical separation of people results in a communal, spiritual breach as well, we run the risk of further isolating women's knowledge by educating young males and females in exclusive settings. On the other hand, if the presence of males in the classroom is not managed by teachers with a feminist consciousness, male students, responding to patriarchal norms, will likely dominate classroom experience for female students.[1] This is a deep and complex issue relating to the presence and absence of men in the home; as more single-parent families are

headed by women than by men (the ratio is seven to one), more female students without fathers are appearing in the school population. Their needs as well as the conditions of their gendering must be addressed by school personnel and the curriculum.

Portrait 2 remarks about her father:

> [When I was born] my father didn't want to come to see me in the hospital because I was a girl, but my father and I became very close later in life. . . School wasn't difficult; I liked the competition and made good grades and got my father's approval that way.

What must it be like to know, from the earliest dawn of one's consciousness, that the immutable, accidental fact of one's being is fundamentally wrong? How does one respond to the certain knowledge that no effort on one's part or no success she achieves will redeem her essential defectiveness? And if her father sees her as a disappointment of this magnitude, how will she be treated by her mother? When I asked her what had influenced her most as a thinker, Portrait 2 said of her early environment:

> [What influenced me most was] my mother, my aunt, and my sisters. My early life was completely dominated by women. . . .I was considered to be a "modest violet." I read everything I could get my hands on; a respect for book learning came from my family.

Interestingly, in spite of the fact that Portrait 2 recounts an initial rejection by her father and a long history of personal oppression by sexism in the dance world and the academy, her narrative is among the least reactive in tone. She describes her 40-year marriage as happy and regards the well being of her children as the primary concern of her life. The connection I make between her unwelcome entrance into the family and her present point of view is that she evidences an ambivalence in her respect for "women's knowledge" and her own; she takes for granted that what

she has to say is not "worth much." Several times in her narrative she was bewildered by my asking her opinion, responding with, "Oh. You mean, what do I think?" as if she could have nothing of value to contribute.

Portrait 5 relates a most painful rejection by her father that is more acute today than it was in her childhood. As she pursues a doctorate, she perceives her family pulling away from her, and she regards this alienation as gender-based. She reports the cost of her program this way:

> . . .I've sacrificed my family. They don't want anything to do with me anymore because they think I've gotten too good. . .too smart. . .for them. They don't know anyone like me. They know a couple of doctors, but they're men.
>
> My family is dysfunctional. They've disowned me, and I consider that to be part of their dysfunction. See, both of my parents are Adult Children of Alcoholics, so there are lots of things they can't deal with and need to. I can still kind of talk to my brother.

Portrait 5 speaks of her family in a brief, perfunctory way, as if she is disinterested; I interpret her brushing them aside as an effort to get to other things as quickly as possible. Her manner indicates to me deeply felt pain; consequently, during the interview, I did not care to press the subject further.

Portrait 7 remembers her father as the single most important influence on her intellectual development. She says:

> But I had a scholarly father and he was my "intellectual companion" during the first seven years of my life, so I'm sure my valuing of others' knowledge came from his influence.

This man was suffering from a psychosis that made divorce inevitable and ultimately necessary for the family's safety. Portrait 7 speaks lovingly and appreciatively of his memory and says that probably a day has not passed when she has not thought of something to add to one of their conversations. Such has been the case for forty years.

Three of the Portraits have no comment about their fathers. Interestingly, these are three of five who were raised in homes by both parents. One such father is an officer in the military, stationed in the Southeast, where his daughter grew up; one is alluded to generally as part of her "radical family," and one is not mentioned at all. Two of these daughters are heterosexual and have been married twice, one is a lesbian and has been married once. Two are radical feminists and one is liberal with socialist interests. What discernable influences upon these women's lives may be seen, influences by fathers who have no place in their reconstructions? Is it possible that one's parent can be so insignificant that his daily presence in her childhood means nothing? I think not. I suspect that these men were, in effect, absent; that they were not emotionally available to their daughters; that their daughters' activities in the public world are indirectly related to that unavailability. It could be that, like Portrait 2, who admits to seeking her father's approval through public success, these women unconsciously strive their lives long to make a mark somewhere that will merit their father's notice. The omission of fathers in a reconstructive narrative is as vital as their inclusion.

Mothers. Feminist counselors, who view clients as products of and participants in gendered relationships, find the primary connection between mothers and daughters crucial in our development. Dinnerstein (1976) sees our species as "self-created" (p. 5) through historical relationships; Eichenbaum and Orbach (1983) contend that, from a psychosexual dynamic, women's relationships with other women derive from the unclear nature of separating from our mothers. Women seem to speak of their mothers more frequently than their fathers, as if their friendships were taken for granted; but they have little to say about them directly unless the mother's influence was hurtful. For example, Portrait 1 reports

the death of her mother as a milestone in her life; Portrait 5 laments her present estrangement from her mother. However, the vitality of the father-daughter relationship that would stir a female child to public activity seems to be missing from these narratives. Neither parent nor the unique contributions made to daughters by each is unimportant; it just seems that our needs and expectations of mothers and fathers are different. From our mothers we want nurturance and from our fathers validation. From both we want acceptance and encouragement.

Of these eight women, not one of them reports a childhood consisting of traditional and idyllic relationships between parents and between fathers and daughters. Where are the Dick and Jane, Ozzie and Harriet families that America celebrates in basal readers and television sit-coms? Statistics indicate that only one of ten households assumes this configuration; of those, fathers (and possibly mothers, too) seem to be unavailable to their children. Do females tend to suffer this loss more commonly than males? As women become more numerous in the workforce, will that mean that the quality of nurturance in the home will decline? Radical Separatists in the ranks of feminists (not represented by women in this study) feel that the influence of men upon women and the world at large has been so damaging, destructive at worst and ineffectual at best, that we would be well advised to create all-female communities where we could nurture one another and live in peace. While that position is not the focus of this paper, it is at least fleetingly understandable when one reads the narratives of a few women in academia who have "made it." Considering the lack of sustained, strong, positive masculine influence in our lives, one wonders what we would be thinking and doing today had we had it.

Emotional Content of Early Schooling

Reiterating that these women are among the few of us who have pursued formal education to its farthest limits, I predicted that we would reflect upon early schooling as rewarding and emotionally satisfying to us. Undoubtedly, we were the "smart" ones in our grade schools, receiving the warm strokes from teachers and the praise from parents that all children crave and only a chosen few merit from successful school performance. Only one Portrait recalls her early schooling as a positive experience. She says:

> I loved school when I was a little kid! I won things for the best essay. I won drawing contests and everybody liked me. Early childhood was happy education.

This satisfaction was to change, however, as she became older and more rebellious, and her teachers found her to be lacking in respect. All seven of the others did not mention a honeymoon phase with education; in fact, our stories seem similar to those from women who disliked school from the beginning and barely tolerated it through the twelfth grade. Portrait 1 was frustrated by school because it did not address her questions of ultimacy; she did not know why she was going there every day, the curriculum was so irrelevant to her interests, even though she remembers its emphasis on philosophy and literature.

Portrait 8 reports a certain resignation to childhood as a student. She says:

[By third grade] I learned to manipulate the teachers and the rules.

Portraits 2 and 3 recall their identities as virtually nonexistent. Recall one saying that she was "a modest violet." Recalling her terror that she would call attention to herself, the other says:

> I guess I was invisible. To me that meant to conform to every expectation of the teacher.

Portraits 4 and 7 remember the social aspect of schooling as painful. One says:

> I was from a working-class family, you see, and I suffered terribly from class discrimination as I won scholarships to better schools and was thrown in with middle class girls. I had to change the way I talked. . .never took anyone home with me after school.

And the other reports:

> I was alienated in school because I was fascinated with the theoretical, abstract material -- ideas, possibilities, reasons why -- and nobody else was like that. . . .I was a social disaster because I came from a "broken" home and we didn't have many material things. I couldn't dress the way the others did and my mother was totally insensitive to all this. . . .If there hadn't been a social component to school, I think I would have been okay. . . .I had mixed feelings about school: while it was an environment that made me an outcast, it was the only place I could go to learn wonderful things about all those exciting people in the history books. . . .the only place where my curiosity was rewarded.

Portrait 6 says nothing of her early schooling at all; her reconstruction begins with college. I find this omission dramatic. That any adult, particularly one in Higher Education, can review the history of her academic life and not mention primary school experience, is a sad commentary on American education as a raving diatribe. The truth is that she dismisses the major enterprise of her childhood, that of being a student, as having no meaning, no relevance to today. Portrait 6 speaks of a "radical" background, citing the avant garde attitudes of her family as one of her greatest strengths in facing the academy, and the source of her "feistiness." Had she been challenged by schooling, it seems likely to me that she would have included that experience in the reconstruction of her past.

Similar to our experience with fathers, our experience with early schooling does not conform to expected cultural norms. One of eight remembers it as happy; two report the pain of alienation; one neglects to mention it; and all of us recall

lesser or greater degrees of anxiety in our efforts to learn the rules and conform. Social interaction appears to be more significant in our schooling than academic activity; it gave our school years the character they had for us then and have for us now in memory. At best, school was a "mixed bag": at some point down the line, we were intellectually challenged, if only partially; in the process, we were frustrated by the separation between academics and social realities, disappointed by the inattention given to our academic interests, or alienated by our peers for having them. Our histories of struggle for identity and validation as young students call for a pedagogy that creates, liberates, and heals.

Women's Oppression

In a sense, it is truly remarkable that we, as people, must be told that we are oppressed. Once told, we can mobilize our energies to overthrow the forces of our oppression; but, until that time, centuries of injustice may roll over us accompanied by little comment or resistance. Generations are benumbed, and time makes it more so. (One thinks of Moses' mission to the Hebrew slaves in Egypt: when he went among them preaching insurrection, they were bewildered; they needed to be educated to understand that their enslavement was untoward before rebellion against it made any sense.) This phenomenon illustrates the power of ideological assumptions about the meaning of justice, the importance of human existence, social hierarchy, theories of accommodation and resistance, and the hegemonic transmission of values.

The women in this study speak of oppression unnamed in our childhoods, in academia, and in our homes; in fact, our stories reveal oppression in all aspects of our lives. Portrait 2 says of her past:

> I wanted to prove to my father that I was as good as a son would have been. . . My father's family was Arab. . . .they thought that women should be behind the

veil. . . .and my mother's people were Orthodox Jews. So being a nice girl on a piano bench was about all that was acceptable to them. . . .They were very strict. . . .I didn't express myself much as a talker, and I think that's why I wanted to dance: to express myself. That was my form of communication. It's always been difficult for me to talk.

. . .Women aren't in any of the arts: it's all men, all men, all the time. My finest studio dance instructors used to say, "Focus on the boy. We can get some girl easy enough." They said that men were going to be in the profession longer. The men will have to support themselves on stage. We are always the outsiders. I was afraid to wear my engagement ring because I was afraid to let them know I was going to get married. I'd lose my job. I'd have been passed over for future parts. . . .We've been forced to make a choice between family and dance, where the men have not. . . .

. . . .And I was refused a dance class in this program, over which I have shed bitter tears. . . .I was excluded because of my age. And all I've heard is how good it will be to have a man teaching advanced ballet. What can I say?. . . I, too, am a human being. It hit me in an unprotected part, this exclusion.

Portrait 4 explains how schooling alienated her:

. . . .I became involved with the British method of studying philosophy, which is destructive, critical, and argumentative, and I found it alien to my natural approach to an idea. I learned how to do it, what I thought then to be "proper," but today I see as male. . . .

Portrait 5 says of the University:

Here, we're nothing as students, and we begin to wonder in ourselves who we are and what value we actually have.

Portrait 7 remembers herself as a young student:

I came up short. Aristotle judged me. It was all that rigid absolutism I superimposed on myself, and by dragging it down on top of me, I developed a very negative view of myself and others. . . .I began to realize that I was at odds with factual learning and that some things didn't interest me at all. . . The boys seemed to be doing well at this point, so I began to accept, at some subliminal level, that scholars were male and that scholarship itself was a male enterprise. I'd read and admire and think: "Gee, it's too bad I wasn't born with testicles. . . ."

Portrait 8 recalls:

We [as young students] spent most of the time playing games with the teachers. One, I remember, would teach only the boys, so the girls would sit

> the back and talk. So by the time I was in high school, there was no longer any value for education for me. . . .

In light of patriarchal arrangements that have governed our daily existence for 5,000 years, it is not so surprising that we have accepted "what is" as what is right, what ought to be, and what is inevitable. One function of critical pedagogy (and certainly feminist pedagogy) is to raise the consciousness of women to an awareness of oppression in our own lives and then to develop that understanding into an empathy for women worldwide. Such empathy ought to be extended to subjugated peoples everywhere: men, women, and children who are poor, non-white, and relegated to labor that benefits the elite. It is the power of education to name personal and global oppression and to encourage empathy with others, toward a goal of ending it.

Aside from the accommodation we have made to patriarchal power arrangements over the centuries, women often do not notice quite painful forms of oppression in our experience because those forms are so subtle. Ortner (1974) describes the usual role of women in a nature-culture paradigm as a clearing at the edge of the forest: as the forest is nature and the city is culture, the clearing between the two represents the place women have traditionally held, taking raw nature and preparing it for civilized use. In that way, we have supported the notion of male enterprise and perpetuated our own roles as supporters and preparers through the education of our daughters and our sons. (I think of the things I required of my children, wanting to be a "good" mother and regarded as such by my friends, and I wonder that I didn't rebel against those requirements at the time. If it were not silly enough that elbows cannot rest on the table, why must it have been my function to teach it? Why are children's elbows on the table so offensive in the first place; and why do they indicate a neglect by the mother? Child rearing is a formal construction of this sort of thing.) We, as daughters, were (and are) proud of our

mothers' good mothering, most of which had to do with surviving in the world and even starting life's race a few steps ahead of our competitors. Information regarding how to clean and adorn our bodies, comport ourselves in public, marry a rich man, and live in relative security (in short, manipulating the system to our own advantage) is gleaned from our mothers' knowledge of and responses to patriarchy; as they loved us, they shared it. If we had brains, we learned it, whether we let them know that or not. Portrait 1 remembers:

> Seems like the first ten years from kindergarten to eighth grade it was really training how to be a young lady. . . .We were told how to sit, have certain skirt lengths. . . .social kinds of learning: how to be a proper young lady and then learn how to be with boys and do that right. Behind that was sort of what was being taught academically. My mother used to say, "Don't be so serious. . . .don't think so much!"

As Avis Rent-A-Car says, when you're number two, you try harder. As second-class citizens in the public realm, women know the value of survival and have learned to place that goal in a primary position. What has needed teaching is a critical view of second-class-ness that makes such a preoccupation with survival necessary in the first place. Women today are very much like the ancient Hebrews. Recall, in patriarchal social arrangements, that not everyone has this primary goal because not everyone has this need. There are some among us who never think of it: their position is so secure from the beginning that other concerns are paramount, such as the pursuit of remote philosophical or scientific truths, the establishment of morality, the accumulation of greater wealth, the maintenance of power over others, choices among certain purchasable luxury items, or techniques in combatting boredom. Traditionally, women have been set apart from these rarified problems, applying our energies to survival and teaching those arts to our daughters. Portrait 1 continues with memories of her mother:

> In college I got somewhat more interested in study but I was told also by my mother: "This is a four-year paid vacation! Enjoy it!" She really wanted me to -- the whole fine print in that line -- fraternity parties, sorority parties, all of it.

It is through education that we have come to regard second-class-ness as intolerable; that we see how it has been thrust upon us throughout our upbringing (in family, church, and schooling); and that we approach the academy as a second-class citizens in the public realm, a bastion of male privilege that views our knowledge as unalterably inferior and our presence as a burden.

Portrait 5 says, about her experience in the academy:

> I'm too emotive, too personal, too affective to have an easy time around here, and I've been told by the patriarchs that I'm a problem to the system.

Portrait 6 describes a woman scholar as a woman mutilated by the university; she contends vehemently that none of us may express her femaleness and be judged scholarly at the same time. And Portrait 4 says:

> Any woman scholar must have the ability to fit into the patriarchal mold. . . all that left-brain stuff. She must be able to jump through proscribed hoops: do research, present evidence, be intellectual. She is someone who has made a deliberate choice to be there, someone who presents learning in traditional male forms: books, theses, etc.

Portrait 7:

> There are a few very important things that keep me from being comfortable in the academy. I'm not assertive, I don't sell myself well, I'm too hesitant, and I'm too likely to be intimidated by male authority. All of this, particularly the last about intimidation by males, is something I see as a lifelong struggle for me in any public space, no matter how much I object to having to deal with it. Thing is, there simply is no ivory tower. I wish there were.

Portrait 8:

> So now I'm trying to decide, What can I live with? What can I give? What do I need? And I'm learning from my losses. . . .The University is masculine and I've been extremely angry, even about what I remember as a woman. I

explain things differently. How do I connect that with theory? Well, I don't always explain things through theory.

And Portrait 3:

Actually, I think it's probably not too difficult to be a scholar in the male sense. . . .because all you have to do is read a lot, memorize a lot, and drop a few names and theories and speak with authority. So I don't think that's particularly challenging. But for me to have to be that, as a woman, is like selling your soul. . . .

Patriarchy weakens us as a force. If we could recognize the value of our knowledge and work together, and not let patriarchy co-opt our language, telling us we're not good enough, and use our solidarity for strength, we could make great changes through this sisterhood. . . .

We must be willing to take risks and make fools of ourselves if necessary, and keep trying, and believe that somehow there's a place for us.

Women's Knowledge

What do women know that men don't? Portrait 3 says:

As second-class citizens we have insights into inequality and injustice in a way that men don't have. Women can feminize the whole notion of scholar, and bring a sensitivity and meaning to it than men just don't seem to have the capacity to do. . . .To be a homemaker in touch with the earth, food, the nurture and care of children. . . .all this has enhanced women's knowledge in ways that men have not been able to engage in.

And Portrait 2 says:

. . . .women bring a certain human value because we are closer to people than men. . . .Men produce "pure science," but women deal with the whole person.

What can women know that men can't? What is it that we know that we want the world to take seriously? Portrait 2 goes on:

When our bodies have had that experience of producing children, our eyes have that experience, too. We see the whole student. . . .because of our motherhood and the experience of producing whole people.

Recall Portrait 6's impassioned cry against the denial of her childbearing experience. And Portrait 7 says:

> A woman scholar is responsible for knowing the world men have made, but make sense of it as a woman and see the difference between the two. I don't think a woman can be a scholar without the habits of making those connections.

Is that all? What of those women who have not given birth to children, for one reason or another? Do they have something uniquely feminine to share with male authority? Portrait 4 is one of these women, and she says:

> I have been given permission by what I've learned of feminist theory to indulge my natural approach, which is positive, constructive, and interested in the usability of an idea.

And why, today, do we push it? For the last 5,000 years that we can count, women have busied themselves in the home and communicated their wisdom to one another, primarily educating their daughters in role rehearsal: the arts of survival in and contribution to man's culture. In spite of an occasional flurry of rebellion among them, or the appearance of individual women whose creative genius was socially conspicuous, women have settled to function in the private sphere and men have distinguished themselves in the world at large. (Recall Portraits 3's descriptive metaphor of the secret "Garden" for women's knowledge). So why is it today, after 25 years of dogged determination, that feminists continue to press for changes in ideological thought that would revolutionize international politics, environmental concerns, economic distribution, decision making within nations, domestic institutions (church, school, and industry), social roles, moral codes of behavior, gendering processes, and family interactions?

Let it be a given that human beings have significantly depleted the nurturant providence of the earth. Further, let it be a given that consumerism has created a gulf between the haves and the have nots by the availability of manufactured goods that may be purchased and enjoyed by only a few, that the lives of the masses, who

must work to provide those few with such pleasures take on characteristics of physical exhaustion and never-ending poverty. Let it be a given that these masses, generally people of color around the world, vastly outnumber the overlords whom they serve; and that the prospect of their pooling the energies of their resentments is terrifying. Why is it that today we see a sustained effort by feminists, one that arose in the mid-60s and refuses to die as it has in the past, throughout history (Spakes says, "Every 50 years or so there is a renewed women's movement in which all the ideas seem radical but, in fact, were spoken before. It's depressing."), to name our difficulties through the language of gendering and patriarchal oppression?

Portrait 5 says:

> . . . About here, I arrived very naive. I've felt that the difficulties I've encountered here have been gender related, and I see more and more how it is true: the power trips, the brush-offs, the patriarchal games we suffer. . . I'm up to here with it.

Is it only through this sense of personal injury that we rebel against patriarchy, or is it that the enormity of the mess made of the world (by men, but with women's co-operation) has become so crucial that it cannot be ignored without endangering our very lives? It is that we sense, as the silenced and marginal, that the knowledge we have accrued in our undistinguished experience could put right the mess our "beleaguered plant" (McFague, 1987, p. 180) has come to be?

Portrait 1 says of women' scholarship:

> I really wanted someone to address those questions of ultimacy -- life, death, infinity -- but school just did not do that. . . .I just want to know why we're killing each other <u>today</u>. . . .Our issues are about humanism, about fairness, about love. We are all human beings struggling within a world that oppresses and let's come to the table and talk as people with each other. . . .Those are the things as scholars I would want us to be thinking about. . . .

Perhaps, after these millinia, women have become enlightened, acquainted with a critical discourse through education and mass media in which we would choose to be included.

Portrait 2 says:

> You know, our abilities as women have not been reflected in scholarship. . . .I began this program because I wanted to have the chance to teach . . .I developed a method of teaching on my own and had started using it when I left Chicago. . . [it] was successful without any formal instruction and the feedback was good, but what did anybody know about it? My ideas made me lonely. . . .my ideas have always made me lonely.

Portrait 3 says of women's exclusion:

> What makes me sad, though, is that society would have me do nothing else [but remain in the "secret garden" of women's knowledge]. That's where the crunch comes in: you can't be anything you want to be and do anything you want to do.

Portrait 4 says of her frustrated need to forge connections:

> . . . .There is no separation for me between school and life. School and life are together; "learning" and "life" are of a piece. I've always looked to make those connections. . . .I've always thought: But what difference does it make what sense I make of philosophy and dance? Who cares what I think?

Portrait 5 speaks of women's language in the academy:

> With the dissertation, I'm finding I have to speak in a male-dominated language. . . .I'm supposed to leave the personal out of it, and pictures are definitely out. I realize that what I'm going through with the dissertation is actually what I'm writing about. . . .I take my education and <u>make</u> it apply to my life and my thoughts.

Portrait 6 says of women in scholarship:

> This place [the academy] is the male super-structure held up by the words. I can survive because of a certain feistiness, for me. . . .aggressiveness. . . .You know, we need different words to express our reality. . . .I feel that it's been very difficult; that I was a foreign animal here. . . .

Portrait 7 sees a women in academe as:

> . . . .insightful, tough, able to hold her own in an all-male gathering of scholars, knowledgeable, and aware of herself and her differences from men's experience within scholarship. . . .Sometimes I look around me and wonder if I am out of my mind. I'm going through all this so I can live this way for the rest of my life. What sense does it make? Maybe I'll always have mixed feelings about it. . . .a love-hate relationship with the University: on the one hand, it's a tight little snake pit of competitive men that reflects the worst of their public domain. On the other hand, it's an oasis of possibility and poetry that survives in a hostile world, feeding us in a way that nothing else can or will. And, for someone like me, what is the alternative?

Portrait 8 says of her purpose for being at the University:

> My final connection has been the making of political art: dance, as a way that children can understand themselves and the issues in their lives. . . .What does it mean to do critical pedagogy through the body? Through dance? What does it mean to make political art?

Perhaps engagement in this discourse stirs and empowers us; that, in the shift from concerns within the home to concerns beyond the home we find a new and unexpected dignity in our own thoughts and words. Perhaps by addressing global issues, traditionally the province of male theorists, we act out the feminist maxim that "what is personal is political" and are energized by doing so: we assign the oppression that pains us as individuals to the world's oppressed masses and bring it to bear upon the patriarchal conscience; we apply the principles of nurturance that sustain our homes and families to the public domain; we judge the wisdom of our decisions by cost to human beings. Perhaps it has all come together at one time: a sense of impending global disaster, a personal refusal to tolerate oppression in our individual lives any further, and the continued circulation of feminists' ideas in a public voice. As Portrait 8 says of her feminist education:

> . . . .I used to shy away from feminism. . . .because it was such a powerful force, like an undertow. . . .I understood some of the surface stuff, but what I didn't understand was that the world is structured in a masculine way, that the way we think is structured in a masculine way. . . .what is valid and what

> is a sin is structured as masculine, the very living of every day is structured in a masculine way. . . .Basically, our world is masculine. That, I came to learn.

And Portrait 3 observes:

> Before I came into this program, I didn't know what the feminine was.

For all of our raised consciousness and newly found language of resistance, we find our perseverance in the male academy tough going. We seem to have something urgent to say, or we would not be here, the effort is so great. Whether we intuit an essential feminine truth to tell, or seek personal liberation from the shackles of past schooling, or feel drawn to global problems that can be addressed by our subjugated knowledge, or find a compelling undertow in critical discourse, or entertain within us a combination of any of these, we seem to be committed as women to making some contribution to knowledge in the public sphere. It is difficult, costly, and generally unwelcomed by the world; but this mission defines who we are, what we need to say, and where we need to be.

Dancers and Academics

The eight women I interviewed approach curriculum theory from a variety of disciplines and with a variety of reasons. By no preconceived plan of mine, four of us come from dance education and four from other fields (counseling and education). I divide them into these two camps of "dancers" and "academics" for the purposes of discussion, though their interests are not identical. For example, among the dancers, three consider themselves to be performers and one a dance theorist from philosophy. Of the three performers, one seeks to formalize her methods of teaching classical dance, one is interested in the making of political art in elementary school classrooms, and the third is interested in feminizing the University along radical

lines. The dance theorist seeks to integrate dance and philosophy in the curriculum, which appears to be a feminist task. Of the academics one is a trained Jungian counselor, one an art therapist, one a religious educator, and one a teacher of the handicapped. I cannot see differences in feminist political leanings explained by specific academic orientation, but there does appear to be a single (if hazy) connection between their points of view and their respective involvements in the arts.

In the field of dance, there is an important distinction to be made between peforming and theory. Dance theory is relatively new. The dance theorist, whose past career includes the teaching of dance technique, is interested in the analysis of movement, the ideas surrounding it. The three performers, whose interests have evolved to teaching dance, are more involved with the production of dance as an art form. All meet in a concern for curriculum. Looking at the four of them, it is the dance theorist who seems to be more at home in the milieu of curriculum studies. This could be the result of her background in philosophy, which is completely academic in nature, or it could relate to the fact that she never was a performer herself. She says that even when she was teaching technique it was not her first love. She notes that dance departments in universities frequently list openings for instructors of technique ("how to kick your legs around," as she puts it) but seldom for professors of dance theory, which provides the theoretical base for dance activity.

The performers, on the other hand, are more at home in the Dance Department than the School of Education. They have a strong artistic lead into academia, expressing doubts that art should ever fall under the academic umbrella in the first place. They suffer its restraints acutely: that the University and its

machinations are characterized by competition among participants, grades in coursework, written reports, funding, and the other concerns of Big Business. They feel torn in the opposition between these requirements and the essential nature of art, which is free-flowing creativity. (This is not to say that conformity is unknown to art. Obviously it is not. But that conformity is the voice of culture regulating creative form, and artists struggle against it throughout their lives, finding success as they "break the rules" successfully. Picasso said, "For the first 40 years of my life, I tried to draw like a man; for the second 40 years of my life, I tried to draw like a child." This issue is well documented in art theory and not developed here, in this paper. But dance performers in the academy would contend that demands placed upon dance by cultural norms are restricting enough without the added lumber of the academy.) Portrait 2 speaks of these conflicts that reach back into her earliest days on stage:

> I have never been very intellectual, you know: sort of bookish. Intellectualism is far removed. I wanted to be a dancer, a performer. So I lived in three worlds: one, the university; one, the dance performers I danced with; and one home. . . .But I've always been a body person, so it was difficult living in the world of intellectuals, the University, even though I made good grades. Because for me, dance was everything. . . .When I first went to the University, I turned away from philosophy, thought. I could deal with art, but not philosophy. We students were so taken with just living and making ends meet. . . .and this is not "intellectual." There was just not too much connection between what I learned in my classes and my life, and I thought about life. So when I came to UNC-G and was faced with the phenomenon of the mind, I couldn't believe it. I was a dance person. We never talked about "dance theory": we just talked about dance as an art form.
>
> . . . .In the old days, I'd never have thought of it [getting a doctorate]. When I came here, my interest was in studying dance in an academic setting rather than the studio. [My own method] was a hit-and-miss kind of thing. I had never had a teacher analyze movement. . . .
>
> It's difficult for classically trained people to initiate the creative process. And then I read [a dance professor's] dissertation and I got a whole different feeling about it: research, the dance curriculum, and classical dancers. . . .the dance curriculum that applies to life.
>
> . . . .Now, I guess I'm getting closer to being an intellectual because I'm learning how to read some of the textbooks.

Portrait 6, who is a professor in the Dance Department, says:

> When I came here, I became a professor. I had a desk. I was teaching, but not being an artist. There has been a conflict here. . . .I don't perform anymore at all.
>
> The males are so into the male critical thinking thing that the words mean so much to them. . . .It's like being in a strange land. Especially to go out of the arts and into the University. . . .I like to think of myself as an insurrectionist. In the past, I taught about joy and affirmation. Now, I'm part of the system. And that is patriarchy rather than being just "men." It's so hierarchical that it's not about people very much. It's such a hard thing to come together and talk about ideas, exchange ideas of spirit. . . .We've got to push the whole University structure out of the way.

This description of dancers as artists in no way denies similar sensitivities among the academics. Portrait 1 is a poet, Portrait 5 currently takes drawing courses, and Portrait 7 has a strong background in painting and drawing. But the fact that these pursuits were always avocational for us, something set aside from our academic focus, has made us second-line fighters in the battle with traditional forms of scholarship. The professional artists have been on the front row for years, more acutely aware of the conflicts there. The two groups meet at an interesting juncture, and that is the realm of feminist pedagogy; here, they have an important message for curriculum.

Huebner (1975) describes curricular language in five different modes, citing three of them as traditionally accepted and almost universally used in American schools. The remaining two, of greatest interest to critical theorists, are the aesthetic and the ethical curricula. It is within the scope of feminist pedagogy that these currently ignored curricula find value, their philosophies being entirely compatible with feminist theory and its mission. Those academic Portraits motivated by philosophy and religion are as enthusiastic about these curriculum languages as the dancers. but the performers have a particularly focused message to the academy grounded in their experience.

First, dancers tend to feel keenly their exclusion by philosophy and linguistics that "language makes it real." They contend that their art form is a language in itself, valid as spoken expression, and that non-verbal experiences can and are stored in the mind without the baggage of verbal definition to make them real. Portrait 5 says:

> Last night I won that debate in class about language. . . .five years ago, that wouldn't have happened. They've all softened, and that's good. We dancers have done that. . . .shown them that there's another way of seeing, thinking, communicating. We've gotten controversy going. We're trying to show them that there are other ways of making connections, which is all their "language" is. . . .

Academic Portrait 3 concurs. Recall her difficulties with linear computer writing in the "masculine" mode, a required style, and her preferred circular style, which is "feminine" and subjugated. Academic and graphic artist Portrait 5 describes the gulf she experiences between the academy and her life as language-based, and quite difficult to bridge:

> I'm trying to develop a new relationship between my schooling and my thoughts, and it's a struggle.

Philosopher-dance theorist Portrait 4 explains it this way:

> Language in culture is always controlled and regulated by the ruling ideology. The University as a masculine culture authorized its own language and, by doing so, creates and perpetuates its own reality.

Dancers extend their insights about oppression beyond illegitimacy of the arts. They see the preoccupation of the academy with conventional methods of sharing information as exclusionary to them as women. This exclusion reflects precisely the nature of women's knowledge as devalued and ignored by the public, masculist world. Portrait 6, performer and dance professor, describes a women scholar as a eunuch:

> . . . .someone with her balls cut off! Sew up her vagina! Make her not think like a woman! Have her cross her legs! Don't cream your pants! Don't have a period. Don't have juices oozing and flowing out of you at inappropriate times or you could never be a scholar. . . .sort of like, don't be a woman.
>
> In the past, women had a respected place in society as healers. . . today, we don't even talk in mixed company about giving birth. We turn our bodies over to male doctors who cut us, instead of to midwives who massage and relax us. . . .it's so different. But we don't use those models much, and they're powerful images. I can't think of any more powerful than the birth image. . . .or the moontime image. Bleeding. That's extremely powerful, and it's not even talked about in the curriculum. There is nothing of women in the curriculum. And I said all this last night in class and I was immediately embarrassed because I had brought it up and gone on about it in front of them [the rest of the class] with such, well, spirit. I told [the male professor] that the reason he thought in words only was because he just hadn't any real body experiences. . . .that he just hadn't begun to live, yet. . . .and that I was sorry for him! . . .I got wild a few times.
>
> But I realized I had never used that image before in public, in a scholarly place, the most powerful image in my life. We deny it as a reality. . . .Our womb-birth-giving, menses-flowing, breast-filled reality. We need to language that.

Certain feminists speak of "writing the body," a task in literary construction that connects with curriculum. Traditional construction consists of setting the scene, describing the characters, building action to a climax, and relaxing into a post-climactic phase of denouement, all of which proceeds along a linear continuum similar to men's sexual experience. Feminist writers are saying that women's sexual experience is different, and that literary construction reflecting our physical and emotional engagement in sexual activity would be different as well. They suggest that it could take on a circular appearance rather than a linear one. Within conventional curricula, models advanced by educator theorists Hilda Taba and David Ausubel (Joyce & Weil, 1980, chaps. 3 and 5) reflect an understanding of non-linear approaches to the construction and sharing of learning. The artists among us, notably the dancers, exhibit a sensitivity to our need for diversified curriculum in all levels of schooling and make a sharply articulated case for the feminization of the academy.

Footnotes

[1]This is one example of conflict between liberal and radical feminists: either we are "equal" to men and deserve the opportunity to be competing with them in an integrated society early on, or we have some special characteristic that must be nurtured and protected in a segregated environment. One resolution to this dilemma comes from analyzing the power relationships between the two sexes. As long as they remain asymmetrical, morality suggests that restraints are placed upon the stronger and choice is awarded to the weaker. Hence, if women choose to segregate for part of their schooling, that arrangement must be honored; but it does not mean that men may choose the same privilege.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERPRETATION AND VISIONS

Historical Legacy of Knowledge and Women's Place

As women do not find themselves in history, this dissertation contends that women do not find themselves in a history of thought. Knowledgeable women have existed at all times and in all places, largely in the private spheres of home and family, but also in the public realms of philosophy, pedagogy, commerce, and politics. Because of our devalued position in a developing hierarchical scheme of society, our names are missing among those who made an overt contribution to culture. Traditionally, we have occupied a place in history along its margins, participating in its machinations as supportive, unsung facilitators.

Feminists are aware of the historic devaluation of women, our assignment to the home, and the reluctance of the public world to recognize and legitimate our presence and our knowledge. Radical feminists contend that there has always been a women's culture bound together with women's knowledge; furthermore, radical feminists feel that the knowledge and values women have developed during 5,000 years of patriarchal exclusion from men's public culture are precisely those needed to redeem the planet from past atrocities; atrocities that threaten its present and future existence: the destructive spirit of domination, possession, and control of natural phenomena and human life.

Recognizing that schools are the primary socializing agent in the country today, feminists seek to change attitudes about being and getting along in the world through an amended curriculum. By a critical perspective of our own schooling, the women interviewed in this study see how the structure of society was and is replicated in our

education at all levels, by purpose, content, and methodology. As a group of both students as well as educators, we maintain a critical perspective on our own experience, work for the dissolution of the historic barriers between public and private domains, and call for a curriculum that would bring forth the neglected aesthetic and ethical dimensions of our "subjugated knowledge." Our views may be analyzed by these three categories, described below.

Women's Ways of Knowing

This pioneer work by Mary Belenky and her colleagues (1986) organizes the production of knowledge into five levels of sophistication. Moving from a preliminary condition of silence, Belenky's women are seen to progress toward a final stage of awareness of themselves, an understanding of their position within and against Objectified Knowledge, and competence in expressing it. This final stage of "knowing" includes specific characteristics of and challenges to the knower: passion, ability to converse meaningfully, morality, commitment to action, and disruption of intimate relationships, among them. The women in this study "fit" into this final stage, with a slight hangover from the previous one, manifested by our hesitation to believe that our personal opinions are really valued and sought. Throughout our narratives, however, we establish our place in Belenky's scheme as Stage Five. Our understanding of the authority of knowledge has been cultivated by a critical education (we did not have it until we became immersed in doctoral study); this education required that we reflect critically on our own experience and place ourselves in the curriculum. We have learned how to engage in scholarly discourse and, at the same time, remain "real." We are able to write and present evidence in the "masculine," public mode of constructed theses and dissertations. We speak with passion, we are committed to change based on moral imperatives, and we have all known loss in relationships with families and

Significant Others. And we have made peace with our internal and external changes through it all. Belenky's scheme seems incomplete, however, if not flawed, as a paradigm for encompassing women's knowledge.

First of all, it is unavoidably hierarchical. It is impossible to read the five stages without judging it better for anyone to be at the fifth stage than the first. According to Belenky and others, true "knowing" is development; and who has "developed" to this stage of completion? Why, academics much like themselves. Where does this leave the great numbers of women, the eternal majority of us, who are not formally educationed; that massive subculture of isolated women who, by their Fifth World activity, remain on the margins to keep culture viable? Does Belenky believe that the only validly knowing women are those who are formally introduced into the public sphere of men's knowledge? By her descriptions it would appear so.

Next, exception could be taken to the first preliminary "silent" stage. Magda Lewis (1990, June) denies silence as an indication of women's ignorance or self-abnegation (one recalls the mute Jesus before the Grand Inquisitor); silence can indicate vast knowing. The more cogent question is, knowing what?

Next, she lists "empathy" as one of the aspects of the "passionate" knower. Must empathy be taught? Do we not find empathy (and great passion), along with certain knowledge, among the silent and subjugated? For one, I do not believe that empathy is a product of critical education, but rather a basic tenet of human nature; while it may be diminished or expanded by socialization, the capacity to care deeply is one of the truly noble attributes of humanity, found in all societies and individuals to one degree or another.

Further, there is an economic feature to Belenky's scale. The fifth stage knower is a middle class woman. One cannot read her fifth stage interviews and imagine a

poverty class woman speaking. As we ourselves are indeed middle class (like Belenky's examples), we hotly maintain that women at all economic levels know a great deal from our experience, wherever that is found. The task of radical curriculum is to free that knowledge and make it sharable. If we look to middle class academics to verbalize "women's knowledge," what we will get is women's interpretation of men's knowledge, which may be considered essential in itself but representative of only a portion of what women know. If we insist that women become middle class to be valued as knowers, we will continue by acceptance of a patriarchal, hierarchical perspective, to leave unplumbed the wisdom of the marginalized majority.

Lastly, there is something irritating about stratifying human beings into stages, phases, levels, and categories of any kind. Even if Belenky can demonstrate (which she has not) that her scheme is not hierarchical, its linearity and progression is masculine and its levels are valued differently. This, to my way of thinking, is precisely what radical feminists are trying to debunk. One remembers that it is never a case of the way something is, but the ways in which we talk about it and think about it. Placing women on any continuum has dangerous possibilities in a patriarchal culture; we must not empower it any further, even if our intentions are the best.

Public and Private Divisions

Another critical way of seeing women's knowledge involves the division between public and private spheres of activity. As has been stated, the relegation of women to those areas of our lives that remain hidden from the public eye (the home and family, with all that entails) has resulted in the accumulation of knowledge about human development, "mental health," personal interaction, physical well-being, moral justice, and "decent survival." In short, families are composed of many conflicting interests in their various members who, with the management of women, learn to accept and get

along with each other and meet the outside world. Strangely, these insights and skills, so necessary for the maintenance of family units, are not found in public life. Guided by economic interests, nations set aside the basic rules and values that sustain their statesmen and populations; different sets of rules are developed and applied. For example, when an industry of the magnitude of Sears and Roebuck manufactures a set of bunk beds that is so unstable that children's lives are lost every year from their use, such a company would rather pay lawyers to defend the life-threatening product in court and continue to market it rather then to give the money to bereaved families. This is incomprehensible by private justice: if a child hurt him or herself in our homes, we would use every resource at our command to intervene, console the family, and take whatever measures were necessary to see that a similar crisis did not occur in the future. Or again, when a birth control device is judged to be life threatening to American women and forced off the domestic market, pharmaceutical houses feel no compunction at exporting the product to the Third World for profit. The rationale seems to be, who cares about a handful of African women, or that there will be a few less Indians? In our homes, at our kitchen tables, we will not feed contaminated food to our families or our guests, not for fear of legal reprisal, but because we have concern for human life and safety. Women in this study are asking that the same morality we know and enjoy in the home, particularly regarding human relationships, be applied to public relationships as well, between Americans and in the global community. We know that human nature is both public and private, our behavior both personal and social; public and private spheres of existence reflect our nature and needs. Each has the potential for cultivating the noblest of our impulses and exciting our creativities. But why are the divisions so distinct and rigid that we cannot think communally, or define ourselves within a communal context? Why is the public sphere so alienating to us as individuals that we

must repair to the isolation of a "secret garden" to engage in meaningful reflection, develop our own knowledge, explore our own values, meditate, and find our identities?

We want the barriers between public and private spheres of activity to come down, so that the planet is treasured as our home and all people living on it are treated as family. We want the values found in the home regarded with the same importance in the streets of commerce. That includes the leveling of hierarchy and a revisioning of language; in short, the demise of patriarchy.

Conclusions: Toward an Alternative Pedagogy

The women in this study passionately advance a new curriculum language that is critical, feminist, aesthetic, and ethical in nature. We see this as necessary for schooling at all levels to meet our needs as women, as both public and private citizens, "first" or "fifth stage" knowers (Belenky, again). Each feature of such a curriculum adds a necessary characteristic to effective education. The four components of a recommended curriculum are discussed briefly below, not as a full or detailed description but as a general schema, including the qualities it should have. This discussion hopes to encourage in the reader a new expectation of what curriculum should be.

Critical Language

Weiler (1988) provides an explanation of the varieties of critical discourse existing within education today, divided between Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives. As was pointed out in Chapter Three, all are aimed at understanding the difference between education and schooling, including its political dimensions. Female and male students need an understanding of the structures and agencies of society, how they are mirrored and supported by public schooling, and how each of us is affected in this reality. Critical pedagogy demands that we place ourselves in the struggle in a very

personal way, historically and presently. Without a critical language, there can be no hope for beneficial changes to take place in the present system. Without critical language, feminist pedagogy has no base. It provides the reason for doing feminist pedagogy in the first place.

Feminist Pedagogy

Feminist pedagogy results from a critical position from which the present curriculum is transformed. McIntosh (1983), in her progression of curriculum transformation, introduces critical analysis in the middle of the process, but actually it appears as soon as the position of women in any discipline becomes part of an inquiry. Sociological, economic, and political issues are examined as they come to bear upon women and women's knowledge in patriarchal society, including the concepts of ideology, hierarchy, hegemony, gendering, and patriarchy itself. The culmination of curriculum transformation is a reconstruction of a given discipline that includes everybody, allowing the student to place herself (and himself) in its historical context.

The Aesthetic Curriculum

Grumet (1988, p. 79) writes:

> I want to explore what it means to take up teaching as art at this place and time. For some years I have relied upon aesthetic forms to study educational experience. . . .Curriculum is, after all, artifice, deliberately designed to direct attention, provoke response, and express value. . . .

The aesthetic curriculum does not describe that part of the school day (or week) set aside for listening to the "William Tell Overture" or making Mother's Day cards or culminating the science unit with the construction of something like a papier mache volcano. Neither does it refer to the number of classroom hours devoted to fine arts of any variety, or the quality of craft projects undertaken by the class or individual students, though all of these things may find their way into the aesthetic classroom with

great relevance. The aesthetic curriculum reflects first a commitment on the part of the teacher to a certain philosophy of education, character of classroom activity, and nature of the student-teacher relationship. While the other curricular languages offer something worthwhile to pedagogy, her commitment to this particular one must be so strong as to counterbalance their inevitable, pervasive influences; at this writing, not much is known about aesthetic curriculum and even less is practiced. School environments cannot support a teacher's pursuit of aesthetics, even if the principal and superintendent encourage her, because most likely she will be the only one on staff doing it. At this writing, aesthetic models are not available to teacher trainees.

The philosophy of the aesthetic curriculum views the purpose of education to be the development of creativity in students in the living of their lives and making something of themselves, necessarily seen as artistic. By conceiving our activities and behaviors as works of art, we regard other civilizations as artworks, too; as we observe what we make, we become impressed with the significance of our efforts here and now, that we fashion things of beauty rather than dropping behind us a trail of meaningless (or worse, destructive) litter.

Fundamental to this philosophy is an understanding that, in proclaiming its identity, an artwork is removed from the world's use. Huebner refers to this in Bullough's terms as "psychical distance" (p. 226). It is itself, valued for what it is. (I asked an art professor once how we know when we encounter a "great" painting; he said, "You know because you do not observe it. . . .it observes you.") In the classroom, all activity is valued not as a preparation for the adult world, or acculturation to commercialism, or potentially high scores on the achievement test, but as a thing of beauty in itself. The teacher with an aesthetic approach to teaching is empowered to recognize and appreciate those unexpected, impromptu moments that occur during the

school day, those small, jewel-like vignettes set apart from the "purpose" of anything planned, that have some intrinsic value within themselves. The aesthetic curriculum not only encourages this awareness, but values these occasions as important. (As it is, teachers sometimes do conceptualize such moments this way, but without a language to describe and dignify them: usually when a presentation is particularly successful, or an interaction with a student is especially satisfying, and she thinks to herself, "I wish I had that on video." And there are those rare instances when things are going so well she wants to fetch her friend next door to share the harmony and energy she witnesses. This fleeting pleasure is stolen by the exigencies of her schedule, and she tries to recall it when she becomes discouraged, doubting her effectiveness as a teacher.)

As students and teachers are inspired by the aesthetic curriculum to see classroom activity as an artistic enterprise, we come to know a wholeness and unity of design that offers us an inner peace. The writer(s) of the first chapter of Genesis understood this satisfaction of the creator very well, repeating often during the Creation myth that: ". . . .God saw that it was good" (King James Version). In addition to our coming to value created works as apart from usage, and derive contentment from our creative efforts, we gain a knowledge of symbolic meaning by which the world is expressed. "Symbolic meaning" refers to the cultural stories and explanations of the world told through its constructions of religion, science, and art. Hackett (1988, November, p. 389) says:

> The essence of any culture is exhibited in its arts, and it is quite clear to me that the aesthetic dimension provides the strongest imprints of how learning is organized in any culture. . . .Our aesthetic experiences provide the key imprints of our existence, allowing us to react and be stimulated by our environment.

Huebner (1975, p. 227) writes:

> The aesthetic object, indeed educational activity, may be valued for the meanings that it reveals, and may be valued for its truth. Educational activity is symbolic

> of the meanings of the educator, as an individual and as a spokesman for the man [sic]. . . .the meaninglessness and routine of much educational activity today reflects the meaninglessness and routine of a mechanistic world order. . . Educational activity can symbolize the meanings felt and lived by educators.

The Ethical Curriculum

Creativity in human beings cannot surface and become evident in the face of humiliation and fear. Michaelis (1980, p. 72) discusses the phenomenon of "blocked creativity" as the result of "an impoverished emotional life. . . .a reluctance to 'let go.'" Creativity comes to fruition as it is supported and encouraged by Significant Others in our lives, the people who love us. Lying comfortably adjacent to the aesthetic curriculum is the ethical, both of them concerned with a pursuit of "truth" through phenomenological knowing. Huebner draws upon Buberian concepts of relationship to describe what is worthwhile in life and how truth emerges: the regard that human beings have for one another is "I-Thou" reflected in classroom interactions and, following, educational goals. Primary is the teacher-student relationship, as Buber asserts that everything about the world is learned through relationships between persons, usually child and caretaker. Portrait 1 says:

> . . . .I would say that the relationship [between my schooling and my thoughts] has to do with the teachers I had. When I think about certain critical moments in my thinking, it came through different teachers along the way and the relationship I would have with them and what they would help me think about. From kindergarten on I can, in two seconds, pull those people out. I think that more than anything that happened in the classroom in terms of lecture and tests and stuff, I think it was really important teachers, and them encouraging me to think about what I think. It had a lot to do with how I think now.

Portrait 8 says:

> Most of my learning had to do with learning about other people. I looked at how we all acted together: who was doing well, what the boundaries were, who was in trouble, how we seemed to "fit." We had special ed kids in the fourth grade I felt sorry for because they were objects of ridicule. There was cruelty in it I didn't like.

Portrait 5 says:

> What influenced me most as a thinker? I think: my experience, and people are part of my experience. My relationships. I believe that, if we are liked and respected, we will be believed and have authority in what we say. If we are not respected, anything we say will be discounted out of hand. I think relationship is primary in credibility of teachers and other people.

As the teacher regards the students as a "thou" rather than an "it," she enjoys the student as a fellow subject rather than object in the eternal present; she does not approach the student in a superior role of teacher or even from a footing of equality. She earns a child's respect and from it derives her authority. She comes to him or her in the sacredness of fraternity for the sharing of the fullness of life and its meanings, which is all there is and all there can be.

Portrait 6 says:

> Some of my teachers were great and some were terrible. It made all the difference.

Lest we grab these neglected curriculum models as panaceas to every problem in education, with the childish expectation that, once in place, they will maintain themselves and free us for other concerns, Eisner and Vallance (1974, pp. 14-17) offer cautionary advice. They warn against the fallacy of formalism, which contends that it is not important what children learn but how they learn it; the fallacy of content, which emphasizes some disciplines at the expense of the others; and the fallacy of universalism, which assumes that some content areas or ideas have universal significance to cultures and for all students everywhere in the world, regardless of their cultural and individual characteristics. All curriculum models contain values that address our experience here and will benefit students in varying degrees. (Conversely, any model can be used oppressively; some lend themselves more readily to this misuse than others.) As it is the plea of this discussion to incorporate the presently ignored

languages of the aesthetic and ethical as relevant to some, we would not, by doing so, completely abandon the technical, political, and scientific languages now in use. We look for incorporation, integration, and balance among them all. It is the function of critical theory to monitor the uses of commonly found models and to respond to their outcomes.

Portrait 6 says:

> . . . .an intellectual is a person who only uses their head for knowledge. . . .doesn't have an integration of the heart and sound and head, which some groups call "wisdom". . . .

How might feminist pedagogy rest with aesthetic and ethical curriculum languages? They share several vital connections. First, all value the individual learner and the importance of autobiography, "self-writing," in the language of learning. (Feminists see the autobiographical impulse as one's effort to find contextual locatedness both in the milieu of one's circumstances and in the progression of one's own life. From the perspective of "where we stand now," we make meaning of events and influences that define who we were and who we are.) Further, these curricular languages value each learner's knowledge, or the subjective, as a reality valid as any other. Biographies of individuals in history and the contributions they made to the beauty of the world become important as vehicles for teaching. Next, they honor non-verbal languages, such as is found in the arts and religion. Recognition is given to "hunch," or intuition, as a respectable way of knowing. And, finally, they all provide a line of defense against the political in its ascription of hierarchical importance to persons and ideas.

In its mission to destroy patriarchy, feminist pedagogy could question aesthetic and ethical curricula on the following points: first, how does creativity view agency, or the agentic impulse of man, considering that much of the earth's destruction has been predicated on a creative effort? When does creativity become interference,and its outcome a man-made change for the worse? Next, how is creative enterprise conducted

without the (inevitable?) judgment of its product; that is, when an activity or project is completed, how does a hierarchical notion of better vs. worse not follow? It is possible to do anything for the simple joy in doing it rather than for the merit, or usability, of its product? Indeed, upon what basis are things valued? Where and how do aesthetic and ethical curricula locate authority? (The problem of authority is a critical issue for women; it seems hardly advisable to trade one form of oppression for another.) What may we find in them that prevents patriarchy from co-opting classroom activity and reasserting itself once again? And, finally, how is community achieved in models of individual creativity and personal relationship? These issues deserve special attention as these alternative languages come into the service of critical and feminist pedagogies.

Implications for the Future

Schooling, like social reality, is not divinely ordained to be the way we know it, nor has its emergence in society been inevitable as the only system that could have been possible. Schooling can be changed, and it must be, if we are to educate students to save the planet, themselves, and our children. The processes we support today as a culture are inadequate at best, destructive at worst, hastening the depletion of the earth's resources and devaluing human life. If alternative, critical models of education could be taught to teacher trainees, an entire generation of the young would stand to change their thinking about the world through an expanded consciousness of "what it means to be human, and how we should live together." As women in the academy, we call for those models; we call for those changes.

I believe that it is here, in the intersection of these approaches (critical, feminist, aesthetic, and ethical), that our answers may be found. I believe that, if we can conceive of ourselves -- teachers -- as artists in life and in the classroom with the task of creating harmony, something whole and beautiful; if we can conceive of our

students as other artists with whom we enter into sacred relationship; if we can develop through critical theory a political sensitivity to the historical power relationships among people, conceiving of our society as a reality we have constructed for better or for worse, an artifact that can and must be reconstructed for our greater good; if we can conceive of the value of all human beings and their knowledges through feminist pedagogy (women, people of color, the poor, the unattractive, the handicapped, the sick, the elderly, the ethnically different), in whatever condition of our marginality, to merit respect by simple virtue of our membership in family; and if we can extend these conceptions to persons and cultures around the world, we can find a curriculum. And in that discovery, perhaps we will find redemption.

Afterward: Dissertation as Praxis

I study the map to see where I am, now, ten months and many miles away from my beginnings. I read and listened and typed and thought. When the "data" was collected, I hit the wall: it flew about my head in a blizzard and I knew I could never make sense of it, never organize it, never finish, after all my preliminary brazenness. Somehow, the linear path of construction provided by the writer's outline, that path which I have been so well trained to follow, became lost in the storm, so I ran in a panic. I escaped into an irritability toward my intimates, a teeth-grinding contention that, "What none of you seems to understand is that I can't do it. I'm not good enough. I don't have it in me." And I drove to the park, to my secret garden.

> It is my most beautiful time of day, this; when a summer's evening brings lengthening shadows, deepening colors to the world, and the lulling songs of locusts on a slight breeze. I sit in the roots of a tree that overlooks a baseball field and hear the kids cheering their teams, and I remember how I loved to play, once, when I was a kid and nothing mattered at the moment but scoring a run before it was so dark we couldn't see the ball. My mother expected us home.
>
> Ma, I miss you. I so wanted you to be proud of me and now you're gone and what's the point. I'm in a bind with this thing: it overwhelms me, and I don't know what to do. I miss my old faith, because there used to be a "Higher Power" who knew me and protected me and told me He would take care of everything and see that it turned out right. He was my champion and Final Word, and having Him felt so good.
>
> And now, I see Sobriety at the corner of my eye, smiling in slight contempt. She gets my attention by pressing against my bare legs in the

roughness of the tree roots, waving to me in the rustling leaves, calling my name from a baseball diamond. As always, she is in the here and now.

"Are you through feeling sorry for yourself yet?" she asks, bringing up my anger. I start to argue, but she waves me silent. "You are almost impossible, but I won't let you get away from me. You thrash about, complaining that you are abandoned, overlooking again your primary and most vital relationship, the one you have with me. The one we've made together over these years. Let us renew our vows: because we need each other, I promise that I will always be with you. I will not fail. You will find your way; it will be our way. You will never live to regret me or to apologize for me, because my love will never betray you. And your vow, Foolish One, is this: you will keep faith with this marriage and grow with it, coming to know its meaning through its changing seasons, from a honeymoon that was over long ago, through the middle years of resignation and boredom, to whatever is to come.

"I am life. I am your engagement with all you know of it, all you will ever know. Take the joy and laughter I offer you along with sorrow, but never regret, never despair. As I never regret having found you, or despair of you, so you must believe in me, your greatest lover, even when my face is hidden from you and the weight of our love is a yoke around your neck. As you have seen, so will you come to see again that in loving me you will find everything you need."

So it was, and so it is. So may it always be.

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APPENDIX

FEMINIST RESEARCH, AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

Introduction

"Feminist research," as such, falls into the already-contested sphere of human science known as sociology, though psychological and medical studies on women can be scrutinized from a feminist perspective. Many of the arguments regarding the legitimacy of sociology as scientific inquiry apply to feminist research as well; it seems reasonable to say that, until sociology itself is respected among academics as yielding important data by its own methods, feminist research can hardly expect to be embraced by traditionalists as scholarly and valid. Quoting Alan C. Kors, an associate professor of history as the University of Pennsylvania, and an attending member of the first major assembly of the National Association of Scholars, Mooney (1988, November 23, p. 1) reports, "Stand up to them!" he urged his colleagues. "They crumble. Say to the feminists [seeking separate courses in certain disciplines]. 'What do you mean by separate courses? You have no methodology.'"

Rather than accept the traditional paradigms of acquiring data, researchers of feminist issues contend firmly that a better paradigm, one more appropriate to the gathering of information about human beings, can be developed and defended on the basis of validity. Lather (1986, August, p. 258) says of feminist research:

> [It] is not monolithic: some researchers operate out of a conventional positivist paradigm, others out of an interpretive/phenomenological one, while others still -- an increasing number -- use a critical, praxis-oriented paradigm concerned both with producing emancipatory knowledge and with empowering the researched.

The research used in this study aspires to be categorized as critical, praxis-oriented, and concerned with the production of emancipatory knowledge and empowerment. While it is not formally "interpretive/phenomenological," it depends upon the interpretations that subjects make of their own lives, how they have reconstructed their pasts, and what has remained in their memories as "real," "true," or what "actually" happened. Such material is not adequately handled by positivist paradigms, but by reflection of the women interviewed. Therefore, this Appendix includes a preliminary discussion of hermeneutics, deconstructionism, and postmodernism as a theoretical foundation for the feminist model used here, as well as a description of the model itself.

Objections to Positivism

Commonly accepted and practiced methods of positivist research known today in the study of human beings have evolved from experiments with agriculture. As portions of farm land yielded crops of varying quality, all factors impacting the growth process were measured and analyzed carefully, with maximum quality and quantity the desired goal. As each factor from a poor yield was compared to the same factor from a good yield, errors could be identified and corrected for an improved total outcome. The whole was the sum of its parts: the task of the scientist was to isolate each part, study it, tinker with it, and put the whole thing back together. Around the turn of the century, business and industry adopted this model in time and motion studies designed to enhance production and profits from factory workers. As these studies were judged to be useful, educational research adopted empiricism as its lodestar toward Truth and the final word sanctioning procedure.

Human behavior and human nature, both of individuals and groups, fell under the analyses of empirical research by the assumptions that everything to be known in and of

the world was available through its methods: why people behave the way they do, how people learn, how the results of behavior and learning may be enhanced, much like the production from farms and factories. Being and learning were conceptualized as measurable behaviors, or commodities. Of course, there were concurrent models of research in use (the "case study," or the longitudinal study"), but none so "substantial" and widely (ideologically) promoted. Today, research funded by government and Big Business is almost exclusively positivist in nature, largely conducted in laboratories and situated within universities. Under the appellation of "scientific," this research is regarded as valid and its results as unequivocally True.

There are tacitly assumed corollaries that accompany this theory of validity that further characterize positivist research and render it generally inappropriate, by feminist reckoning, for the study of human be-ing (Gergen, 1989, p. 94):

1. The independence of scientist and subject. [Finding Truth is a function of the psychic and emotional distance between researcher and subject, known as "objectivity"; Objective Truth is contaminated by subjectivity. The interviewer must treat each subject in exactly the same manner in which he or she treats every other. As Oakley (1981, p. 41) says, "Getting involved with the people you interview is doubly bad: it jeopardizes the hard-won status of sociology as a science and is indicative of a form of personal degeneracy."]

2. The decontextualization of the subject matter from the field in which it is embedded, physically and historically. (The only way to arrive at the Truth about a person is to remove him or her to a sterile, unfamiliar setting for observation or questioning. Since cause-and-effect is ascertained in the laboratory, but may not be observed there, such a connection does not exist. There is no such thing as an unobserved reality. Furthermore, as only

observable responses to interviewers' questions are reported, individuals' reasons for behavior are left unplumbed.)

3. Value-neutral theory and practice. [Everything about the human person (as with rats) can be observed, measured, and reported with a numerical score as Truth available to and benefiting everyone. For instance, the positivist would claim that the genetic studies produced by Harvard University showing intelligence of children as inherited from parents is clinical verification of the ideological assumption that the sons of doctors should become doctors (because they inherited brains) and the sons of garbage collectors should become garbage collectors (because they inherited stupidity): this information is equally relevant to all.]

4. The independence of "facts" from the scientist. (Unlike other knowledge, scientific knowledge has no author: it floats independently until some researcher "discovers" it and reveals it to others. The accuracy of scientific facts depends upon finding Trust as a learned process: the better learned the process, the more reliable the Truth. Further, finding Truth is an externally applied operation perpetrated and regulated by the researcher, rather than an internally generated interpretation created and offered by the subject. In this way we see that facts, or truth, exist independently from everybody, scientist and subject as we..)

5. The superiority of the scientist over other people. (Specialized knowledge is accessible to only a few, which includes knowledge about oneself. Only the scientist can really "know" someone. Since scientists know the questions to ask, subjects have only responses: subjects do not have questions or reasons or varying degrees of certainty.

Feminists find these assumptions to be objectionable on several counts, primarily because they dehumanize and commodify the individual as subject. Additionally, results from empirical studies are often misleading as subjects' interpretations are not measureable with scores. Many subjects do not care to participate in research that reduces their interactions with life, often painful to report, to a number value. And, finally, feminists contend that the political component of all traditional "scientific" research (its initial questions, hypotheses, and conclusions) determines the interpretation and use of findings: results can be and are used to suit the purposes of studies. As Kuhn said, the trust of a thing always lies just beyond the limits of the paradigm. Scientific research usually (if not always) shows us what we want to know, supporting ideological positions already valued, yielding only new pathways to established outcomes. Feminists and critical theorists recommend an alternative model of researching the lives of human beings that is interactive, personal, and probing. Gergen (1989, p. 94) describes it this way:

> Feminist-inspired research would endeavor to recognize that scientists, subjects, and "facts" are all interconnected, involved in reciprocal influences, and subject to interpretation and linguistic constraints. In addition, scientific endeavors would be treated as value-laden and would be formed with specific value orientations in mind. This research approach would treat scientists as participants in the research project along with the subjects of the research and not as superior beings who maintain a knowledge monopoly among themselves.

The quest for such a research model is founded upon a philosophical base that is fundamentally disposed to the ascribed traits of the female: her "nature," her point of view, her values. It is the feminist alternative to the masculist, positivist paradigm of traditional scientific research. Generally, we call it "Interpretive Inquiry."

Interpretive Inquiry

Interpretive inquiry is a form of "qualitative" research that seeks to understand the "lived world" of ourselves and others. Its primary questions asks how we make

meaning of our lives rather than, What is the Truth? This research values the subjective and the inter-subjective: as stories are shared, both interviewer and subject learn about themselves and we are, as a result, re-created and empowered to re-create. The interviewer listens to the sense another makes of his or her life and then makes sense of that interpretation. Interpretive inquiry is rooted in certain philosophical traditions.

Hermeneutics. Modern hermeneutics is founded on the art of interpretation. What began as a "study and collection of specialized rules of interpretation for the use of theologians or jurists" (Mueller-Vollmer, 1985, ix) in the analysis of sacred texts were adopted by Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and his colleagues for the interpretation of other classic works. Its principles were applied to history and literature. These "second wave" hermeneuticists were concerned with understanding anything as a part of its whole. Droysen (1987, p. 35) says, "The part is understood from the part in which it finds expression." This conceptualization came to be known as the Hermeneutic Circle. As social science drew hermeneutics into its studies, the "Hermeneutic Spiral" (Mehan & Wood, 1975, p. 192) was developed. It presents a model echoing Dewey for making meaning of the activities and events of our lives, and is particularly helpful for us as educators, researchers, and individuals trying to understand our own thoughts and behaviors.

Mehan and Wood (1975, p. 193) offer a "visual metaphor to describe the interpretive model:

> Understanding is like night. Interpretation is like day. People's meaningful lives spiral into the unknown like the cycle of nights and days. Any particular day has an existence independent of the previous night. But, at once, it is dependent upon the substance of that previous night, and upon the totality of nights and days before the most recent night. . . .In the spiral of night and day, there are two penumbras where the blend into each other. At dawn, understanding -- our night -- drifts into interpretation. At dusk, interpretation -- our day -- shades into understanding. These two passages provide the motor for the theory. They are

> the places of mystery for ethnomethodology. It is in these two areas that people make their quantum leaps into meaningfulness. Ethnomethodologists have called dawn "indexicality," and dusk "reflexivity."

As key concepts in this paradigm, indexicality refers to the "relations of interpretations to prior understandings"; reflexivity refers to the mind aware of itself in thought, or thinking. Purpel (class lecture, 1988, spring semester) illustrates the metaphor more fully: at night, an individual meditatively reviews the events of his or her lived day and arrives at some understanding of them. This phase of the Spiral is known as "reflection." The understanding that one gleans lays the platform, or standard, of behavior of the following day. At dawn, one envisions activities based on that platform of understanding; at midday, one interprets them into activities (the "praxis" phase of the Spiral); and at dusk, one begins to process those activities into new understandings. These "new understandings are the old ones of the night before, but now amended by a day's experience.

The Spiral continues toward a "horizon," which includes all previous understandings and interpretations of those understandings up to that moment. Of course, this metaphor is not intended to be a literal outline of a time-locked process (reflection may likely occur only in moments and frequently during the day), but rather as a loose description of the ebb and flow of experience and thought, the real and the ideal. It is paradigmatic of the relationship of theory and experience, showing how one grows out of the other, how one impacts and defines the other, and how progress toward a horizon occurs.

Emancipation

The Italian social theorist, Antonio Gramsci, encarcerated between 1929 and 1935 for his political views, contributed an emphasis to the significance of daily activity in the world. He underscored the need for an increasing realization of the

importance of what one chooses to do (and not to do) as an interpretation of belief and commitment. He recommended that, through the formation of progressive groups, people would become more aware of the ways in which their activities made their ideas real; that their perception of daily activity as significant, rather than mindless and of no consequence, would be empowering. One's perceived connection between theory and praxis is a result of effective education and, according to Gramsci, is most successful within the context of a group. Lather (1986, pp. 257-258) describes research as praxis as well, pointing out that it is in the reflection of one's life and interpretation of it for the benefit of the researcher that one makes sense of it. The researcher listens to the subject and expands his or her own experience to include that of the speaker, each learning but both learning together.

Postmodern Interpretation

Originally, "Postmodernism" was coined by the arts (architecture, painting, and dance) to describe art forms that grew out of the "modern" schools, modes of expression that were clearly defined by specific characteristics. Used today, Postmodernism refers to the practices of pillaging the past and re-interpreting old texts in light of new ideas. As an example, historians and biographers take any text under consideration and deconstruct it by language, the context in which it was written, an analysis of what was not said by the author (as well as what was), or by contemporary values.

Biographies of women, both living and dead, are written and rewritten to give their lives and their circumstances new meaning. Rose (1989) calls her style of biography "postmodern because she relies on facts that have already been established and concentrates her energies on 'the way those facts are put together, changing the vision of something'" (Mathews & Beachy, 1989, November 6, p. 83). This present trend of reinterpretation strengthens interpretive inquiry as a legitimate method of research. In

the study of oppressed and silenced groups, who have relatively little written history to give them identity, it contributes to the reconstruction of their histories through discovery.

Ehrlich (1975, pp. 9-10) quotes an anonymous poem describing women as such a group, searching for a past:

> Our history has been stolen from us.
> Our heroes died in childbirth,
> from peritonitis
> overwork
> oppression
> from bottled-up rage.
> Our geniuses were never taught to
> read or write.
> We must invent a past adequate
> to our ambitions.
> We must create a future adequate
> to our needs.

Ehrlich goes on to warn researchers of the pitfalls inherent in such an approach:

> When we <u>invent</u> a past instead of discovering it, we substitute wishful thinking for reality. . . .If we are truly oriented towards social transformation, the past is useful primarily for what it can tell us about designing the future; and any future that will be genuinely "adequate to our needs" must be grounded in fact, not in myth.

Postmodern interpretation accepts out of hand the premise that the making of any "fact" or any "history" lies in a point of view, a creative selection of elements from an infinite variety of choices, the recounting of them through language, and movement

toward a particular end. It matters less whether or not events "actually" occurred than the impact their perception have on human lives. Consequently, the hermeneutic guiding a tale makes it potentially degrading or empowering, both for groups and for individuals discovering the truths of their pasts.

Feminist Model

There is no one "feminist" model of research, as has been noted. The one used in this study can be described as "qualitative," as the depth and nature of findings are more important to its fundamental question than categorical numbers along baselines; "interpretative," in that it belongs to the "whole family of approaches to participant observational research" (Erickson, 1986, p. 119); "ethnographic," in that its subjects are a particular population (women) who have a particular challenge grouping them together; "praxis-oriented" (Lather, 1986, p. 258) in that its ultimate goal is a critical point of view and a changed meeting with the world, on the part of all participants; and "feminist" because its hope is to better the lot of women, to "lead in the direction of radical transformation of the existing order, not accommodation with it. . . to maintain or widen class differences among women" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 15). It is more accurately described by these characteristics than a definition.

Politics of Feminist Research

Casey (1988, pp. 61-62) points to a distinction between those researchers and research projects that seek information from the elite and "those who wish to give voices to groups largely ignored by traditional (privileged, white, male, academic) historians." She says that "impetus for the recent burgeoning of oral history has come from researchers connected to socialist. . . .and feminist. . . .projects." This indicates that a critique of our capitalist society, including the "realities and relationships that are hidden beneath a superficial consciousness," has been and is at the roots of feminist

research. The reason for this is that capitalism has no criticism of itself beyond how well it does capitalism: Marxist criticism (or socialism, for that matter) looks at the circumstances of people living in groups or nations and critiques them for their inequities and the causes of those inequities. Whether or not one claims to be "Marxist," or "socialist," it is clear that our notions of superiority and inferiority among people are based on economic differences between them; and visions of destroying those differences require some understanding of the structures and agencies of capitalism. Hooks (1984, p. 58) goes so far as to say, "Until women accept the need for redistribution of wealth and resources in the United States and work towards the achievement of that end, there will be no bonding between women that transcends class."

Techniques of Feminist Research

Casey (1988, pp. 59-61) discussed the "tension between the objective and subjective" as the central challenge to interpretive inquiry. Considering that "research" demands validity, the question to methodology is, how does one obtain valid data ("objective," exact) through conversations ("subjective," inexact) with women? Oakley (1981, chap. 2) sees the problem as a contradiction in terms, and that the concern for "objectivity" is a bogus issue since there is no such thing. Furthermore, interviewer and subject enter into a conspiracy as women (if true feminist research is conducted, and by a woman), characterized by friendship. However, within this research paradigm, a subject who can say, "This or that happened to me and it changed my life in this way. . . ." is yielding hard data of the sort that the researcher needs. Similarly, a subject who assiduously avoids a question or omits a part of her life that is directly relevant to a researcher's question is yielding hard data also.

One objection to interpretive inquiry by positivists is that subjects, with fallible memories, forget information that researchers are seeking. However, since

knowledge is defined as that which we produce (and hold) as a result of our experience, and then incorporate into further experience, it is significant to note what has been retained and what has been released. The sort of information that has meaning to the subject is the information that has value to the researcher.

Another objection to the validity of interpretive methodology concerns the possible insertion of the researcher's personality into the interview, and the subject's possible anxiety to please. Interviewing is an art that is refined by practice, however, and reticent interviewers can learn to be more outgoing over the course of hours spent in interviewing, as more gregarious ones can learn to listen better. Further, a subject's desire to please can be (and should be) perceived by the researcher and accommodated by additional taping sessions, after the subject feels at ease and on safer ground, or by questions that ask for the same information in different ways. Though these techniques and others for putting people at ease have been developed fully in the counseling literature, it must be noted that they apply to the masculist interview paradigm, which insists on a formalized situation characterized by distance and personal non-involvement.

Feminist research is not committed to that paradigm. It is best conducted in an informal situation characterized by closeness and mutuality. The interview process includes an atmosphere of trust, comfortable conversation, the researcher's desire to elicit information (both explicit and implied) from the subject that shows the sense she makes of her own life, and a resulting expanded consciousness of both from this sharing by friends.

Results

Oakley (1981, chap. 2) reports that the extent of her personal involvement with subjects has netted her about ten good friends. Considering that she has queried several

hundred women, it sounds as if the chances of finding relationships among interviewees are about the same as finding them in the general population. In other words, subjectivity can hardly be termed a "problem" to the researcher who prefers to be unencumbered by friendships encountered "on the job," but encouraging to one who would enjoy the freedom to develop a friendship as its potential became evident.

Data can be manipulated by a researcher to support whatever hypothesis he or she cares to legitimate. But qualitative researchers make that charge against all data, however obtained, noting the distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative" studies to be a false one. True feminist research, guided by a hermeneutic of empowerment, will be, by definition, conscientiously undertaken and carefully done, open to scrutiny and challenge in every phase, giving voice to women's experiences and their lives that they may eventually be improved.

As feminist researchers persevere in their efforts to make public the circumstances and conditions of the lives of the silenced, raising consciousness of them among women and men through abundant publication, the ultimate result of feminist research is similar to critical and feminist pedagogies. It is inseparable from its philosophical base and its methodology. It is simply the dignity of women's lives and the value of their knowledge.